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ABSTRACT 
The theory of compensating differentials asserts that workers facing undesirable work 
conditions, such as night shift work, should receive compensating wage differentials.  The theory 
assumes that workers can easily find jobs with desirable characteristics; thus, compensating 
wages are necessary to induce workers to take jobs with undesirable characteristics.  This 
dissertation considers a variation of the theory of compensating differentials in which labor 
markets are weak.  If workers are more likely to work night shifts in areas with weak economic 
conditions and if firms are less likely to offer compensating differentials for night shift work in 
areas with weak economic conditions, weak regional economies may lead to smaller 
compensating differentials for night shift work.   
Using NLSY79 data from 1990-2000, this paper employs an endogenous switching 
regression model to analyze wages of day and night shift workers and shift choice.  The model is 
estimated using both the Lee two-step method and maximum likelihood.  Two measures of local 
economic conditions, the local unemployment rate and the state leading index, are used.  The 
models provide evidence that shift differentials and local economic conditions significantly 
impact shift choice.  Of the two local economic condition variables used in the analysis, the 
leading index is a stronger predictor of shift choice.  This paper develops a new method of 
analyzing the impact of the interaction between the shift differential and local economic 
conditions on shift choice, providing limited evidence that compensating differentials for night 
shift work may be lower when local economies are weak.  The calculated interaction effects are 
small.  Estimated wage premiums for night shift work are negative, and are approximately half 
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of day wages in the 1990 cross-section.  Estimated wage differentials for night shift work are 
smaller in pooled cross-section analysis, ranging from roughly 2% to 11% below day wages.  
Analyzing cross-sections over time indicates that shift differentials were below day wages 
throughout most of the 1990’s but in 2000, night wages were approximately 7-11% higher than 
day wages.  Overall, the results provide evidence that individuals take both the size of the wage 
premium and local labor market conditions into account when selecting working hours.    
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
1.1 Introduction 
Workers who face difficult working conditions are often compensated for this 
inconvenience by higher wages.  Labor economics literature refers to this phenomenon as the 
theory of compensating differentials.  This theory assumes that workers can easily find jobs with 
desirable characteristics; thus, compensating wages are necessary to induce workers to take jobs 
with undesirable characteristics.  This dissertation considers a variation of the theory of 
compensating differentials in which labor markets are weak and workers have difficulty finding 
jobs.  In weak economies, employers have the advantage of a larger number of potential 
employees and workers are more likely to take jobs that would otherwise be undesirable.  Poor 
economic conditions may thus lower the compensating wage differential offered for undesirable 
work conditions.   
Shift workers work during non-standard work hours; thus it has been hypothesized that 
these workers are motivated to accept shift work because of higher wages.  Compensating wage 
differentials are commonly analyzed using wage regressions, with worker wages modeled as a 
function of worker characteristics and job characteristics.  This dissertation uses a more general 
econometric model to analyze shift wages and selection into shift work, improving upon 
previous studies by including indicators of labor market strength, the local unemployment rate 
and the state leading index, in the analysis.  Shift selection is modeled as a function of local 
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economic conditions and shift differentials.  Three major questions are considered in the 
analysis:  
What is the impact of local economic conditions on shift choice? 
What is the impact of the shift differential on shift choice? 
How does the impact of the shift differential on shift selection depend on local economic 
conditions? 
In the empirical analysis, we find evidence that shift selection is impacted by shift 
differentials and local economic conditions.  We also find weak support for the theory that 
compensating wages for night shift work have a smaller impact on selection into night shifts in 
areas with weak economic conditions.  Thus, in these labor markets, compensating wage 
differentials for night shift work may be lower.  Estimated wage premiums for night shift work 
are negative, but increase over time in the sample, and eventually become positive in the last 
year of the data that is considered.   Shift differentials are smaller in pooled cross-section 
analysis relative to cross-section analysis.    
The dissertation is organized as follows.  The remainder of Chapter I provides 
background on the theory of compensating differentials and a discussion of how this theory is 
applied to shift work.   To motivate the econometric model employed in the current analysis, 
trends in shift work and the inconvenience of shift work are also examined.  A brief review of 
data on shift differentials is also provided.  The introduction concludes with a discussion of how 
the current research contributes to the literature.  Chapter II reviews related literature, Chapter III 
examines the data used in the current analysis, and Chapter IV explains the econometric models.  
Chapter V provides a summary of the empirical results, and Chapter VI concludes.    
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1.2 Motivation 
1.2.1 The Theory of Compensating Differentials  
The study of wage differences among workers is fundamental to labor economics.  
Workers are paid differently not only because all workers have different characteristics and 
different levels of skills and abilities, but also because the jobs they perform vary.  This paper 
considers wage differences between day and night shift workers.  The economic motivation for 
this study is the theory of compensating differentials.  Also known as the theory of equalizing 
differences, the theory of compensating differentials refers to the idea that wage differentials 
equalize the total monetary and nonmonetary advantages and disadvantages among work 
activities and among workers themselves (Rosen 1986).  In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith 
first proposed the idea that working conditions could impact wages and worker preferences for 
jobs.  Jobs differ in the amenities that they offer; thus firms offering amenities should pay lower 
wage rates while firms offering disamenities should offer higher wages.  Smith believed that 
such compensating differentials equated “the whole of advantages and disadvantages of different 
employment.”  The main implication of the theory of compensating differentials is that 
conclusions on labor market outcomes should be based upon both wages and non-wage job 
characteristics, not solely upon wages.   
Rosen (1986) provides a more detailed treatment of the economics of compensating 
differentials.  According to Rosen’s theory of equalizing differences, the wage paid is “a sum of 
two conceptually distinct transactions, one for labor services and worker characteristics and 
another for job attributes.”  Firms purchase labor services and worker characteristics and sell job 
amenities/disamenities.  Workers sell labor services and personal characteristics and purchase 
job attributes.  Wage premiums are paid by firms in order to attract workers to accept job 
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disamenities.  Workers pay a price for positive job attributes, and this price is subtracted from 
their wage.  Rosen emphasizes that the equilibrium achieved under the theory of equalizing 
differences, unlike the traditional supply and demand labor market equilibrium, matches specific 
workers with specific firms.  Because the allocation of labor is non-random, Rosen believes that 
the theory of compensating differentials is “the fundamental long-run market equilibrium 
construct in labor economics.”  A simple economic model of the theory of compensating 
differentials is included in Section 1.2.1.1 as applied to shift work. 
The theory of equalizing differences requires rather strong assumptions including perfect 
mobility, homogenous worker preferences, perfect information, and efficient labor markets. 
Adam Smith qualified conditions necessary for the theory of equalizing differences to hold. 
“This [the presence of equalizing differences] would at least be the case in a society where things 
were left to follow their natural course, where there was perfect liberty, and where every man 
was perfectly free both to choose what occupation he thought proper, and to change it as often as 
he thought proper” (Smith 1776).  The theory of equalizing differences holds that workers are 
perfectly mobile, able to choose occupations and change jobs as often as they please, an 
assumption that is not applicable to the true labor market.   The theory additionally assumes that 
all market participants have perfect information.  Firms are aware of all worker characteristics 
and workers are able to identify and evaluate job amenities and disamenities.  This assumption is 
also unrealistic, thus the theory cannot be expected to explain all variation in wages.   
The theory of equalizing differences also holds that the size and sign of the wage 
premium depends on the underlying distribution of worker tastes and on the demand for certain 
job characteristics.  For example, if all workers agree that a certain job characteristic is 
undesirable, that is, if worker preferences are homogenous, the compensating differential should 
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be positive.  However, if some workers actually prefer that job characteristic and the demand for 
such workers is low, the compensating differential may be negative.  The existence of negative 
compensating differentials is highly relevant to the results of the current analysis.  A supply and 
demand model for determining both positive and negative compensating differentials is included 
in Section 1.2.1.1.  Heterogeneous worker preferences may additionally account for some of the 
inconclusive results obtained in previous studies of compensating differentials.  These studies are 
discussed further in Section 2.3.1.   
A final assumption of the theory of equalizing differences is that labor markets are 
efficient and quantity of labor supplied equals quantity of labor demanded.  Labor markets are 
tight, with little to no unemployment.  Compensating wages are thus necessary to equalize 
disadvantages and advantages of employment and attract workers.  However, when an excess 
supply of workers exists, the theory of equalizing differences is weakened.  The idea that the size 
and possibly the sign of compensating differentials may be impacted by local labor market 
conditions is a primary motivation of the current analysis.  A more detailed treatment of the 
relationship between labor market efficiency and compensating differentials is included in 
Section 1.2.2.  
Applications of the theory of equalizing differences are widespread in economics 
literature.  Models evaluating compensating differentials frequently address selectivity bias since 
workers sort themselves into different occupations and because firms choose to offer certain 
amenities or disamenities.  For a review of several important studies, see Rosen (1986).  Notable 
applications include studies of compensating differentials for job risks, undesirable working 
conditions, city and regional amenities, work schedules, fringe benefits, and human capital.  Due 
to the nature of the current analysis, a more detailed discussion of studies related to undesirable 
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working conditions is found in Section 2.3.1.1.   
 
1.2.1.1 The Theory of Compensating Differentials Applied to Shift Work 
One job characteristic for which compensating differentials may arise is work-time 
scheduling, including shift work.  Shift workers often work during non-standard shifts such as 
evening, night, rotating, split, or irregular shifts.  A more detailed description of these shifts is 
provided in Section 3.2.1.  Non-standard work hours are often regarded as a job disamenity, and 
workers may require a compensating differential to be induced to accept shift work.   Previous 
studies have found evidence of compensating wage differentials for shift work.  See Section 
2.3.1.2 for a review of this literature.   
Rosen (1986) includes a discussion of the theory of compensating differentials applied to 
working hours and shift work that provides the motivation for the current research.  Rosen notes 
that “there is no reason to suppose that a single wage will clear the labor market at all 
conceivable hours choices by all workers.  Instead, it is logically necessary to consider each 
work-hours opportunity as a separate labor market.”   In other words, each shift can be treated as 
a different market with its own wage.  Lewis (1969) provides evidence that employers are not 
indifferent to the number of hours worked by employees because some tasks require teamwork 
and because there are quasi-fixed hiring costs.  Additionally, firms may be motivated to operate 
multiple shifts in order to maximize capacity utilization.  Thus, depending on production goals 
and the underlying cost structure, firms will provide different combinations of shifts and wages, 
and workers will select the firm that offers the most desirable combination.  Participation in shift 
work is not random, thus a selection model is the proper method for examining shift work wages. 
Following Rosen (1986) and Borjas (2008) a simple theoretical model of compensating 
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differentials is now applied to the current analysis of night shift work.  Define a worker’s utility 
function as 
Utility = f (W, night shift) 
where a worker’s utility depends upon both W, wages, and on night shift, an indicator of whether 
or not the individual works the night shift.  The marginal utility of income is assumed to be 
positive since higher wages should increase utility, holding constant night shift.  The marginal 
utility of night shift is assumed to be negative if workers dislike night shift employment.  The 
marginal utility of night shift is assumed to be positive, however, if some workers actually prefer 
and enjoy night shift work.  This possibility is explored in Figure 1.3. 
 First, we analyze how compensating differentials arise by assuming that night shift work 
is undesirable for all workers.  The indifference curves representing workers’ choices between 
day and night employment are upward sloping since workers prefer higher wages but consider 
night shift work to be an economic “bad.”  Following Borjas (2008), Figure 1.1 considers 
possible indifference curves for one worker.  At point X the worker receives a day wage of Wd 
and utility of U0 and is a day worker, as indicated by the horizontal axis.  The only way to 
persuade this worker to work a night shift and hold the worker’s utility constant at the same time 
is to increase the worker’s wage.  This need for increased wages is the motivating factor for the  
theory of equalizing differences.   
The indifference curves in Figure 1.1 help to illustrate the necessary size of the 
compensating differential for night shift work by considering three possible wages for night shift 
work.  For example, if night shift work pays a wage of Ws’, this worker would still prefer day 
shift work since utility from working the day shift, U0, would be higher than utility from 
working the night shift, U1’.  If however, night shift work pays a wage of Ws’’, the worker 
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Figure 1.1 Indifference Curves Relating Wage and Night Shift Employment 
 
 
 
would gain higher utility, U1’’, from night work.  If night shift work pays a wage of  s, this 
worker would be indifferent between day and night work, as illustrated by achieving the same 
level of utility, U0, in both day and night work.  At  s, this worker has been exactly 
compensated for the inconvenience of working a night shift.  Thus, W =  s- d, is the 
worker’s reservation wage, or the shift differential that must be offered in order to induce this 
worker to switch from day to night work.  The size of W necessary to induce a worker to work 
a night shift depends on a worker’s preferences for night shift work.  The less a worker dislikes 
night work, the flatter the individual’s indifference curves and the smaller the shift differential. 
The market for night shift work is shown in Figure 1.2.  Maintaining the assumption that  
all workers dislike night shift work, the wage differential for night shift work, W =  s- d, 
must be positive.  At Wmin , the worker who dislikes night shift work the least is compensated 
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Figure 1.2 The Market Compensating Differential for Night Shift Work 
 
 
 
enough to induce the worker to accept night shift work.  The supply curve for night shift work 
slopes upward since more workers accept night shifts as the wage differential between 
night and day shift rises.  Since fewer firms offer night shifts as the compensating wage they 
must pay for night shift work rises, the demand curve for night shift work is downward sloping.  
The market wage differential for night shift work is (Ws-Wd)*, and it equates supply and 
demand.  S* is the equilibrium number of night shift workers.  Borjas (2008) notes that it is 
important not to interpret the market wage differential as the average reservation wage for night 
shift work.  Instead, it should be interpreted as the wage differential required to attract the 
marginal worker into night shift work.  At the market wage differential, all workers except for 
the marginal worker are overcompensated for accepting night shift work. 
  An important modification of the above market equilibrium occurs in the event that some 
workers actually derive utility from working at night.  In this case, the reservation wage for night 
shift work is negative.  Figure 1.3 indicates the market for night shift work when some workers 
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Figure 1.3 Negative Market Equilibrium Night Shift Wage Differential 
 
 
 
prefer night shifts.  The supply curve depicts the presence of negative reservation wages for 
those who consider it a job amenity to work at night.  For the market equilibrium wage 
differential to be negative, demand for night shift work must be relatively small.  For example, 
firms may not desire to incur the costs of operating a night shift, or weak economic conditions 
may lead firms to cancel night shifts.  In this case, the market demand curve intersects the market 
supply curve at a negative compensating differential for night shift work.  The firms who did 
require the use of night shift work would hire workers who prefer to work at night.  The models 
provided above indicate an important implication of the theory of compensating differentials: the 
size and sign of the compensating differential rely on worker preferences.  
 
1.2.2 Impact of Local Economic Conditions on Compensating Differentials 
 As mentioned previously, an implicit assumption of the theory of equalizing differences 
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 is that labor markets are efficient.  In order to attract workers to accept jobs, firms must offer 
compensating differentials.  However, when labor markets are weak and more workers are 
seeking jobs, the need to offer compensating differentials is reduced.  This caveat of the theory 
of equalizing differences provides the impetus for the current research.  This paper seeks to 
determine if local labor market conditions impact the size of compensating differentials for night 
shift work.  The local unemployment rate and the state leading index are included in hedonic 
wage regressions to serve as measures of labor market efficiency. 
 Bender and Mridha (2011) provide the basic model for the effect of the local 
unemployment rate on compensating wages.  They note that the inclusion of the unemployment 
rate in hedonic wage regressions and studies of compensating differentials is not new; however, 
the focus of previous research was upon determining the presence of compensating differentials 
for job insecurity.  A review of this literature is provided in Section 2.3.3.  Bender and Mridha’s 
research is innovative in that it attempts to determine the impact of the local unemployment rate 
on the size of compensating differentials for work conditions.  Their research seeks to isolate the 
interaction between the local unemployment rate and the compensating wage differential for 
injury risk on the job.  DeBeaumont and Nsiah (2010) analyze the impact of local unemployment 
rates on compensating wages for shift work.  A more detailed account of Bender and Mridha’s 
research as well as its relationship with the work of DeBeaumont and Nsiah is included in 
Section 2.3.3.  This dissertation builds upon these papers, employing a more general econometric 
model to explore possible interactions between the local unemployment rate and the 
compensating wage differential for night shift work.  In addition to the local unemployment rate, 
interactions between the shift differential and an alternate measure of local economic conditions, 
the leading index, are considered.    
12 
 
1.3 Trends in Shift Work 
An investigation of shift work would be incomplete without considering the prevalence 
of shift work in America.  According to BLS estimates, the percentage of the population working 
during non-standard hours increased from 15.9% (11.6 million workers) in 1985 to 17.7% (21 
million workers) in 2004.  Today, approximately one-fifth of all employed Americans work 
largely on evening, night, or rotating shifts (McMenamin 2007).  Presser and Ward (2011) note 
that “widespread employment at nonstandard times is a significant social phenomenon,” and that 
“much attention has been paid to the number of hours which Americans work, but the issue of 
which hours Americans work has generally gone unnoticed.”   This dissertation is therefore 
relevant, because it adds to the small but growing literature on work during nonstandard hours.  
Shift work is formally defined as a work schedule that occurs outside regular daytime hours.  
Shift work helps firms achieve continuous production and more efficient capital utilization.  
Because many industries operate at non-standard hours, other services have increased their 
operating hours to accommodate shift workers.  The increase in expanded-time hours from 
grocery stores, restaurants, and gas stations has allowed for new job markets for shift workers.  
Rosa and Colligan (1997) describe the phenomenon of a “24-hour society” accurately: “Because 
there are so many shift workers, society now needs more shift workers.” 
The current analysis focuses on a comparison of day and night shift workers.  Day shift 
workers typically work between the hours of 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. while night shift workers 
typically work between the hours of 9:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m.  Despite the widespread nature of 
shift work, the data available on shift workers is relatively sparse.  A majority of the data on shift 
work in America is provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Surveys examining shift work 
have been conducted periodically for the BLS by the Census Bureau as special supplements to 
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the Current Population Survey.  The most recent supplements on shift work are available from 
1985, 1997, 2001, and 2004.  Mellor (1986), Beers (2000), and McMenamin (2007) author 
detailed BLS reports from the 1985, 1997, and 2004 CPS supplements, respectively, that provide 
a clear comparison of trends in shift work during a twenty year time span.  Although information  
is available on day, evening, night, rotating, irregular and other shifts, the present discussion will 
only consider findings relevant to day and night shifts.  The following pages consider two 
categories of CPS data: general trends and reasons for selecting shift work. 
 
1.3.1 Demographic Characteristics 
It is necessary to consider what worker characteristics might determine participation in  
night shift work.  The CPS supplements provide statistics on shift work for different categories 
of workers, classifying workers based upon sex, race, sector of work, and marital status.   
Table 1.1 details the percentage of each of these categories working day and night shifts.   
 
Table 1.1 Percentage of Workers by Category Working Day and Night Shifts, CPS Supplements 
 
 
Category 1985 1997 2001 2004 1985 1997 2001 2004
All Workers  84.1* 82.9 84.8 82.3    2.7** 3.5 3.3 3.1
Men 82.2 80.5 82.9 80.9      3.0*** 4 3.6 3.5
Women 87 86.1 87.3 83.9 2.3 2.8 3 2.6
Ethnicity
    White 84.7 83.6 85.8 83.3 2.6 3.2 3 2.9
    Black 80.1 78.5 79.3 76.8 3.5 5.5 5 4.4
    Hispanic 84.6 83.6 84.3 81.9 2.5 3.2 3.4 3.5
Sector
    Private Sector 83.5 82.3 84.1 2.9 3.5 3.5
    Public Sector 87.2 86.1 88.3 2 3.2 2.5
Marital Status
   Single 80.9 78.2 80.8 3.1 4.2 3.8
   Married 85.7 85.1 87.4 2.4 3.1 3
***For example, calculated as total # of male workers working night shifts in 1985 / total # of male workers in 1985.
% of Category Working Day Shift % of Category Working Night Shift
Sector and Marital Status were not reported in the BLS report in 2004.  The number of individuals in the sample by
year are as follows:   1985: 73,395 workers.  1997: 90,549 workers.  2001: 99,631 workers.  2004: 123,167 workers.
*For example, calculated as total# of workers working day shifts in 1985 / total # of workers in 1985.  
**For example, calculated as total # of workers working night shifts in 1985 / total # of workers in 1985.
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Overall, these percentages remained relatively stable from 1985 to 2004; only slight variations 
are observed.  The first row in Table 1.1 indicates the percentage of all workers in the CPS 
sample that were employed on day or night shifts.  From 1985 to 2004, employment in day shifts 
ranged from 82.3% to 84.8% of workers while employment in night shifts ranged from 2.7% to 
3.5% of workers.  The incidence of night shift work was highest in 1997.  In years with lower 
percentages of day workers there were higher percentages of night workers, indicating that some 
workers may have switched from day to night work in these years.  Although the data do not 
allow for a year by year comparison, the fluctuations in the percentages of night shift workers 
provide a hint of the cyclical nature of shift work.  In each supplement year, men were more  
likely than women to be night shift workers.  Additionally, blacks were more likely to work night 
shifts than whites or Hispanics.  The incidence of night shifts was also higher for single workers.  
Higher percentages of private sector workers were employed on night shifts when compared to 
public sector workers.   
Participation in night shift work is also partially determined by a worker’s industry and 
occupation.   The 1985, 1997, and 2001 CPS reports provide detailed information on the 
percentage of workers in each major occupational and industry group by shift.   These CPS 
supplements use the 1980 and 1990 occupational and industrial classification system, which are 
similar and easily comparable.  Detailed data on industry and occupation by shift are not  
available from the 2004 report.  Additionally, for the 2004 survey, the CPS switched from using 
the 1990 occupation and industrial classification system to using the 2002 occupation and 
industrial classification system; therefore, it is difficult to compare the 2004 CPS supplement’s 
contents to those from 1985, 1997, and 2001.  Only data from the 1985, 1997, and 2001 
supplements are included in the current discussion.  These data are displayed in Table 1.2 and 
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Table 1.2 Percentage of Workers by Industry & Occupation on Day and Night Shifts, CPS Supplements 
 
 
 
 
provide information on the percent distribution of each industry and occupation between day and 
night shifts.  During the three survey years, the use of night shift work was most prevalent in the 
non-durable manufacturing industry.  There were also relatively high percentages of durable  
manufacturing workers employed on night shifts, with manufacturing likely requiring night shift   
work to ensure continuous production processes.  Night shift work was also more common in the 
transportation, retail trade, personal services, business and repair services, and entertainment and 
recreation services industries.  These industries have operations that take place outside the 
traditional daytime hours.  Additionally, the professional and related services category features 
Industry Category 1985 1997 2001 1985 1997 2001
Agriculture 89.4* 93.1 92.2    2.2** 0.3 1.2
Mining 78.1 74.6 74.4 1.6 2.3 4.6
Construction 97.5 95.9 96.7 0.4 0.2 0.4
Non-Durable Manufacturing 79.1 76.0 76.3 4.4 7.9 8.4
Durable manufacturing 84.0 83.0 83.4 2.5 5.0 4.9
Transportation, Communications, & Public Utilities 79.4 73.8 78.2 3.5 3.3 3.5
Wholesale Trade 91.9 89.7 92.0 2.1 2.6 2.0
Retail Trade 73.7 71.1 73.0 3.7 3.6 4.1
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 93.9 94.8 94.8 1.0 0.7 0.5
Business and Repair Services 87.4 86.0 88.7 2.4 3.6 3.2
Personal Services 74.0 74.9 79.3 3.8 4.1 2.1
Entertainment and Recreation Services 66.6 63.9 71.0 2.2 2.8 4.2
Professional and Related Services 81.3 86.0 87.6 4.4 3.3 3.3
Public Administration 87.2 86.1 88.3 2.0 3.2 2.5
Occupation Category
Managerial and Professional Specialties 91.4 90.4 92.8 1.2 1.3 1.2
Technical 84.5 80.4 83.9 3.3 3.8 4.2
Sales 82.8 81.4 84.3 2.2 1.1 1.3
Administrative Support/Clerical 92.0 91.0 91.1 1.7 2.3 2.4
Service 61.6 62.1 68.0 6.1 6.5 5.7
Farming, Forestry, and Fishing 89.9 93.8 93.5 1.4 0.0 0.8
Precision Production, Craft, and Repair Occupations 87.0 86.2 87.4 2.2 4.0 3.6
Operators, Fabricators, and Laborers 76.3 72.5 73.6 4.6 7.4 8.0
1985 data classified according to 1980 industry and occupation codes.  1997 and 2001 data classified according to 1990 industry and occupation codes.
The number of individuals in the sample by year is as follows:   1985: 73,395 workers.  1997: 90,549 workers.  2001: 99,631 workers.  2004: 123,167 workers.
*For example, calculated as total # of agriculture workers working day shifts in 1985 / total # of agriculture workers in 1985.  
**For example, calculated as total # of agriculture workers working night shifts in 1985 / total # of agriculture workers in 1985.
% of Category Working Day Shift % of Category Working Night Shift
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relatively large percentages of night shift workers, due to the fact that “hospital” workers, who 
frequently work at night, are included in this category.  Low percentages of night shift workers 
were employed in the agriculture, construction, finance, insurance, and real estate industries.  
When analyzing night shift work by occupation, the service, operator, fabricator, and laborer 
occupations featured the highest percentages of night shift work.  Service occupations include 
food service and protective service workers.  Managerial and professional occupations, as well as 
sales, farming, forestry, and fishing occupations were least likely to use night shift workers.  
 
1.3.2 Reasons for Selecting Shift Work 
Also included in the CPS supplements is information on why individuals choose to work 
a shift.  Respondents who worked non-day shifts were asked “What is the main reason you work 
this type of shift?”  This information is highly relevant to the current econometric analysis since 
a selection model is employed.  Since data on shift workers is limited, this survey question 
allows for the unique opportunity to understand workers’ primary motivation for working a shift.  
The 1985 report only includes information on all workers with non-standard shifts, while the 
1997, 2001, and 2004 reports include information on specific categories of shift work such as 
evening, night, rotating, split, and other shifts.  Because the current analysis focuses on night 
shift workers, statistics on night shift workers are compared to statistics on all workers on non-
standard shifts.  Reasons for choosing to work a shift are classified as either voluntary or 
involuntary.  Table 1.3 provides a summary of the available statistics on shift choice.   
Information on the main reason for choosing shift work is extremely limited in the 1985 report.  
28% of all non-standard shift workers cited voluntary reasons such as “better arrangements for 
child care or care of other family members, more time for school, and better pay.”  64.8% of 
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workers accepted their shift schedule because it was “a requirement of the job” (Mellor 1986).  
The 1997, 2001, and 2004 reports allow for a more detailed comparison of the main reason for 
choosing shift work for non-standard and night shift workers.  A few general trends apply to both 
groups.  From 1985 to 2004, workers became more likely to choose shift work for voluntary 
reasons.  The most common reason cited for shift work is “the nature of the job,” with roughly 
50% of non-standard shift workers and 30% of night shift workers selecting this reason.   
The percentages of workers choosing shift work because of child care arrangements, 
better pay, and because they could not get any other job remained roughly steady.  In 1997, 
approximately 13% of non-standard shift workers and 10% of night workers reported that 
employer mandated pollution controls influenced them to work a shift.  Larger percentages of 
non-standard and night workers cited “allows time for school” as their reason for selecting shift 
 work in 2004. 
The most striking difference between non-standard shift workers and night shift workers 
is that night shift workers are more likely to choose their shift schedule for voluntary reasons, 
 
Table 1.3 Main Reason for Working Shift: Percentage of Non-Standard Shift and Night Workers, CPS 
Supplement 
 
 
1985 1997 2001 2004 1985 1997 2001 2004
Voluntary Reason 28.0** 16.61 32.4 38 N/A 28.2 50.1 50.57
    Better arrangements for family or child      6.96*** 8.9 8.4   14.92^ 14.9 16.43
    Better pay 6.06 6.9 5.15 10.46 11.2 9.58
    Allows time for school 2.87 3.3 14.87 1.96 2.5 5.35
    Personal preference 13.3 9.75 21.5 19.21
Involuntary Reason 72 69.82 59.9 55.58 N/A 52.19 40.9 40.83
     Employer Mandate for pollution control 12.96 0.12 10.33 0.05
    Could not get any other job 5.7 6.6 7.46 7.51 8.9 8.06
    Nature of the job 64.8 51.16 53.3 48 34.35 32 32.72
Some other reason/Not Reporting 14.31 6.2 6.36 20.44 7.2 8.66
100 100 100 100 100 100 100
**Example: calculated as total # of non-standard shift workers citing voluntary reasons for shift work 1985 / total # of non-standard shift workers 1985.  
***Example: calculated as total # of non-standard shift workers citing better arrangements as reason for shift work 1997 / total # of ns shift workers 1997.
^ Example: calculated as total # of night shift workers citing better arrangement for child as reason for shift work 1997 / total # of night shift workers 1997.
% Dist. of Non-Standard* Shift Workers % Dist. of Night Shift Workers
Some questions were unavailable or omitted from the survey in 1985, 1997, and 2001.  *Non-standard shifts include evening, night, rotating, split ,
irregular, and other shifts.  The number of individuals on non-standard shifts by year are as follows: 1985: 11,670 workers. 1997: 15,183 workers.   
2001: 14,461 workers.  2004: 21,762 workers.  The number of individuals on night shifts by year are as follows:   1985: 1,982 workers.  
1997: 3,156 workers.  2001: 3,318 workers.  2004: 3,811 workers.  
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with approximately half of night workers selecting voluntary reasons in 2001 and 2004 
compared to only 40% of night workers selecting involuntary reasons.  In contrast, 
approximately 32%-38% of non-standard shift workers chose their shift for voluntary reasons, 
while approximately 55%-60% chose their shift for involuntary reasons. The reason for selecting 
shift work that differs most between non-standard and night workers is “personal preference,” a 
category that was only included in the 2001 and 2004 surveys.  In 2001 and 2004, approximately 
10-13% of all non-standard shift workers cited this as their primary motivation for working a 
shift compared to 20% of night shift workers.  These statistics provide evidence that preferences 
of night shift workers may be different from non-standard shift workers as a whole.  It should be 
noted that during 1997, respondents were not given the option to select “personal preference” as 
a reason for choosing shift work. This omission most likely explains why the “some other 
reason/not reporting” category is high in 1997 relative to other years.  Additionally, this explains 
why it appears as if percentages of workers choosing shift work for voluntary reasons declines in 
1997.   
The BLS data from the 1985, 1997, 2001, and 2004 surveys provide evidence of recent 
 trends in shift work and motivate the current analysis.  The data indicate the relevance of this 
dissertation since shift work impacts a significant portion of the population.  The CPS data 
analyzed in Tables 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 also aid in constructing the wage and selection equations 
employed in this paper by indicating which persons are more likely to work shifts and what 
reasons workers may have for choosing shift work.  The data also demonstrate that night shift 
workers’ preferences may differ from all non-standard shift workers; thus, this paper’s focus on a 
comparison of day and night workers is economically interesting.  The theory of equalizing 
differences relies on homogenous worker preferences, particularly the assumption that all 
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workers dislike night shift work.  Table 1.3 indicates, however, that a significant number of night 
shift workers actually prefer night shift work.  The reasons cited for working a shift in Table 1.3 
support one hypothesis of the current analysis by indicating that some shift workers are 
motivated to select shift work in order to receive compensating wages.   Overall, the information 
in the CPS supplements provides evidence that the current research is relevant and that much can 
be learned by analyzing labor market outcomes in light of work hours preferences of individuals. 
 
1.4 The Inconvenience of Shift Work 
The current analysis is motivated by a desire to better model a unique workplace 
disamenity: working non-standard hours.  The theory of equalizing differences as applied to 
night shift work relies on the premise that night shift work is an inconvenience for at least some 
workers.  This section seeks to briefly explain why night shift work is inconvenient.  An 
understanding of the hazards and side effects associated with night shifts aids in understanding 
why night shift workers may receive compensating differentials.   The inconvenience of night 
shift work is well-documented in the health and sociology literature.   A majority of these studies 
on shift work concern the physical and psychological responses of workers to shift work.  The 
focused nature of the current research does not permit a thorough review of the vast number of 
shift work studies.  For detailed accounts of shift worker responses to shift work, see Dunham 
(1977), Finn (1981), Costa (1996), Pati, et al. (2001), Buxton (2003), and Saksvik, et al. (2011).  
The main side effects or problems associated with shift work are difficulty sleeping and 
sleepiness during work, increased health problems, adverse effects on family and social life, and 
increased risk of injury and accidents on the job.   
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1.4.1 Difficulty Sleeping and Sleepiness during Work 
 Akerstedt (2003) notes that, although there are many health-related side effects of shift 
work, “disturbed sleep is the most common.”  Much of the literature on sleep effects of night 
shift work is based upon an understanding of circadian rhythms.  Circadian rhythms are 24 hour 
biological body rhythms that rise and fall throughout the course of a day.  These bodily patterns 
are synchronized with light and dark and are designed to slow down bodily function during the 
night and allow for increased activity during the day.  For night shift workers, work occurs when 
circadian rhythms are low and sleep occurs when circadian rhythms are high (Rosa and Colligan, 
1997).  In addition to negative sleep effects of interrupted circadian rhythms, shift workers’ 
daytime sleep is often interrupted by their environment or family life schedule.  Akerstedt (1985) 
estimates that shift workers receive an hour less sleep on average than day workers.  Drake, et al. 
(2004) analyze a medical condition called “shift work sleep disorder,” a disorder in which shift 
workers experience periods of extreme sleepiness and insomnia as a result of the altered quantity 
and quality of their sleep.   
 
1.4.2 Increased Health Problems 
In addition to the harmful side effects caused by a lack of sleep, night shift work impacts 
 workers’ health in other ways.  Rosa and Colligan (1997) note that some health consequences of 
shift work occur immediately while others take time to develop.  Immediate consequences 
include sleep disorders, depressed mood, and digestive problems.  Costa (1996) finds that  
20 - 75% of night workers experience gastrointestinal problems.   Shift workers also experience 
more heart problems than day workers.  Studies by Akerstedt, et al. (1984), Michel-Briand, et al. 
(1981), and Knuttson, et al. (1999) indicate that shift workers are more likely to develop 
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cardiovascular disease, myocardial infarction, heart attacks, and high blood pressure than day 
workers.  Scott and Ladou (1990) note that shift work can be an added stressor during pregnancy.  
Davis, et al. (2001) find that exposure to light at night, particularly by night shift workers, may 
be associated with the risk of developing breast cancer.  Scott (2000) finds that some individuals 
may develop moderate to severe depression while working shifts.  Additional studies indicate 
that there may be linkages between shift work and obesity and diabetes, whether due to poor diet, 
irregular mealtimes, or lack of exercise often associated with shift schedules.  
 
1.4.3 Adverse Effects on Family and Social Life  
Presser (2003) notes that dual-earner spouses are “the predominant family type among 
married couples” and that “employment at nonstandard hours and on weekends undoubtedly 
challenges such families.”  Shift workers often have reduced quality and quantity of time with 
family and others.  Work or sleep often conflicts with social activities and child care 
arrangements.  Additionally, the negative effects of shift work are often shared with one’s 
family.  Grosswald (2003) finds significant negative spillover effects of shift work to family, 
indicating that shift work negatively impacts one’s mood, energy, and time for family life.  Pati, 
et al. (2001) find higher anxiety levels and lower mental health levels in spouses and children of 
shift workers when compared with spouses and children of day workers.   
 
1.4.4 Increased Risk of Injury and Accidents on the Job 
 Smith, et al. (1994) find that the risk of sustaining injuries is higher for night shift 
 workers than for those working during the day.  Shift workers’ ability to remain alert is 
negatively impacted by circadian rhythm disruptions, making it more likely that they make 
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mistakes or are injured on the job (Rosa and Colligan 1997).   Dula, et al. (2001) find that night 
shift workers’ performance declines after they have worked five consecutive night shifts.  
Akerstedt, et al. (2002) find that night workers are more likely to fall asleep at work than day 
workers.  Folkard (1997) finds that most worker mistakes and accidents occur between the hours 
of 2:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m.  In an interesting report, Mitler, et al. (1988) observe that disasters at 
nuclear power plants Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and the 
Challenger space shuttle accident all occurred during the early morning hours of night shifts. 
 
1.5 Shift Differentials 
This paper seeks to determine an empirical measure of the wage differential for night 
shift work.  The U.S. Office of Personnel Management defines a night shift differential as “the 
differential paid for work performed when the majority of a prevailing rate employee's regularly 
scheduled non-overtime hours fall between 3 p.m. and 8 a.m.”  Shift differentials are considered 
supplemental pay and may be paid for evening, night, split, rotating, or irregular shifts.  Shift 
differentials are commonly awarded as a percentage of the employee's rate of regular pay or as a 
fixed cents-per-hour increase over day wages.  The Fair Labor Standards Act does not require 
extra pay for night work.  According to the U.S. Department of Labor, shift differentials are a 
matter of agreement between employers and employees. 
Data on shift differentials are limited.  Using estimates from BLS surveys from 1959-
1968, O’Connor (1970) determines that 95% of workers on late shifts received compensating 
wages.  Although the incidence and amount vary depending upon industry and occupation, the 
average shift differential for night shift workers was under 10%.  Foss (1984) summarizes 
O’Connor’s findings, stating that late shift differentials are small relative to straight-time wages.   
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King and Williams (1985) offer a rare account of shift differentials for manufacturing workers 
using Area Wage Survey data from the BLS from 1959-1984.  King and Williams note that “in 
1984, more than 90 percent of the workers on second and third shifts in urban manufacturing 
plants received premium pay for such schedules.”  Average shift differentials in cents per hour 
for night shifts were 11.1 cents above day workers in 1959 and 29.9 cents above day workers in 
1984.  Average shift differentials in percentages for night shifts were approximately 10 percent 
of day rates in both 1959 and 1984.  In a 1979 BLS report on CPS data, Hedges and Sekskenski 
find that the median night shift wage was $5.62 compared to $4.62 for day workers.  They also 
indicate that 80% of late shift union workers had collective bargaining agreements that specified 
payment of either a money or time differential for shift work.  O’Connor, Hedges and 
Sekskenski, and King and Williams find that shift differentials have tended to rise slower than 
general wage rates.  Foss (1981) commented on the apparent long run decline in night shift 
differentials, speculating that the supply curve of labor willing to work nights may have shifted 
to the right.  Foss (1984) also surmises that the increased prevalence of shift work may result 
from the failure of shift differentials to rise as much as straight-time wages, making employers 
more inclined to offer shift work. 
In a BLS report, Bishow (2009) briefly examines three forms of supplemental cash 
compensation for employees: overtime, bonuses, and shift differentials.  Bishow analyzes data 
from seven quarters of Employer Cost for Employee Compensation surveys from 2001-2007 
finding that shift differentials are the least common form of supplemental pay.  20% of workers 
receive shift differentials.  When analyzing supplemental pay by wage quartiles, Bishow also 
finds that shift differentials are a larger proportion of cash compensation for low-paid workers.   
When analyzing workers by occupation, Bishow finds that shift differentials as a percentage of 
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cash compensation are highest for healthcare practitioner and technical occupations at 
approximately 3%.  
Most published estimates of shift differentials referenced above are negligible.  These 
estimates are computed from average earnings or, in the case of Bishow, from reports of firm 
costs; thus they fail to control for individual worker characteristics or self-selection into shift 
work.  An empirical measure of shift differentials, such as the one estimated in this paper, would 
be more informative.   
 
1.6 Contribution to the Literature 
Shift work is an important and still partly undiscovered area of research for labor 
economists.  The organization of work and the sorting of workers among firms are fundamental 
economic questions.  This dissertation contributes to the literature by providing a recent test of 
the theory of equalizing differences, by adding to a small economic literature on shift 
differentials, by being the first to provide maximum likelihood estimates of an endogenous 
switching regression model of shift work, by employing an improved econometric model that 
includes indicators of labor market strength, by developing a new method of analyzing 
interaction effects in the endogenous switching regression model, and by modeling shift 
differentials and shift selection using a larger, more diverse dataset. 
This paper provides a recent test of the theory of equalizing differences.  Although this 
classical labor economics theory predicts substantial wage differentials for jobs with undesirable 
characteristics, there is mixed empirical support.  Section 2.3.1 provides a survey of studies on 
compensating differentials.  This paper also helps to fill a gap in the existing literature estimating 
wage differentials for shift work.  Labor economics literature focused specifically on shift 
25 
 
differentials is limited to five published studies.  Section 2.3.1.2 outlines the shift studies of 
Kostiuk (1990), Lanfranchi, et al. (2002), Schumacher and Hirsch (1997), Agnarsson (1998), 
DeBeaumont and Nsiah (2010), and Scheffel (2011).  Kostiuk and Lanfranchi, et al. provide the 
most widely cited findings of shift differentials.   
This dissertation is the first shift work analysis to employ maximum likelihood estimation 
of an endogenous switching regression model.  Previous labor studies by Kostiuk and 
Lanfranchi, et al., have estimated shift differentials and shift choice by estimating the 
endogenous switching regression model using a two-step estimator.  In addition to using the two-
step estimator, the current analysis provides maximum likelihood estimates of the switching 
regression as applied to shift work.  The estimates obtained through maximum likelihood are 
more asymptotically efficient than those obtained using the two-step method, and provide an 
interesting point of comparison for the two-step results. 
The models used in this paper further improve upon the research of Kostiuk and 
Lanfranchi, et al. by including measures of local economic conditions in the analysis.  An 
individual’s decision to work a night shift may be related to local economic conditions; thus we 
estimate the impact of the local unemployment rate and the state leading index on both the 
incidence of shift work and upon the size of compensating wages for shift work.  Kostiuk and 
Lanfranchi, et al. only consider worker, firm, and industry characteristics when estimating wages 
of day and shift workers, thus failing to consider a relationship between shift differentials and the 
strength of the labor market.  Section 2.3.3 reviews existing theory and literature on the link 
between local economic conditions and compensating differentials.   
This paper is also an improvement on research by DeBeaumont and Nsiah.  DeBeaumont 
and Nsiah include the local unemployment rate in their estimation of day and night wages; 
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however, they employ a treatment effects model.  The current analysis uses a less restricted, 
more general model, a switching regression model with endogenous switching.  This model 
allows for the estimation of the effect of wage differentials on the decision to work a night shift 
and allows the returns to individual characteristics of day and night workers to differ.  
Additionally the model is analyzed using the state leading index as an alternate measure of local 
economic conditions.  Analyzing the interaction effect between shift differentials and local 
economic conditions on shift choice is complicated in the endogenous switching regression 
model.  This paper offers a method of investigating interaction effects by estimating lower and 
upper bounds on the probability of selecting night shift work for different values of the shift 
differential and the local economic conditions.   
This dissertation applies these improved econometric models to a larger, more diverse 
dataset of workers than previous literature.  This paper uses data from the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 1979, which allows for the estimation of shift premiums for full-time workers 
in various industries and occupations.  Additionally, this paper includes both male and female 
workers from across the United States.  Kostiuk employs CPS data on shift workers from 1979 
and 1985, but limits the analysis to full-time male manufacturing workers.  Lanfranchi, et al. use 
French data on male blue collar private sector workers from 1992.  Schumacher and Hirsch 
restrict their analysis to 1985 and 1991 data on nurses employed in hospitals.  Anargsson 
considers only Swedish male workers.  Scheffel employs German Time Use data on male 
workers from 2001-2002.  DeBeaumont and Nsiah (2010) estimate their model using the same 
cross-sectional dataset from 1990 as used in this paper; however, as previously discussed, this 
paper improves upon their analysis by estimating shift choice and shift differentials using an 
endogenous switching regression model.    
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This chapter first briefly reviews existing literature on sample selection models and 
switching regression models.  Then, attention is focused on existing estimation methods for the 
type of sample selection model used in the current analysis, a switching regression model with 
endogenous switching.  An overview of research on unfavorable working conditions is next 
included with attention devoted to shift work literature focusing on hedonic wage models.  A 
brief discussion of demand side shift work issues follows, and the literature review concludes 
with analysis of research motivating the use of local economic conditions in the current analysis. 
 
2.1 Sample Selection Models 
2.1.1 Sample Selection Problem and Related Studies 
 Selection bias is common in analyzing labor economics issues since workers self-select 
into jobs that best suit their abilities and preferences.  Participation in shift work is not randomly 
determined; workers self-select into shift work.  A sample selection model is necessary to 
estimate the shift premium and the choice to work a shift.   
 Gronau (1974), Lewis (1974), and Heckman (1974) provide the first major discussions of 
the problem of self-selection.  Gronau (1974) examined self-selection issues by modeling the 
labor force participation decisions of women.  Lewis (1974) expands Gronau’s work.  The 
Gronau/Lewis model describes the decision to accept employment as a function of an 
individual’s reservation wage.  If the market wage is greater than the reservation wage, 
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individuals choose to work, and wages are observed.  Otherwise, wages are unobserved.  A 
simple regression of observed wages on individual characteristics of workers leads to sample 
selection bias and inconsistent estimates, and returns to individual characteristics will be 
estimated on workers alone, not the population as a whole.  To address this selection bias, 
Heckman developed a two-stage estimation method in a series of papers (1974, 1976, 1978, 
1979, 1990).  Heckman (1979) provides a well-known correction for sample selection by 
approaching selectivity bias as an omitted variables problem.  A survey of the many extensions 
of the general sample selection model is provided by Maddala (1983). 
 
2.2 Switching Regression Models 
  The sample selection model employed in the current analysis is a switching regression 
model.  The basic switching regression model is provided by Goldfeld and Quandt (1973) and is 
useful when the behavior of individuals is best described by two regression equations or regimes.  
An additional criterion function determines which regime applies to particular individuals, i.e. 
the criteria provide the motivation for a “switch” in the regression equation used.  For example: 
Regime 1: 1 1 1 i i iY X       iff iZ   
Regime 2: 2 22  i i iY X                 iff iZ   
where    is assumed to be uncorrelated with 1i  and 2i .  The criterion function iZ   or   
iZ   determines which regression equation applies.  This model is more formally called a 
switching regression model with exogenous switching.  Maddala and Nelson (1975) consider a 
switching regression model with endogenous switching.  In their model, it is assumed that    is 
correlated with 1i  and 2i .   
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2.2.1 Switching Regression Model with Endogenous Switching 
The sample selection model most applicable to the current research is a switching 
regression model with endogenous switching.  Individuals self-select into either day work or 
night work, and wages of day workers and wages of night workers are observed dependent upon 
a selection equation modeling the decision to work at night.  Factors influencing the decision to 
work at night which are included in the error term of the selection equation are likely correlated 
with factors in the error term of the individual’s wage equation.  The switching regression model 
with endogenous switching may be estimated by a two step procedure employed by Lee (1978) 
or by maximum likelihood. 
 
2.2.1.2 Estimation Methods:  Lee Model 
Following previous research on shift work, the model provided by Lee (1978) is first 
employed in the analysis.  The Lee model is a variation of the switching regression model with 
endogenous switching which involves estimating endogenous variables and then substituting 
these variables into the selection equation prior to final estimation of the selection equation.  This 
method, known as the structural probit method, is similar to Heckman’s two-step method.   Lee’s 
endogenous switching regression model analyzes union and non-union wages, and allows for 
two hedonic wage equations, one for log wages of union workers and one for log wages of non-
union workers.  A simplified version of the regression equations presented in Lee (1978) allow 
for the returns to union and non-union membership to vary and take the form 
     0 1 2 ui u ui u ui u uiw X Z                                              (1) 
    0 1 2 ni n ni n ni n niw X Z                       (2) 
(1) and (2) are the log wage equations for union and non-union workers respectively.  The vector 
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X includes worker characteristics and the vector   includes firm characteristics.  Since workers 
self-select into union status, a selection equation, or structural probit, is needed to model an 
individual’s decision to join a union.  The structural probit takes the form 
    * 0 1 2 3  i ui ni i i iI w X Z vw                          (3) 
Additionally,  2 ~ 0,u uN  ,   2 ~ 0,  n nN  , and 2~ (0, )vv N   .  In (3),   and   include a 
majority of the individual and firm variables from the individual wage equations as well as an 
additional   variable, an indicator of the industrial-concentration ratio that serves as an exclusion 
restriction to improve model identification.  The variable  ui niw w  indicates the wage 
differential for union workers.    When * 0iI   the individual joins the union, otherwise, the 
individual does not join the union.   
The individual wage equations (1) and (2) may be substituted into the selection equation 
(3) to compute the reduced form (4).   
                         * 0 1 2i i i iI X Z                                    (4) 
This equation is estimated by probit, and the results are used to calculate the inverse Mills ratios 
for each observation.  The conditional expected wages for union and non-union workers are 
calculated as   
   0 1 2 ,
(ψ)  
( |    
Φ
, )
(ψ)
uui ui ui u ui u ui uE w X Z X Z  

              (5) 
   0 1 2 ,
(ψ)  
( |  ,  )  
1-Φ(ψ)
nni ni ni n ni n ni nE w X Z X Z  

              (6) 
where  0 1 2  ψ   i iX Z     .   ψ  and Φ(ψ)  are the density function and cumulative 
distribution function evaluated at  .  Including the Mills ratios in the expected wage equations 
provides an estimate of the sample selection bias and controls for selectivity.  The coefficients on  
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(ψ)  
Φ(ψ)

 and 
 
(ψ)  
1 Φ ψ


  yield estimates of the covariance between the error term in the individual 
wage equations and the selection equation.   
  Lee’s estimation method for endogenous switching regression models may be 
summarized as follows: 
1) Estimate the reduced form of the selection equation (4) using probit.  Compute (ψ)   and 
Φ(ψ) for each observation. 
2) Apply OLS to the conditional expected wage equations (5) and (6).  The coefficients of 
the selection terms, 
,u 
  and 
,n 
 , serve as an estimate of the covariance between the 
error in the individual wage equations and the error in the selection equation.  These 
coefficients also serve as an indicator of selection bias. 
3) The estimated wage gain,  ui niw w , is next computed and included in probit estimation 
of the structural equation (3) to obtain an estimate of 1 .  
In his application of the above model to union data, Lee finds that 1  is a significant 
predictor of union choice, indicating that workers consider expected wage gains of union 
membership when deciding whether or not to join a union.  Lee (1976) proves the consistency of 
the estimate of 1  and provides a formal presentation of his two-step estimator.   
Maddala (1983) notes that the model described above can be modified to evaluate the 
benefit of selection.  This creates the treatment effects model, which is a restricted version of the 
expected wage equations.  Using the Lee model above as an example, the treatment effects 
model describes the total gross benefit of participation in union work for all workers in the 
sample by comparing the expected potential outcome from union work,  uilogW  (participation in 
32 
 
the program) to the expected potential outcome without union work,  nilogW  (not participating in 
the program).  The treatment effects model assumes that all coefficients for union and non-union 
workers are identical except for the intercept term.  For the union model, the treatment effects 
model is  
0 1 2 , ,
( | , )  Φ(ψ) ( ) (ψ)u ni i i i iE w X Z X Z                                         (7) 
where   is the difference in the intercepts for union and non-union workers and indicates the 
effect of union employment on wages.  
, ,
( )u n      indicates the direction of selection into 
union work and provides a test for the presence of selection bias.  
For other examples of the use of endogenous switching regression models, see Willis and 
Rosen (1979), Lee and Trost (1978), and Adamchik and Bedi (2000).  Willis and Rosen estimate 
expected lifetime earnings of high school versus college graduates.  The model includes a wage 
equation for high school graduates, a wage equation for college graduates, and a selection 
equation modeling an individual’s decision to attend college.  The wage differential for college 
graduates is determined to be a significant predictor of the individual’s decision to attend 
college.  Another well-known example of a switching regression model with endogenous 
switching is Lee and Trost’s (1978) model of expenditures on owned housing and rental housing.  
Adamchik and Bedi (2000) use an endogenous switching regression model to examine wage 
differentials for public versus private sector work.  The estimation of the Lee model for shift 
work is outlined in Section 4.3.2. 
 
2.2.1.2.1 Roy/Borjas Interpretation of Selection Term Coefficients  
 The Lee model provides a test for the presence of selectivity bias.  A test for selectivity 
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 bias is a test of
,
0u    and , 0n    in equations (5) and (6).  Additionally, the sign of these 
coefficients can be used to indicate positive or negative selection.  Roy (1951) offers an early 
treatment of the problem of self-selection in analyzing the optimizing behavior of individuals 
selecting between two occupations: hunting and fishing.  Roy indicates that workers are endowed 
with skills and abilities in each occupation, but they will choose their occupation based upon 
expected wages.  Roy’s main contribution to the literature involved using the signs of the 
covariances (the coefficients on the selection terms in the individual wage equations of hunters 
and fishermen) as an indication of positive or negative selection based on comparative 
advantage.  For example, positive selection into hunting implies that those who choose to hunt 
have above average earnings in hunting.  Negative selection into hunting implies that those who 
choose to hunt have below average earnings in hunting.  Maddala (1983) provides a summary of 
the Roy model.  Borjas (1987) develops Roy’s framework into a well-known model through 
analysis of migration selection between a source and host country.   
Because the Roy/Borjas model deals with how individuals sort themselves into different 
regimes, it is commonly used in evaluating the selection term coefficients in switching regression 
models with endogenous switching.  Using the Roy method, Lee (1978) finds positive selection 
into both union and non-union work.  As an example of how positive versus negative selection is 
determined for the version of the Lee model presented above, let the sign of the coefficients 
obtained from regressions (5) and (6) be 
,
positiveu    and , negativen   .  Positive or 
negative selection into union or non-union status is determined by interpreting these coefficients 
in light of equations (5) and (6), shown below. 
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0 1 2 ,
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                (6) 
,u 
  positive indicates a positive correlation between variables in the error term in the union 
equation and the variables in the error term in the selection equation.  For example, if a worker 
has abilities not captured by the union wage equation that lead to higher wages, the union error 
term is positive.  If, additionally, this higher union wage makes the individual more likely to 
choose union work than is indicated by the selection equation, the selection equation error term 
will also be positive.  The covariance 
,u 
  will be positive, implying positive selection into 
union work.   Likewise, if an individual has abilities not captured by the non-union wage 
equation that lead to higher wages, the non-union error term is positive.  This higher non-union 
wage makes the individual less likely to choose union work, and the selection equation error 
term is negative.  The covariance 
,n 
  will be negative, which indicates positive selection into 
non-union work. 
Another way to understand the interpretation of the selection term coefficients is to 
realize that the conditional expected wage equations provide the mean income of union and non-
union workers.  Equation (5) evaluated for 
,u 
  positive indicates that the mean income of 
union workers is greater than 0 1 2 u ui u ui uX Z     and those who choose union membership have 
higher expected wages from union work than the average union worker.  Thus, a positive 
selection coefficient is evidence of positive selection into union work.  Likewise, equation (6) 
evaluated at 
,n 
  negative indicates that the mean income of non-union workers is greater than 
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0 1 2 u ui u ui uX Z    .  This result indicates positive selection into non-union work since those who 
choose non-union work have higher expected wages from non-union work than the average non-
union worker.   
 
2.2.1.3 Estimation Methods:  Maximum Likelihood 
 The switching regression model with endogenous switching may also be estimated using 
maximum likelihood.  Full Information Maximum Likelihood is preferred over the two-step 
method prescribed by Lee above.  As noted by Maddala (1983), maximum likelihood produces 
consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates.  Full information maximum likelihood involves 
forming the joint distribution of the endogenous variables and then maximizing the likelihood 
function.  Maximum likelihood estimates the individual wage equations and structural equation 
from the switching regression model simultaneously.  Following Maddala (1983), the likelihood 
function for the current analysis is derived in Section 4.3.3.  The interpretation of the coefficients 
and selection terms is the same as explained for the Lee model above.    
 
2.3 Review of Shift Work-Related Studies 
2.3.1 Tests of the Theory of Compensating Differentials 
The focus of the current research is to analyze compensating differentials and labor 
supply decisions for shift work.  The basis of this research is the theory of compensating 
differentials, the belief that workers receive compensating wage differentials for unfavorable 
work conditions.  The literature review that follows first considers research on unfavorable 
working conditions, then specifically examines shift work literature focusing on hedonic wage 
models.   
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2.3.1.1 Unfavorable Work Conditions 
Previous labor research has attempted to find support for the theory of equalizing 
differences by estimating the wage premiums received by workers who face undesirable working 
conditions.  These work conditions range from risk of death or injury on the job to stress, 
physical work, fast-paced work, supervisory responsibilities, work with machinery, job 
repetitiveness, and job insecurity.   
Thaler and Rosen (1976) provide the first major study of death or injury on the job, 
finding positive and significant wage differentials, which is consistent with the theory of 
compensating differentials.  A majority of the economic literature since has concluded that risk 
of death or possibility of injury on the job lead to compensating wages.  Hersch (1998) finds 
strong evidence of compensating differentials for women facing risk of injury on the job.  
Viscusi and Aldy (2003) provide a comprehensive review of economic studies that evaluate 
compensating differentials for on-the-job mortality risk.  These studies form the basis for 
economic literature calculating the value of a statistical life.   
Economic literature has not seen as much success in consistent estimation of  
compensating differentials for other unpleasant work characteristics.  For example, Lucas (1977) 
finds that jobs requiring physical strength, repetitive work, and supervisory responsibilities 
induce statistically significant compensating wage differentials.  According to the theory of 
equalizing differences, jobs requiring physical strength are less pleasant and thus should pay 
higher wages.  Lucas, however, finds that the sign on the physical strength coefficient is 
negative, suggesting that jobs demanding physical strength actually pay less.  Counterintuitive 
signs such as this are common in research on equalizing differences. 
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Smith (1979) offers a review of previous hedonic research on compensating differentials 
by Bluestone (1974), Duncan (1976), Hamermesh (1978), Thaler and Rosen (1976), and many 
others.  Smith concludes that “tests of the theory of compensating wage differentials are 
inconclusive with respect to every job characteristic except the risk of death.”  Brown (1980) 
also offers a review of previous literature on equalizing differences stating the there was “some 
clear support for the theory, but an uncomfortable number of exceptions.”  Brown believed that 
many of the previous studies failed because they did not accurately control for worker 
characteristics, but in his empirical analysis of longitudinal data from the United States, Brown 
was still unsuccessful in finding significant effects of most working conditions on wages.  He 
does find significant wage differentials for repetitive work, but notes that the wage differential is 
negative, not positive as the theory of equalizing differences would predict.  
There are however, several studies that find compensating differentials of the expected 
sign.  Antos and Rosen (1975) apply the theory of equalizing differences to unpleasant job 
characteristics faced by teachers, particularly examining factors that could induce white teachers 
to seek employment at predominantly black schools.  They determine that differences in teacher 
wages could be the result of equalizing differences for difficult work conditions such as high 
dropout rates, lack of student motivation, job location, or teaching students of the opposite race.  
Duncan and Stafford (1980) find that a portion of the compensating wage differentials for union 
workers could be explained by job conditions such as working with machinery or work effort.  
Duncan and Holmlund (1983) find statistically significant compensating wages for stressful and 
dangerous work, but do not find statistically significant compensating wages for difficult 
physical work or hours constraints.   
Eberts and Stone (1985) find that failure to include firm-specific information such as 
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financial status and bargaining strength can lead to small or incorrectly-signed compensating 
differentials.  Roback (1982, 1988) determines that compensating wages for differences in 
regional amenities can explain regional wage differentials.   Garen (1988) emphasizes the 
importance of correcting for selection bias in estimates of compensating differentials for working 
conditions.  Hwang, et.al. (1992) examine whether unobserved productivity heterogeneity in 
 workers could account for inconclusive or wrong-signed estimates of compensating 
differentials.  Applications of panel data, however, do not correct for the problem (see Duncan 
and Holmlund, 1983).  Gronberg and Reed (1994) use a job search model to analyze the theory 
of equalizing differences through estimation of workers’ marginal willingness to pay for job 
amenities.  Bonhomme and Jolivet (2009) develop a model of wages and amenities, emphasizing 
the importance of modeling job mobility in order to find significant compensating differentials 
for work conditions.  They argue that the theory of compensating differentials is unlikely to hold 
unless worker mobility is perfectly free.   
  
2.3.1.2 Compensating Wage Differentials for Shift Work 
Following previous research on the theory of equalizing differences, economists realized 
that shift work qualified as an unfavorable work condition that might result in compensating 
wages.  Research by Kostiuk (1990) provides the first estimates of shift-based wage premiums.  
Prior to his attempts, most research fails to find shift differentials, likely due to failure to correct 
for self-selection.  Kostiuk applies a switching regression model with endogenous switching to 
CPS data on United States male manufacturing workers from 1979 and 1985.  He estimates a 
positive shift differential of 4.6% in 1979 and 8.2% in 1985.  Kostiuk finds evidence of positive 
selection into daytime work, but no evidence of selection into night work.  His results also 
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indicate that shift differentials have a positive and significant impact on the decision to work a 
shift.   
Lanfranchi, Ohlsson, and Skalli (2002) follow Kostiuk’s model, also estimating a 
switching regression model with endogenous switching.  Lanfranchi et al. analyze a matched 
employer-employee French dataset from 1992.  They estimate that shift workers receive wages 
that are 16% higher than daytime workers.  Like Kostiuk, they determine that the shift premium 
is significant for shift choice and find evidence of positive selection into daytime work.  A 
significant difference between Kostiuk and Lanfranchi et al. is that Lanfranchi et al. find 
evidence of negative selection into shift work, indicating that the choice to work a shift is the 
result of compensating wage differentials, not shift preferences.  They also find that data for shift 
and day workers should not be pooled, providing support for the use of the switching regression 
model. 
Schumacher and Hirsch (1997) explore the sources of the large wage premiums realized 
by nurses employed in hospitals relative to nurses employed elsewhere.  Using CPS data from 
1985 and 1991, they find that the shift premium of evening shift nurses is approximately 4%, 
while the shift premium of night shift nurses is approximately 11.6%.  Additionally, they 
estimate that shift work accounts for 10% of the premium hospital nurses receive over nurses 
employed in health practitioner offices.  Schumacher and Hirsch fail to find significant premiums 
for working rotating or split shifts.   
DeBeaumont and Nsiah (2010) employ a treatment effects model to estimate the night 
shift differential for respondents of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979.  They 
additionally examine the impact of the local unemployment rate on the night shift differential 
and an individual’s choice to work a night shift.  They confirm the presence of a wage premium 
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for night shift work, with the size of the wage differential dependent upon the local 
unemployment rate.  In areas of high unemployment (approximately 15%), the night shift 
differential was 5%, while areas of low unemployment (approximately 3%) experienced a night 
shift differential of 15%.  Thus, areas experiencing high unemployment offered lower 
compensating differentials for night shift work. 
Agnarsson (1998) estimates shift differentials for Swedish male employees, finding a 5% 
shift premium.  Scheffel (2011) builds upon the work of Kostiuk and Lanfranchi et al., 
employing a treatment effects model as well as a switching regression model with endogenous 
switching to estimate shift differentials.  Analyzing German Time Use Data on male workers 
from 2001-2002, Scheffel finds evidence of significant negative selection into shift work.  The 
treatment effects model reveals a shift premium of 10.3% for shift workers.   
The above referenced research provides evidence that compensating wage differentials 
exist for shiftwork.  The size of the wage differential as estimated by these researchers ranges 
from 4% to 16%.  The above research also indicates that it is necessary to control for self-
selection into shift work.  Although Kostiuk, Lanfranchi et al., Scheffel, and DeBeaumont and 
Nsiah all find evidence of positive selection into day work, Kostiuk finds no evidence of 
selection into shift work, while Lanfranchi et al., and Scheffel find evidence of negative 
selection into shift work.  Thus, the previous research is inconclusive as to the direction of 
selection into shift work.   
 
2.3.2 Shift Work Demand-Side Issues 
A growing economics literature considers the firm’s motivation to use shift work.  The 
 analysis of shift work is often used synonymously with the terms “duration” and “capital 
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utilization.”  Karl Marx (1867) and economist Alfred Marshall (1873) both studied the length of 
the working day, with Marshall advocating the adoption of multiple shifts as early as 1873.  In 
1964, Robin Marris published The Economics of Capital Utilization which has been called the 
“seminal analysis of shift work”.  He suggests that economies could prosper by more intensive 
utilization of capital stock through employing multiple shifts.  Marris develops some of the first 
theoretical models of shiftwork, and using British data, looks at the impact of various factors 
upon the planned utilization rate of capital.  For a review of literature and advances in the theory 
of capital utilization (use of shift work) since the work of Marris, see Betancourt (2008).  A 
fundamental finding of these studies that is relevant to the current analysis is a reduction in the 
rate of capital utilization in the presence of large wage differentials for shift workers.  Betancourt 
(1986) provides a model of the theory of the firm which allows for choice of duration.   
Shapiro (1993) and (1996) find that much of the cyclical nature of production can be 
accounted for by variations in the workweek of capital or variations in the number of operative 
shifts.  Thus, when adjustments for the workweek of capital are made, the Solow residual is no 
longer pro-cyclical.  Following Marris’s work, Mayshar and Solon (1993) find that shiftwork is 
procyclical.  Mayshar and Solon estimate elasticity of late shift employment versus elasticity of 
overall employment to changes in real GNP.  The elasticity of late shift employment in both 
manufacturing sectors and in all nonfarm employment is approximately double the elasticity of 
overall employment.  They find that “although late shifts account for only about one-sixth of 
full-time nonfarm wage and salary employment, they account for almost one-third of cyclical 
variation.”  These results indicate that one-third of the declines in employment during a recession 
occur through declines in employment of late shift workers.  Mayshar and Solon’s research 
indicates that the procyclical nature of capital utilization can aid in explaining procyclical 
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productivity.  Halevy and Nason (2002) find that shift work explains business cycle fluctuations 
and concur with the findings of Mayshar and Solon, that employment during the late shift is very 
procyclical.  The procyclical nature of shift work as determined by the above literature has 
interesting implications for the current analysis.  These implications are discussed in Section 
3.1.1. 
 
2.3.3 Wages, Compensating Differentials, and Local Labor Market Conditions 
In addition to estimating compensating differentials for shift workers, this paper also 
seeks to determine the effect of local economic conditions on compensating wages for shift 
workers and on the incidence of shift work.  A closer examination of the literature relating local 
economic conditions to wages is warranted.    
One way that local economic conditions affects wages is through compensating 
differentials offered for risk of job loss.  Adam Smith (1776) believed that one unpleasant work 
characteristic that might generate a compensating wage differential was “constancy or 
inconstancy of employment.”   In order to persuade workers to accept a job with low job 
security, firms will need to offer a compensating differential.  Abowd and Ashenfelter (1984) 
provide support to this theory, concluding that industries where workers experience little 
anticipated unemployment receive small compensating differentials.  Industries where workers 
experience substantial anticipated unemployment receive large compensating differentials.  
Hatton and Williamson (1991) author a historical study of workers in 1890’s, finding that who 
faced a higher risk of layoff commanded wage premiums.  Winter-Ebmer (2001) finds that layoff 
risk can explain a portion of the firm size wage differential.  Assad and Tunali (2002) find that 
employers offer substantial compensation for turnover risk.  Using data from the 1880’s 
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Averette, Bodenhorn, and Staisiunas (2005) find that compensating differentials were awarded 
for workers facing a higher probability of predictable unemployment and that low-skill workers 
received larger compensating differentials than more skilled workers when facing unanticipated 
unemployment.  Moretti (2000) and Magnani (2002) also find a positive compensating 
differential for risk of unemployment.  For additional discussion of the compensating wage 
differentials for risk of layoff see Harris and Todaro (1970), Hutchens (1983), and Hamermesh 
and Wolfe (1990).   
A second channel through which local economic conditions affect wages is through 
changes in compensating differentials for work characteristics during economic downturns.  In 
terms of labor supply, when the economy slows and unemployment rises, workers are more 
likely to take jobs that would otherwise be undesirable.  Section 1.1.1.1 discussed the economic 
theory for compensating differentials for night shift work.   When unemployment is high and the 
local economy is weak, the worker’s indifference curves in Figure 1.1 may become flatter.  Thus 
the compensating differential required to induce workers to accept night shift work may be lower 
in weak economies.  On the demand side, when the economy weakens and unemployment rises, 
employers have the advantage of a larger number of potential employees.  For these employers, 
the need to offer compensating wages for undesirable work conditions is reduced.  Thus, 
compensating wages for undesirable work characteristics should fall during recessions.   
Section 1.2.2 offers an overview of the research of Bender and Mridha (2011) who 
provide a basic model for the effect of the local unemployment rate on compensating wages.   
Bender and Mridha emphasize that one of the major assumptions of the theory of equalizing 
differences is that labor markets are working efficiently.  Firms must pay compensating 
differentials in order to induce workers to accept inconvenient or undesirable work conditions.  
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However, when labor markets do not clear and unemployment exists, the theory of equalizing 
differences is weakened.  Thus, compensating wages for work characteristics may change. 
Bender and Mridha attempt to estimate the impact of the local unemployment rate on 
compensating differentials for injury on the job.  Their basic model is  
1 2 3    i i i i i iX I UE I UEiw             
where they estimate the log wages of workers dependent upon a vector of individual 
characteristics, X, a measure of risk, I, the local unemployment rate, UE, and the interaction of 
the risk measure and the local unemployment rate, IUE.    indicates how the compensating 
differential for risk changes as the unemployment rate rises.  Bender and Mridha compare 
estimates obtained from this model with estimates obtained from a simple model that includes no 
information on the local unemployment rate.  They determine that estimated compensating wage 
differentials for injury risk are lower in areas of high unemployment, suggesting a downward 
bias in estimates of compensating wage differentials for injury in typical cross-sectional research 
that does not consider local labor market conditions.   
There is limited research on the effect of the local unemployment rate on the size of 
compensating differentials for work characteristics.  This paper follows DeBeaumont and Nsiah 
(2010) in applying an analysis of the local unemployment rate to estimates of the compensating 
differential for night shift work.  We develop a method of analyzing the impact of changing local 
economic conditions on shift differentials in an endogenous switching regression model.  In 
order to further investigate the impact of macroeconomic phenomenon on worker wages and 
shift selection, we use both the local unemployment rate and the state leading index in the wage 
and selection regressions.   
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CHAPTER III 
DATA 
3.1 Dataset 
This paper uses cross-sectional data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
1979 (NLSY79).  The survey is sponsored and directed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The 
NLSY79 provides a sample of 12,686 men and women who were surveyed annually from 1979 
to 1994 and are currently interviewed on a biennial basis.  The NLSY79 provides a nationally 
representative sample and includes information on earnings, demographic characteristics, and 
shift work.  Two major portions of the NLSY79 data are analyzed in this paper.  First, a cross-
section of data from 1990 is analyzed.  Additionally, a pooled cross-section of data from 1990, 
1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000 is evaluated.   
 
3.1.1 1990 Cross-Section 
Following the previous literature, a cross-sectional dataset of shift workers is used to 
analyze shift wages.  This paper seeks to analyze the response of shift wages to local economic 
conditions, so the choice of cross-section used is important.  Data from 1990 are employed in the 
current analysis for a few major reasons.  First, 1990 marked the end of an economic expansion.  
From July 1990 through March 1991, the United States suffered a recession.  Thus, 1990 
provides an opportunity to analyze shift wages and shift choice during a weak economy.  1990 
data was also chosen to take advantage of a larger sample of night shift workers.  Additionally, 
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics, Sample Mean and Standard Deviation, 1990 Cross-Section 
 
 
Variable Description All Day Night
Wage hourly wage in dollars and cents 9.79 9.84 9.23
(5.065) (5.012) (5.700)
Log Wage logarithm of hourly wage 6.773 6.780 6.697
(0.474) (0.471) (0.503)
Night Shift =1 if night shift worker 0.070
(0.255)
Age age as of 1990 29.058 29.170 29.050
(2.269) (2.274) (2.268)
Years of School years of completed schooling 12.923 12.981 12.153
(2.409) (2.431) (1.939)
Experience age - hgc - 5 11.135 11.069 12.017
(3.226) (3.231) (3.031)
Tenure number of years worked at current job 3.456 3.496 2.932
(3.365) (3.380) (3.114)
Union =1 if wages are set by collective bargaining 0.181 0.174 0.304
(0.385) (0.377) (0.461)
Non-white =1 if nonwhite 0.304 0.295 0.423
(0.460) (0.456) (0.495)
Female =1 if female 0.448 0.455 0.349
(0.497) (0.498) (0.477)
Married =1 if married 0.533 0.540 0.406
(0.499) (0.542) (0.406)
North East =1 if resident of northeast 0.147 0.150 0.111
(0.355) (0.357) (0.314)
North Central =1 if resident of north central 0.237 0.234 0.281
(0.426) (0.423) (0.450)
South =1 if resident of South 0.419 0.419 0.420
(0.493) (0.493) (0.494)
MSA Resident =1 if resident of MSA 0.476 0.475 0.491
(0.499) (0.499) (0.501)
Professional Occupation =1 if professional and/or management occupation 0.255 0.264 0.131
(0.436) (0.441) (0.338)
Sales Occupation =1 if sales and/or clerical occupation 0.270 0.279 0.151
(0.444) (0.449) (0.358)
Craft Occupation =1 if production, craft, repair, or operator occupation 0.352 0.351 0.369
(0.478) (0.477) (0.483)
Unemployment Rate unemployment rate at labor market of current residence 5.554 5.546 5.671
(in percent) (1.819) (1.835) (1.587)
Leading Index state leading index, prediction of the six-month growth rate 1.200 1.195 1.275
in the state coincident index (0.864) (0.869) (0.790)
Number of Children number of children 1.075 1.056 1.324
(1.169) (1.154) (1.322)
Industry Shift Rate shift rate within the industry, calculated as the proportion 0.591 0.579 0.757
of night shift workers in 11 industry categories (0.387) (0.386) (0.367)
Firm Size 1 =1 if employed at a firm with 25-99 employees 0.248 0.252 0.199
(0.432) (0.434) (0.400)
Firm Size 2 =1 if employed at a firm with 100 to 499 employees 0.211 0.205 0.290
(0.408) (0.404) (0.454)
Firm Size 3 =1 if employed at a firm with 500 to 999 employees 0.058 0.052 0.136
(0.233) (0.221) (0.344)
Firm Size 4 =1 if employed at a firm with over 1000 employees 0.147 0.143 0.207
(0.354) (0.350) (0.406)
Observations 5026 4674 352
Note: Standard Deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 3.2 Summary Statistics, Sample Mean and Standard Deviation, 1990 Cross-Section 
 
 
 
during the 1990 survey round, the survey respondents were between the ages of 25 and 33 and 
were likely participants in the labor force.   
For 1990, the dataset of 12,686 workers was first modified to only include full-time 
workers, defined as those working more than thirty-five hours per week.  To remove outliers 
from the NLSY79 wage data, only individuals with wages between $1 and $150 per hour were 
included.  Observations on 5026 workers are included in the final analysis. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 
provide summary statistics for the variables included in the 1990 cross-section regressions. 
 
3.1.2 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section 
In order to analyze changes in shift differentials and shift choice over time, cross-sections 
of data from 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000 are pooled.  Analyzing additional years of 
data allows for a larger number of observations on night shift workers.  From 1990 to 2000, the 
1980 Census/CPS codes were used to categorize workers by occupation and industry in the 
NSLY79.  Thus, using cross-sections of data from these years permits consistent comparison of 
Variable Description All Day Night
Ag/Construct Industry =1 if agric, forestry, mining, & construction industry 0.117 0.124 0.028
(0.321) (0.329) (0.166)
Manufacturing Industry =1 if manufacturing industry 0.231 0.227 0.278
(0.422) (0.419) (0.449)
Transportation Industry =1 if transportation industry 0.075 0.074 0.088
(0.264) (0.262) (0.284)
Wholesale Trade Industry =1if wholesale trade industry 0.046 0.047 0.023
(0.209) (0.023) (0.149)
Retail Trade Industry =1 if retail trade industry 0.119 0.111 0.227
(0.324) (0.314) (0.420)
Finance Industry =1 if finance industry 0.076 0.081 0.011
(0.265) (0.272) (0.106)
Prof. & Related Industry =1 if professional or related industry 0.183 0.185 0.156
(0.386) (0.388) (0.364)
Public Administration Industry =1 if public administration industry 0.047 0.046 0.057
Note: Standard Deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 3.3 Summary Statistics, Sample Mean and Standard Deviation, 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section 
 
  
Variable Description All Day Night
Wage hourly wage in dollars and cents 13.04 13.16 11.14
(8.67) (8.79) (6.14)
Log Wage logarithm of hourly wage 7.017 7.025 6.893
(0.543) (0.545) (0.492)
Night Shift =1 if night shift worker 0.060
(0.237)
Age age for years 1990-2000 33.860 33.870 33.709
(4.180) (4.179) (4.218)
Years of School years of completed schooling 13.110 13.164 12.260
(2.416) (2.439) (1.806)
Experience age - hgc - 5 15.750 15.706 16.450
(4.748) (4.756) (4.569)
Tenure number of years worked at current job 5.039 5.074 4.474
(4.875) (4.880) (4.758)
Union =1 if wages are set by collective bargaining 0.169 0.160 0.302
(0.374) (0.367) (0.459)
Non-white =1 if nonwhite 0.337 0.330 0.455
(0.473) (0.470) (0.498)
Female =1 if female 0.453 0.459 0.371
(0.498) (0.498) (0.483)
Married =1 if married 0.571 0.578 0.458
(0.495) (0.494) (0.498)
North East =1 if resident of northeast 0.146 0.148 0.125
(0.353) (0.355) (0.331)
North Central =1 if resident of north central 0.233 0.230 0.276
(0.423) (0.421) (0.447)
South =1 if resident of South 0.425 0.424 0.435
(0.494) (0.494) (0.496)
MSA Resident =1 if resident of MSA 0.524 0.522 0.556
(0.521) (0.521) (0.513)
Unemployment Rate unemployment rate at labor market of 6.028 6.027 6.036
current residence (in percent) (2.804) (2.817) (2.598)
Leading Index state leading index (prediction of the six month 1.706 1.707 1.688
growth rate in the state coincident index) (0.904) (0.905) (0.893)
Number of Children number of children 1.468 1.453 1.702
(1.305) (1.293) (1.462)
Industry Shift Rate shift rate within the industry, calculated 0.525 0.517 0.639
as the proportion of night shift workers (0.326) (0.327) (0.286)
in 11 industry categories
Firm Size 1 =1 if employed at a firm with 25-99 employees 0.253 0.256 0.200
(0.435) (0.437) (0.400)
Firm Size 2 =1 if employed at a firm with 100 to 499 employees 0.227 0.221 0.311
(0.419) (0.415) (0.463)
Firm Size 3 =1 if employed at a firm with 500 to 999 employees 0.061 0.058 0.114
(0.239) (0.233) (0.318)
Firm Size 4 =1 if employed at a firm with over 1000 employees 0.124 0.119 0.211
(0.330) (0.324) (0.408)
Observations 24732 23260 1472
Standard Deviations are in parentheses.
49 
 
Table 3.4 Summary Statistics, Sample Mean and Standard Deviation, 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section 
 
 
 
individuals by occupation and industry.  Again, only full-time workers with wages between $1 
and $150 an hour were included in the analysis.  Observations on 24,732 individuals were 
analyzed.  In 1990, the minimum age of respondents was 25 and by 2000, the oldest respondent 
was 44.  Tables 3.3 and 3.4 provide summary statistics for the variables included in 1990-2000 
pooled cross-section regressions. 
 
3.2 Variable Description 
 A description of the main variables of interest, the shift variable, the unemployment rate, 
the leading index, the wage variable, and other demographic variables is next provided in 
addition to a discussion of occupation and industry characteristics. 
 
Variable Description All Day Night
Professional Occupation =1 if professional and/or management occupation 0.310 0.321 0.137
(0.462) (0.467) (0.343)
Sales Occupation =1 if sales and/or clerical occupation 0.245 0.251 0.144
(0.430) (0.434) (0.351)
Craft Occupation =1 if production, craft, repair, or operator occupation 0.326 0.320 0.431
(0.469) (0.466) (0.495)
Ag/Farm/Fish Industry =1 if agriculture, farming, or fishing industry 0.022 0.023 0.003
(0.146) (0.150) (0.058)
Mining Industry =1 if mining industry 0.006 0.005 0.015
(0.076) (0.072) (0.121)
Construction Industry =1 if construction industry 0.083 0.088 0.013
(0.276) (0.283) (0.113)
Non-Durable Manufacturing Industry =1 if non-durable manufacturing industry 0.088 0.082 0.181
(0.283) (0.274) (0.385)
Durable Manufacturing Industry =1 if durable manufacturing industry 0.128 0.127 0.145
(0.334) (0.333) (0.353)
Transportation Industry =1 if transportation industry 0.085 0.084 0.094
(0.278) (0.277) (0.292)
Wholesale Trade Industry =1if wholesale trade industry 0.035 0.036 0.026
(0.184) (0.185) (0.159)
Retail Trade Industry =1 if retail trade industry 0.103 0.100 0.162
(0.305) (0.300) (0.368)
Finance Industry =1 if finance industry 0.072 0.076 0.007
(0.259) (0.265) (0.086)
Prof. & Related Industry =1 if professional or related industry 0.207 0.209 0.165
(0.405) (0.407) (0.371)
Public Administration Industry =1 if public administration industry 0.062 0.062 0.063
(0.242) (0.242) (0.243)
Note: Standard Deviations are in parentheses.
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3.2.1 Shift Variable 
The variable of primary interest is the shift variable.  Respondents to the NLSY79 are 
asked to select one of the following categories to describe the hours or shift they normally work: 
regular day, regular evening, regular night, rotating shift, split shift, irregular shift, or other.    
The BLS defines a regular day shift as one that takes place between the hours of 6 a.m. and  
6 p.m.  Regular evening shifts usually occur between the hours of 2 p.m. and midnight.  A 
regular night shift is defined as a shift schedule taking place between the hours of 9 p.m. and 8 
a.m.  Rotating shifts require that workers rotate through a cycle of shifts; i.e. working first day 
shifts, then evening shifts, then night shifts.  Individuals working irregular shifts do not have a 
predetermined regular shift schedule.  For example, they may work night shifts one week, day 
shifts the next week, then possibly night shifts again the next week.  Irregular schedules may be 
employer-arranged, allowing employers to vary the time of the shift to meet the needs of the 
business (McMenamin 2004).  The final samples only include day and night shift workers.  In 
the original sample of 12,686 individuals in the 1990 cross-section, 9,170 respondents indicated  
the hours or shift that they normally worked.  72% of the respondents work a regular day shift.  
Approximately 6% work a regular evening shift, while 5.2% work a regular night shift.   6.4% of 
respondents report working a rotating shift, 1% report working a split shift, and 8.4% report 
working an irregular shift.  1% of respondents report a shift that does not fall into the above 
categories.  In the original sample of 76,116 observations from the 1990-2000 pooled cross-
sections, 46,970 observations on shift status were available.  74% of observations were regular 
day shift workers.  Approximately 6% of the observations were regular evening shift workers, 
while 4.5% of observations were regular night shift workers.  5.5% of observations were rotating 
shift workers, 1% were split shift workers, and 8.4% were irregular shift workers.  0.85% of 
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observations did not fall within these categories. 
Following the research of DeBeaumont and Nsiah, the two categories considered for the 
current analysis are regular day shift and regular night shift.  The rationale for choosing to 
compare day workers to night workers rather than comparing day workers to all workers who are 
employed during non-standard hours follows the research of Schumacher and Hirsch (1997), 
Shapiro (1993) , Mayshar and Solon (1993), and Halevy and Nason (2002).  Schumacher and  
Hirsch (1997) indicate larger wage premiums for night shift workers relative to evening shift, 
split shift, rotating shift, or other shifts.  This finding is consistent with the theory of 
compensating differentials.  Night shift work is an unfavorable work condition that a majority of 
workers may find inconvenient, and substantial wage premiums may be necessary to induce 
workers to accept night work.  Thus, compensating wages are likely to be more prevalent in 
night shifts.   
The current analysis also seeks to determine the impact of local economic conditions 
on the size of the compensating wage differential for shift work and on the incidence of shift 
work.  This further justifies the use of day versus night shifts.  Shapiro (1993) and Mayshar and 
Solon (1993) provide evidence of the cyclical nature of shiftwork.  Mayshar and Solon indicate 
that night shift employment is more responsive to changes in real GNP than overall employment.  
Halevy and Nason (2002) also find that night shift employment is extremely procyclical.  The 
current analysis is restricted to a comparison of day and night shift work since differences in 
compensating wages and the effect of changes in local economic conditions will be more 
pronounced.  Table 3.5 indicates that 7.1% of respondents in the 1990 cross-section were night 
shift workers, while 6% of the respondents in the 1990-2000 pooled cross-sections worked at 
night.  Night shift work was most prevalent in 1990, with the lowest incidence of night shift  
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Table 3.5 Observations, All Years 
 
 
 
work occurring in 1994 with 4.6% of the sample working at night.  After 1994, night shift work 
became more prevalent.   
Evaluating the respondents of the NLSY from 1979 to 2004, Presser and Ward (2011) 
find that shift participation varies over an individual’s lifetime, with higher participation rates in 
non-standard shift work more prevalent early in one’s life, from ages 18-24.  They find relatively 
stable rates of shift work after the age of 25.  Similar results are obtained when conducting this 
analysis for night shift workers using the current dataset.  In 1990, the youngest workers were 
25, and the data indicate that night shift work participation rates remain relatively stable, 
averaging 6% and ranging from approximately 4.7 – 7.13% of workers at each age in the sample.   
 
3.2.2 Local Unemployment Rate 
 The unemployment rate used in the analysis is defined as the local unemployment rate at 
the labor market of current residence.  The unemployment rate variable is part of the NLSY 
confidential geocode information, and was obtained through a license agreement with the BLS.  
Year All Night Day
1990 5026 352 4674
(%) 7.1 92.9
1992 4157 254 3903
(%) 6.1 93.9
1994 2523 117 2406
(%) 4.6 95.4
1996 4339 251 4088
(%) 5.8 94.2
1998 4371 240 4131
(%) 5.5 94.5
2000 4312 258 4054
(%) 6.0 94.0
Pooled 24732 1472 23260
(%) 6.0 94.0
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To construct the unemployment rate variable, the BLS uses data from the March publication of 
Employment and Earnings, a report of the Department of Labor.  Unemployment rates are 
available for each state and for selected metropolitan areas.  Respondents are determined to live 
in a specific metropolitan area based on their state, county, and zip code information.  For 
respondents living in those selected metropolitan areas listed in the Employment and Earnings 
report, the unemployment rate is the unemployment rate for that area.  For respondents living in 
a metropolitan area that is not listed in the report, the BLS uses the state unemployment rate and 
the unemployment rates from the metropolitan areas to compute an unemployment rate.  The 
average unemployment rate for 1990 respondents was 5.6%, while the average unemployment 
rate for respondents from 1990-2000 was 6.0%.   
Table 3.6 indicates the percentiles for the unemployment rate for the years used in this 
analysis.  Blanchard (1993) remarks that the recession of 1990-1991 featured a “slow and weak” 
recovery.  Schweitzer (2003) summarizes that the “expansion of the 1990’s began with such 
unexpectedly slow employment growth that commentators called it the jobless recovery.”  This 
slow recovery is reflected in the NLSY79 data, since the respondents still experience high 
unemployment for years after the 1990 recession.  The average unemployment rate in the sample 
was 5.6% in March of 1990 and reached a peak in 1992 at 7.9%.  Unemployment slowly tapered 
off through 1994 and 1996.   By 1998, the average unemployment rate in the sample was below 
the average unemployment rate in 1990.  The lowest average unemployment rate occurred in 
2000, at 4.5% unemployment.  Table 3.5 indicates declines in the incidence of night shift work 
from 1990 through 1994, reflecting the slow recovery and the high unemployment rates 
experienced in these years. 
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Table 3.6 Percentiles for Unemployment Rate, All Years 
 
 
 
3.2.3 Leading Index 
This paper also uses the state leading index as another indicator of local economic 
conditions.  The leading index used in the analysis is produced for each of the 50 states by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.  The indexes are calculated monthly.  The state leading 
index predicts the six month growth rate of the state’s coincident index.  The state coincident 
index provides information about the current state of the economy and includes four state-level 
indicators, nonfarm payroll employment, average hours worked in manufacturing, the 
unemployment rate, and wage and salary disbursements deflated by the consumer price index.  
The Philadelphia Fed uses vector autoregression models to construct the state leading index, 
which includes the state coincident index, state level housing permits, state initial unemployment 
insurance claims, delivery times from the Institute for Supply Management manufacturing 
survey, and the interest rate spread between the 10-year Treasury bond and the 3 month Treasury 
bill.  Prior and current values of these variables are used to determine the future values of the 
state coincident index.  
To remain consistent with the local unemployment rate variable, the leading index values 
used in this paper are from March of the survey year.  Respondents were interviewed from June 
through December, with a majority of the respondents completing the survey in July, August, 
and September.  Thus, the leading index from March of the survey years predicts growth in the 
Percentile (for model
with Unemployment Rate) 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Pooled
10th 3.6 5.3 4.4 3.6 2.8 2.4 3.1
25th 4.4 6.2 5.2 4.5 3.3 2.9 4.1
mean 5.6 7.9 7.0 6.8 5.1 4.5 6
50th 5.3 7.4 6.3 6.1 4.5 3.9 5.5
75th 6.2 9.0 8.3 7.6 5.8 5.3 7.3
90th 8.0 10.4 10.3 13.3 7.9 6.4 9.6
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coincident index that coincides with the time period of the interviews.  Table 3.7 provides 
percentiles of the leading index.  In 1990, the average leading index value was 1.2, indicating 
that the coincident index was predicted to grow 1.2% in the next six months.  Predicted growth  
continued to be relatively low in 1992, reflective of the slow recovery from the recession of 
1990.  As the economy rebounded in 1994, the average predicted growth increased to 2.6%.  
Predicted growth tapered off in the remaining years in the sample, reaching smaller values in 
2000, foreshadowing the recession that would plague the 2000’s. 
 
Table 3.7 Percentiles for Leading Index, All Years 
 
 
 
3.2.4 Other Variables 
3.2.4.1 Wage 
 The dependent variable in this paper is the log of the individual’s hourly wage.  The 
NLSY79 survey collects information on each respondent’s rate of pay as well as information on 
the applicable unit of time an individual worked.  For those respondents who did not report an 
hourly unit of pay, the time measure and reported wage are used to calculate an hourly rate of 
pay.  The wage is reported in dollars and cents.  As reported in Table 3.1, the average hourly 
wage is approximately $9.84 for day workers compared to approximately $9.23 for night shift  
workers in the 1990 cross-section.  Table 3.3 indicates that the average hourly wage is 
Percentile (for model
with Leading Index) 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Pooled
10th 0.2 0.2 1.6 1.2 1.2 0.2 0.5
25th 0.9 0.4 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.2
mean 1.2 1.6 2.6 1.8 1.9 1.5 1.7
50th 1.3 1.7 2.4 1.7 2.0 1.9 1.7
75th 1.7 2.5 3.2 2.3 2.5 2.1 2.3
90th 2.4 3.0 3.9 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.7
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Table 3.8 Average Wage, All Years 
 
 
 
$13.16 for day workers compared to $11.14 for night workers in the pooled cross-sections from 
1990-2000.  Table 3.8 details the mean wage for all of the years of data included in the analysis.  
Both day and night wages increased over time, however, night wages did not rise as much on 
average as day wages.  The largest difference in the average wages of day and night workers 
occurred in 1998 and 2000.  Overall, day wages are consistently higher than night wages. 
 
3.2.4.2 Exclusion Restrictions 
 To improve model identification, two exclusion restrictions, number of children and 
industry shift rate are included in the analysis.  In both the cross-section and pooled cross-section 
analysis, night shift workers have more children on average than day workers.  Following 
Kostiuk (1990) and Lanfranchi et. al (2002), the industry shift rate is included in the analysis.   
The shift rate variable is calculated as the proportion of night shift workers in the full NLSY79 
cross-sections in each of 11 industry categories: agriculture/forestry/fishing, mining, 
construction, non-durable manufacturing, durable manufacturing, transportation, wholesale trade, 
Year All Day Night
1990 9.79 9.84 9.23
(5.07) (5.01) (5.70)
1992 10.95 11.04 9.39
(6.52) (6.63) (4.34)
1994 12.41 12.49 10.65
(8.01) (8.14) (4.41)
1996 13.55 13.62 12.40
(8.55) (8.57) (8.11)
1998 14.91 15.09 11.94
(9.27) (9.42) (5.30)
2000 16.79 17.01 13.41
(11.28) (11.50) (6.26)
Pooled 13.04 13.16 11.14
(8.67) (8.79) (6.14)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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retail trade, finance, business/repair/personal services, entertainment/recreation, professional, and 
public administration industries.  The shift rate variable provides a way of incorporating industry 
differences in the frequency of night shift work and reflects worker preferences since workers 
may avoid industries where night shift work is common if they are averse to working at night. 
 
3.2.4.3 Demographic Variables 
The wage equation also includes several standard demographic variables, such as 
education, job tenure and experience, union status, marital status, race, and region of residence.  
Tables 3.1 and 3.3 provide summary statistics for these variables.  Highest grade completed, hgc, 
is used as a measure of the educational attainment of respondents.  In the 1990 cross-section and 
in the pooled cross-sections, on average, day workers had one year of additional schooling when 
compared to night shift workers.  A variable indicating job experience, exp, is calculated as a 
respondent’s age minus the highest grade completed minus five (age-hgc-5).  On average, night 
shift workers had an additional year of experience when compared to day shift workers.  When 
comparing job tenure, teny, night shift workers have worked at their current job half of a year 
less, on average, than day workers.   
Night shift workers are almost twice as likely as day workers to be members of a union. 
30% of night shift workers are union members in both the 1990 cross-section and in the pooled 
cross-section.  Approximately 42% of night shift workers were non-white in 1990 compared to 
45% in the pooled cross-section.  Night shift workers are less likely to be female, with female 
night shift participation at 35% in 1990 and 37% in the pooled cross-section.  Night shift workers 
are approximately 12-13% less likely to be married than day workers.   
Respondents are also classified as living in one of four regions of the United States: 
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northeast, north central, south, and west.  Table B1 in Appendix B details how states are 
classified according to region in the NLSY79.  The South is the most densely populated region, 
with 43% of the final sample in residence in the pooled cross-section.  The regional distribution 
of night shift workers and day workers is relatively similar.  When compared to day workers, a 
higher percentage of night shift workers live in the north central region, while a lower percentage 
of night shift workers live in the northeast region.  A variable is also included to model whether 
or not a respondent lives in a metropolitan statistical area, or msa.  Metropolitan statistical areas 
are cities and counties that are grouped into a common region by the Office of Management and 
Budget.  Metropolitan areas contain an urban area with a population of 50,000 or more.  In both 
the cross-section and pooled cross-section, night shift workers are more likely to live in a 
metropolitan area.   
  
3.2.4.3 Industry and Occupation 
The prevalence of night shift work varies by industry and occupation.  An industry is a 
group of firms that produce similar products and services.  An occupation is the set of tasks that 
a worker performs.  For the years 1990 through 2000, the NLSY79 categorizes a worker’s 
industry and occupation according to the 1980 Census Bureau classifications.  In cross-sectional 
analysis, each worker is assigned a dummy variable for each of thirteen major industrial 
categories and eight major occupational categories.   
The major industry classifications included in the NLSY79 are detailed in Tables 3.9 and 
3.10.  The tables indicate the percentage of the entire sample and the percentage of both day and 
night workers employed in each industry category for the 1990 cross-section and for the pooled  
cross-sections.  The third column of Table 3.9 indicates the percentage of night shift workers  
59 
 
Table 3.9 Percentage Distribution of Total, Day, & Night Workers by Industry Category, 1990 Cross-Section 
 
 
 
employed in each industry category in 1990.  In the sample, approximately 28% of night shift 
workers are employed in the manufacturing industry (both durable and non-durable).   
Approximately 25% of night shift workers are employed in trade (both wholesale and retail).   
16% of night shift workers are employed in professional and related services, while 12% are 
employed in business, repair, and personal services.  The industries least populated by night shift 
work are agriculture, forestry, and fishing; mining; construction; finance, insurance, and real 
estate; and entertainment and recreation services.  Approximately 1% of night shift workers were 
employed in these industries.  The categories which differ the most between night and day 
workers are construction, retail trade, and finance, insurance, and real estate.  Table 3.10 
indicates the percentage distribution by industry for the pooled cross-sections.  The percentage 
distribution of night shift workers is similar to the distribution in 1990, with higher percentages 
of night shift workers employed in non-durable manufacturing compared to the 1990 sample.   
16% of night workers are employed in retail trade from 1990-2000 compared to 22.7% in 1990.  
% of All % of Day % of Night
Workers Workers Workers
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing   2.0*     2.2** 0.3^
Mining 0.6 0.6 1.4
Construction 9.0 9.6 1.1
Non-Durable Manufacturing 9.4 9.1 14.2
Durable manufacturing 13.7 13.7 13.6
Transportation, Communications, and Other Public Utilities 7.5 7.4 8.8
Wholesale Trade 4.6 4.7 2.3
Retail Trade 11.9 11.1 22.7
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 7.6 8.1 1.1
Business, Repair, and Personal Services 10.0 9.9 11.9
Entertainment and Recreation Services 0.7 0.6 1.1
Professional and Related Services 18.3 18.5 15.6
Public Administration 4.7 4.6 5.7
100.0 100.0 100.0
Industry Category
*For example, calculated as total# of workers in agriculture, farming, and fishing industries / total # of workers
**For example, calculated as total# of day workers in agriculture, farming, and fishing industries / total # of day workers
^For example, calculated as total# of night workers in agriculture, farming, and fishing industries / total # of night workers
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Table 3.10 Percentage Distribution of Total, Day, & Night Workers by Industry Category, 1990-2000 Pooled 
Cross-Sections 
 
 
 
The major occupational categories included in the NLSY79 are detailed in Tables 3.11  
and 3.12.  The tables indicate the percentage of the entire sample and the percentage of both day 
and night workers employed in each occupation category for the 1990 cross-section and for the 
pooled cross-sections.  The third column of Table 3.11 indicates the percentage of night shift 
workers employed in each occupation category.  In the sample, approximately 34% of night shift 
workers are employed in the service industry, with night workers three times more likely to be 
employed in service occupations than day workers.  30% of night workers are employed as 
operators, fabricators, and laborers, compared to only 20% of day workers.  11.6% of night shift 
workers are employed in administrative/clerical positions and 11.1% are employed in managerial 
and professional specialties.  The occupations least populated by night shift work are farming, 
forestry, and fishing, technical, and sales workers.    
Table 3.12 provides a similar analysis for the 1990-2000 pooled cross-sections.  When 
data on night shift workers is averaged from 1990-2000, higher percentages of night shift  
% of All % of Day % of Night
Workers Workers Workers
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing    2.2*      2.3**   0.3^
Mining 0.6 0.5 1.5
Construction 8.3 8.8 1.3
Non-Durable Manufacturing 8.8 8.2 18.1
Durable manufacturing 12.8 12.7 14.5
Transportation, Communications, and Other Public Utilities 8.4 8.4 9.4
Wholesale Trade 3.5 3.6 2.6
Retail Trade 10.3 10.0 16.2
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 7.2 7.6 0.7
Business, Repair, and Personal Services 10.1 10.0 11.0
Entertainment and Recreation Services 0.8 0.8 1.6
Professional and Related Services 20.7 20.9 16.5
Public Administration 6.2 6.2 6.2
100.0 100.0 100.0
Industry Category
*For example, calculated as total# of workers in agriculture, farming, and fishing industries / total # of workers
**For example, calculated as total# of day workers in agriculture, farming, and fishing industries / total # of day workers
^For example, calculated as total# of night workers in agriculture, farming, and fishing industries / total # of night workers
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Table 3.11 Percentage Distribution of Total, Day, &Night Workers by Occupation, 1990 Cross-Section 
 
 
 
workers are employed in precision production, craft, and repair and operator, fabricator, and 
laborer occupations relative to 1990.  Only 28% of night shift workers were employed as service 
workers, compared to 34% in 1990. 
Following DeBeaumont and Nsiah, broad occupation and industry categories are defined 
for the regression analysis.  Definitions and summary statistics for the industry and occupation 
variables used in the 1990 cross-section regressions are outlined in Table 3.2, with definitions  
 
 Table 3.12 Percentage Distribution of Total, Day, & Night Workers by Occupation, 1990-2000 Cross-Section 
 
 
% of All % of Day % of Night
Occupation Workers Workers Workers
Managerial and Professional Specialties   22.0*      22.8**   11.1^
Technical 3.5 3.6 2.0
Sales 7.4 7.7 3.4
Administrative Support/Clerical 19.6 20.2 11.6
Service 10.4 8.6 34.4
Farming, Forestry, and Fishing 1.9 2.0 0.6
Precision Production, Craft, and Repair 14.6 15.1 6.8
Operators, Fabricators, and Laborers 20.7 20.0 30.1
100.0 100.0 100.0
*For example, calculated as total# of workers in managerial occupations / total # of workers
**For example, calculated as total# of day workers in managerial occupations / total # of day workers
^For example, calculated as total# of night workers in managerial occupations / total # of night workers
% of All % of Day % of Night
Occupation Workers Workers Workers
Managerial and Professional Specialties   27.0*     28.0**  10.3^
Technical 4.0 4.0 3.4
Sales 6.7 6.9 3.4
Administrative Support/Clerical 17.8 18.2 11.0
Service 10.0 8.8 28.6
Farming, Forestry, and Fishing 2.0 2.1 0.2
Precision Production, Craft, and Repair 13.7 14.0 9.6
Operators, Fabricators, and Laborers 18.9 18.0 33.6
100.0 100.0 100.0
*For example, calculated as total# of workers in managerial occupations / total # of workers
**For example, calculated as total# of day workers in managerial occupations / total # of day workers
^For example, calculated as total# of night workers in managerial occupations / total # of night workers
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and summary statistics for the industry and occupation variables used in the pooled cross-section 
analysis outlined in Table 3.4.  Business, personal, and entertainment services are controlled as 
the base industry group in the regressions.  Three major occupation variables included in the 
regression analysis are professional workers, which includes workers in the managerial and 
professional specialty occupations as well as those in technical occupations, sales workers, which 
includes both sales and administrative support/clerical workers, and craft workers, which 
includes those workers in the precision production, craft and repair occupations as well as those 
in the operators, fabricators, and laborers category.  Service, farming, forestry, and fishing 
workers are controlled as the base occupations in the regressions.   
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CHAPTER IV 
MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
4.1 Introduction  
 This chapter describes econometric estimation techniques employed to analyze the 
following questions: 
 What is the impact of local economic conditions on shift choice? 
 What is the impact of the shift differential on shift choice? 
 How does the impact of the shift differential on shift selection depend on local economic 
conditions? 
First, a basic OLS model is described.  The proper model to analyze the current data is the 
switching regression model with endogenous switching.  Both cross-sectional and pooled panel 
datasets are estimated using both a two-step procedure provided by Lee (1978) and by maximum 
likelihood.  The endogenous switching regression model is also estimated using two measures of 
local economic conditions, the local unemployment rate and the state-level leading index.  Wage 
differentials are estimated for all variations of the models.   
 
4.2 OLS Estimation 
An analysis of shift differentials begins with a simple hedonic log wage equation with the 
form  
1 2   i i i iw X nshift                        (1)                                                    
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where the dependent variable is the log of the individual’s wage,   is a vector of personal 
characteristics,        is a dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual works a 
night shift, and   is an i.i.d. error term.  In this model,    is an estimate of the compensating 
differential for night shift work.   If individuals are located in labor markets with varying local 
economic conditions,     may be estimated incorrectly.  To correct for this, the hedonic wage 
equation is estimated as 
1 2 3    i i i i i i iX nshift LEC nshift LECw                                      (2) 
where     is the measure of local economic conditions (either the local unemployment rate or 
the state leading index) and           is the interaction between         and    .  In model 
(2),    indicates the compensating differential for night shift work when the local unemployment 
rate or the state leading index is zero.    indicates how the compensating differential for night 
shift work changes when local economic conditions change.  If compensating differentials for 
night shift work are lower in areas with weak economic conditions,   will be negative in models 
using the local unemployment rate as the indicator of local labor market conditions and   will be 
positive in models using the leading index as the indicator of local labor market conditions.
1
   
Simple OLS estimates of the above equations are biased and inconsistent due to the 
failure to correct for the endogeneity of the night shift variable.  An individual’s status as a night 
shift worker is likely correlated with some unidentified variable in the error term of the 
individual’s wage equation.  Worker characteristics included in X such as ability, schedule 
constraints, preferences, and family obligations are unmeasured components of an individual’s  
                                                          
1
 Models (1) and (2) are estimated with the data from the current analysis, and the results are included in Table A33.  
All of the models fail to find significant impacts of the interaction between the local economic condition and status 
as a night shift worker.   
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wage that are likely correlated with the decision to work a night shift.  Additionally, participation 
in night shift work is not randomly determined; workers self-select into night work.  As detailed 
in Section 1.3.1, workers may choose to work a night shift for various reasons including higher 
wages, nature of the job, or personal preference.  Following Kostiuk (1990) and Lanfranchi, et 
al. (2002), model (2) is best estimated by using a selection model.  
 
4.3 Switching Regression Model with Endogenous Switching  
One goal of this paper is to determine the impact of shift differentials and local labor 
market conditions on the decision to work a night shift.  The appropriate model to estimate shift 
premiums and the choice to work a shift is a switching regression model with endogenous 
switching.  Individuals self-select into either day work or night work, and wages of day and night 
workers are observed dependent upon a selection equation modeling the decision to work a shift.  
Factors influencing the decision to work a shift which are included in the error term of the 
selection equation are likely correlated with factors in the error term of the individual’s wage 
equation.  A switching regression model with endogenous switching is estimated using both a 
two-step procedure provided by Lee (1978) and maximum likelihood.   
 
4.3.1. Basic Equations Used in the Switching Regression Model   
In the switching regression model, separate log wage equations for night and day workers 
are specified and are assumed to take the form 
        
s s s s
i i i iw X LEC                                                          (3) 
   d d d di i i iw X LEC                                                       (4) 
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where the dependent variable is the log hourly wage rate for individuals and   is a vector of 
personal, demographic, occupational, and industrial variables.      denotes the local economic 
conditions, either the local unemployment rate or the state leading index.  Equation (3) models 
wages for night shift work (denoted by the superscript s), and equation (4) models wages for day 
workers (denoted by the superscript d).  These equations allow the returns to each work 
characteristic to be different for night and day workers.  Since workers choose which shift to 
work, a structural selection equation specifying shift choice is also included in the model.  Shift 
choice is determined by  
 * 1    2   s di i i i i iS Z LEC w w v                                                 (5) 
where   
  is a latent variable indicating the net benefit of working a night shift.  Only the decision 
    to work a night shift or not, is observed, where 
*( 0)i is I s                                                                      (6)  
where    indicates if the net benefit is non-negative and shift work is selected.        if 
* 0is 
and        otherwise.  The observed log wage is thus defined as 
(1 )s di i i i iw s w s w                                                                (7)  
and is equal to    
    for those who choose to work the night shift and is equal to    
   for those who 
choose to work the day shift.   
 In (5) above, Z is a vector of variables that influence shift choice.  It includes some of the 
variables in   and exclusion restrictions, exogenous variables expected to influence the decision 
to work a shift that are not included in the individual wage equations, which improve model 
identification. The variable   (  )
s d
i iw w indicates the premium obtained for night shift work.  The 
unobserved errors , )( ,s di i iv   are assumed to be independent of ( , , )X Z LEC  and 
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are normally distributed: 
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     
                                             (8) 
 
  The wage equations (3) and (4) and the selection equation (5) form the switching 
regression model with endogenous switching.  The error terms in the individual’s wage 
equations, s
i  and 
d
i , are likely correlated with the error term in the selection equation,   .  This 
correlation gives rise to selectivity bias.  Thus, it is useful to substitute the wage equations into 
the selection equation to find the following reduced form:  
     * 1  2   s s d s di i i i i id i iS Z LEC X LEC v                                   (9)                
which can be given new parameters to become 
  * 1 2  i i i i iS Z X LEC                                                    (10) 
where  | , ,i i i iX LEC Z  ~    0,1).    
 
4.3.2 Two-Step Estimation Strategy  
Lee (1978) provides the two-step method for estimating the endogenous switching 
regression model.  Lee’s estimator for the switching regression model is summarized as follows: 
1) Estimate the reduced form of the selection equation, (9) using probit.  Compute (ψ) , the 
probability density function and Φ(ψ) , the distribution function evaluated at 
1 2
ψ  
i i i
Z X LEC     .  The density and distribution functions may be used to calculate 
the inverse Mills ratios 
(ψ)  
Φ(ψ)

 and 
 
(ψ)  
(1 Φ ψ )


for each observation.  
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2) The inverse Mills ratios are next included in OLS estimation of the expected wage 
equations 
  * ,
(  ψ)  
| , , , 0   
Φ(ψ)
s
s s s
i i i i i i iE w X LEC Z S X LEC  

                             (11)       
       
 
 *
,
(ψ)  
| , , , 0   
(1 Φ ψ )
d
d d d
i i i i i i iE w X LEC Z S X LEC  

     

                     (12) 
to estimate    ,   ,   ,   ,      , and      .  Here,      , and       are estimates of the 
covariance between the error in the individual wage equations and the error in the 
selection equation.   
3) The results of the individual wage equations are next used to calculate                        
                              | , ( ) )(s d s d s di i i i i iE w w X LEC X LEC                               (13) 
the wage differential for night shift work.  This wage differential is then included as a 
regressor in probit estimation of the structural form of the selection equation (5).   
A comparison of the results of the reduced and structural estimation allows us to 
determine the impact of local economic conditions on shift choice and the impact of the shift 
differential on shift choice.  The estimation of the conditional expected wage equations (11) and 
(12) provides a test for the presence of selection bias by estimating the covariances      , and 
     , the coefficients on the inverse Mills ratios.  If      , and       are significant in the 
individual wage equations, the correction for sample selection was necessary.  The sign of these 
coefficients indicates the presence of positive or negative selection into day or night work and 
should be interpreted as follows: 
       positive indicates positive selection into night shifts, and that workers choosing night 
shift work earn above average wages at night.        negative indicates negative selection into 
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 night shifts and that workers choosing night shift work earn below average wages at night. 
       negative indicates positive selection into day shifts, and that workers choosing day 
work earn above average wages during the day.        positive indicates negative selection 
into day work and that workers choosing day work earn below average wages during the day. 
 
4.3.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimation  
The switching regression model with endogenous switching may also be estimated using 
maximum likelihood, which leads to consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates.  To derive 
the likelihood function for the switching regression model, the individual wage equations (3) and 
(4) from above are needed as well as the structural equation (5) and the reparameterized version 
of the reduced form (10).  Full information maximum likelihood involves forming the joint 
distribution of the endogenous variables and then maximizing the likelihood function.   
The likelihood function for this model is  
1
 ( , | , , ) 
n
i i i i i
i
L f W S X LEC Z


ψ
, ,
1 ψ
( ,  )d  (1 ) ( ,  )d  s d
n
s s d d
i i i i i i
i
L S f W X LEC S f W X LEC
   

       

  
 
       
  
  
where 1 2ψ   i i iZ X LEC     .        and       are the bivariate normal density functions of 
( , )s   and ( , )d  .
Selection into night shift work is endogenous to wages; thus, simultaneous maximum 
likelihood estimation of equations (3), (4), and the selection equation (5) corrects for this 
selection bias by taking  , i if W S  into account.  Estimates of the individual wage equations (3) 
and (4) are used to calculate the estimated wage differential for night shift work (13).  This wage 
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differential is then included in probit estimation of the structural form of the selection 
equation (5).  The coefficients on the inverse Mills ratios in equations (11) and (12) are also 
estimated in the maximum likelihood model.  These coefficients provide a test for the presence  
of selection bias and indicate positive or negative selection into day and night work
2
. 
   
4.3.4 Interaction Effects 
In the simpler models proposed by Bender and Mridha (2011) and DeBeaumont and 
Nsiah (2010), determining the impact of local labor market conditions on the size of the wage 
differential was accomplished by interacting a shift indicator variable with the local 
unemployment rate and including this interaction term in OLS wage regressions.  The coefficient 
on the interaction effect in the wage regressions in Section 4.2,  , indicates how the 
compensating differential for night shift work changes when local economic conditions change.  
The use and interpretation of interaction terms is more complicated in the endogenous switching 
regression model.  Analyzing the impact of local labor market conditions on shift differentials is 
accomplished in this model by analyzing the impact of an interaction effect between the shift 
differential and local economic conditions on shift selection in the structural selection equation.  
This analysis will help to answer the third major question addressed by this paper: how does the 
impact of the shift differential on shift selection depend on local economic conditions?  In areas 
with weak economic conditions, we might expect shift selection to depend less on the night shift 
                                                          
2
  Lokshin and Sajaia (2004) provide a Stata program, movestay, for maximum likelihood estimation of the 
endogenous switching regression model.  The movestay results include estimates of the inverse Mills ratios, 
estimates of the correlation coefficient between the error term in each wage equation and the selection equation 
(      and      ), and the standard deviation of the errors in the wage equations (    and    ).  The selection term 
coefficients, estimates of the covariance between the errors, are obtained by multiplying the correlation coefficients 
by the standard deviations from each individual wage equation.  Using the night shift selection term as an example, 
since                   where    is normalized to 1, multiplying     by        provides an estimate of the 
covariance.  Since     is a scale factor, the significance of       and      determine the significance of the selection 
terms.    
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differential since workers would likely have fewer alternatives to night shift work and there 
would be more unemployed workers competing for shift positions.  Night shift work is also less 
likely to be profitable in weak economies when production levels are down and thus fewer shift 
positions are likely to be available. Consequently, a greater supply of shift workers coupled with 
lower demand for them means that firms can pay a smaller shift differential.         
 To investigate this possible interaction, we consider the probability of selecting shift 
work conditional on the shift differential, local business conditions and the observed exogenous 
covariates.  It follows from equations (3) though (7) and well-known properties of the 
multivariate normal distribution that    
* 2
( 1| , , , )
       1 [ ( , , , ) / var( | , , )(1 )]
s d
i i i i i i
s d
i i i i i i i i i
P s w w LEC X Z
w w LEC X Z s LEC X Z 
  
   
                   (14)  
where   denotes the standard normal distribution function and  
*
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Of interest is the effect of changes in the shift differential on the probability of selecting 
night shift work (14) under different local economic conditions.  One obstacle is that (14) 
depends on sd which is not point identified and, therefore, neither is (14). Both quantities are 
only partially identified.  Vijverberg (1993) provides informative bounds for  sd  that can be 
consistently estimated, but deriving informative bounds for (14) from these is complicated by the 
fact that (14) is not a monotonic function of sd  for all values of the shift differential.  However, 
(14) is a monotonic function of sd  when conditioned on the expected differential, that is, 
( | , , )s d s di i i i i i iw w E w w LEC X Z   , and, thus, deriving informative bounds in this case is a 
straightforward exercise.
3
  A focus on the expected differential can also be justified by being the 
“average” shift differential for the subset of the population characterized by the given values of 
X, Z, and LEC.  Hence, we will investigate how the effect of the shift differential on the 
distribution of shift selection depends on local economic conditions by analyzing changes in the 
expected differential for various local economic conditions.  The lower and upper bounds of the 
selection probability are calculated according to Theorem 1.    
 
Theorem 1  
If  ( | , , )s d s di i i i i i iw w E w w LEC X Z    then  ( 1| , , , )  
s d
L i i i i i i UB P s w w LEC X Z B     
where 
*( | , , )
1 i i i iL
L
E s LEC X Z
B
 
  
  
 and
*( | , , )
1 i i i iU
U
E s LEC X Z
B
 
  
  
. 
              (continued) 
 
                                                          
3
 For the other cases, it would be necessary to apply constrained minimization and maximization techniques to (14) 
over the bounds interval for sd  to derive the bounds.  
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Let 
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.                                                          Proof: See Appendix B 
The lower and upper bounds of the selection probability in Theorem 1 are functions of 
only the identified parameters and thus can be consistently estimated for any specified setting  
of , , , ( | , , ).s di i i i i i i iLEC X Z E w w LEC X Z  The estimated bounds are reported in Section 5.4 for 
the local unemployment rate and the state leading index for both the cross-section and pooled 
cross-section models. 
 
4.3.5 Tests for Pooling 
Lanfranchi, et al. (2002) point out that a potential problem of estimating wages of day 
and night shift workers is model misspecification.  The estimation of separate wage equations in 
the switching regression model allows for the wages of day and night workers to be determined 
in different ways.  If day and night wages are determined differently, the data should not be 
pooled, and the switching regression model is appropriate.  If, however, the returns to each 
worker characteristic are the same for all workers, the data can instead be pooled and a single 
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wage equation, a treatment effects model, may be estimated.  Following Lanfranchi, et al. 
pooling may be tested by estimating the conditional expected wage equation and a treatment 
effects model.  The conditional expected wage equation is derived as  
      
, ,
E | , ,   Φ(ψ) Φ(ψ) ( ) (ψ)s d
d d s d s d
i i i i i i i i
w X LEC Z X UE X LEC
   
                       (15)      
which is estimated using a similar two-step procedure as employed in the estimation of the 
individual wage equations.  The coefficients         and         indicate the difference in 
the returns to day and night workers.  A Wald test of the hypothesis        =       =0 
determines the joint significance of the variables representing the difference in the returns to day 
and night workers.  If significant, the test results indicate that data on day and night workers 
should not be pooled.  If insignificant, however, the treatment effects model is preferred.  A 
restricted version of the expected wage equation (10), the treatment effects model assumes 
        and      , that the coefficients for day and night workers are identical except for the 
intercept term.  The treatment effects model is estimated as                      
              , ,| , , Φ(ψ) ( ) (ψ)s di i i i i iE w X LEC Z X LEC                                     (16)                
where α is the difference in the intercepts for day and night workers.  The coefficient α indicates 
the effect of night shift work on wages and its significance indicates whether a significant 
difference exists between the wages of day and night workers.   
Analogous to the tests for pooling provided by Lanfranchi, et al. for the two-step 
estimator, pooling may also be tested for the maximum likelihood estimates.  This is 
accomplished by comparing the results obtained from the switching regression estimates of the 
individual wage equations (3) and (4) to the results obtained from maximum likelihood 
estimates of a treatment effects model of the form 
1 2 3    i i i i ilogW X nshift LEC               (17) 
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The reduced form of the selection equation for night shift work is provided by (9) above.  The 
log-likelihoods from the switching regression and treatment effects models are compared 
through a likelihood ratio test, which, if significant, indicates that data on day and night workers 
should not be pooled.   
 
4.3.6 Shift Differentials 
As mentioned in Section 4.3.2, the log wage differential (13) is calculated for each 
individual in the sample.  This paper seeks to estimate the expected value of the wage, not the 
expected value of the log wage.  The expected wage differential can be derived using the 
properties of the bivariate log-normal distribution as follows 
 
2 2
  E | , (    )  (  )
2 2
s d
s d s s d d
i i i i i i i iw w X UE exp X UE exp X UE
  
                    (18) 
where      and      are estimated as the intercepts in the following OLS regressions 
 2 2 ( )  ( ( ) –(  ))      
( )
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s s s
i i i iln w X UE u
 
    

   

                                           (19) 
    
 
 2 2 ( )  ( ( ) –(  ))      
(1 )
d
d d d
i i i iln w X UE u
 
    

   

                                          (20) 
where 1 2ψ   i i iZ X UE     .  These estimates can be used to compute the average shift 
premium in dollars.  Following Lee (1978) the percentage difference in the wage rate for night 
workers when compared to day workers,    E – | ,s di i i iw w X UE , is computed as 
2 2{ (   ) (1/ 2(  ))  (  )} / ( )          dss s d d d di i i i i iexp X UE exp exp X UE exp X UE            (21) 
This equation indicates the average percentage increment of the wage rate for night workers. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
5.1 Organization of Results 
The results from the estimation of shift choice and shift differentials using the 
endogenous switching regression model are divided into two major sections; results for a cross-
section of data from 1990 and results for a pooled cross-section of data from 1990-2000.  Both 
datasets are estimated using two-step (Section 4.3.2) and maximum likelihood (Section 4.3.3) 
methods.   Results will be evaluated using two measures of local economic conditions, the local 
unemployment rate and the state leading index.  Interaction effects are also estimated as 
discussed in Section 4.3.4.  The models are tested for pooling.  Major results for other cross-
sections from 1992-2000 are presented, as well as major results for the pooled cross-section 
regressions for different industries.  Wage differentials are estimated for the cross-section and 
pooled cross-section models as outlined in Section 4.3.7.  Tables highlighting the main results 
are presented throughout the chapter, with supporting results presented in tables in the Appendix. 
 
5.2 1990 Cross-Section Switching Regression Results 
The endogenous switching regression model is first evaluated for the 1990 cross-section 
as outlined in Section 4.3.1.  Results are first presented using the local unemployment rate as an 
indicator of local economic conditions, followed by model results using the leading index.  
Results for pooled cross-section analysis are reported in Section 5.3.   
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5.2.1. 1990 Cross-Section Switching Regression with Unemployment Rate 
5.2.1.1 Reduced Form Selection Equation 
Selected coefficients from the two-step and maximum likelihood estimation of the 
reduced form of the selection equation (9) are reported in columns 1 and 3 of Table 5.1.  
Columns 2 and 4 report the results from estimation of the structural equation (5), which will be 
discussed in Section 5.2.1.3.  Tables A1_1 and A1_2 in the Appendix reports coefficients and 
standard errors for all variables, offering a more complete version of the information provided in 
Table 5.1.  Regressors in the reduced form selection equation include a measure of local 
economic conditions (either the local unemployment rate or the leading index), the explanatory 
variables used in the individual wage equations, and two exclusion restrictions, number of 
children and industry shift rate.   
The results for most of the variables in estimation of the reduced form equation are 
largely similar between two-step and maximum likelihood methods.  The unemployment rate is 
insignificant for shift selection and the coefficient is negligible.  Both two-step and maximum 
likelihood results indicate that having more children significantly impacts the likelihood of 
working at night.  Two-step and maximum likelihood results also indicate that those working for 
larger firms are significantly more likely to work a night shift, with firm size having the largest 
impact for workers at firms with 500-999 employees, denoted by firm size 3.  Education, denoted 
by years of school, is a significant predictor of shift choice, however, experience and tenure fail 
to have a significant impact on the likelihood of selecting night shift work.  Union status 
positively and significantly influences shift choice in both the two-step and maximum likelihood 
results.  Female and married individuals are significantly less likely to choose night shift work.  
Those employed in professional, sales, and craft occupations are significantly less  
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Table 5.1 Two-Step and ML Selection Equations, 1990 Cross-Section with Unemployment Rate 
 
 
 
likely to work at night than those in the base group, service occupations.  There are not 
significant differences in shift choice as defined by broad industry categories.   
 
5.2.1.2. Individual Wage Equations 
The reduced form probit results are next used to control for self-selection into shift work 
in the estimation of the individual expected wage equations (11) and (12).  The coefficients from 
two-step and maximum likelihood estimation results for night and day workers are included in 
Table 5.2.  Tables A2_1 and A2_2 in the Appendix provide full results and standard errors.  The  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reduced Form Structural Form Reduced Form Structural Form
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Wage Differential 0.933** 0.831**
Unemployment Rate 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000
Number of Children 0.045* 0.051* 0.048** 0.052*
Industry Shift Rate 0.456 0.430 0.756 0.421
Firm Size 1 0.194** 0.185** 0.203** 0.189**
Firm Size 2 0.610*** 0.280 0.627*** 0.352**
Firm Size 3 1.057*** 0.549** 1.059*** 0.668***
Firm Size 4 0.706*** 0.274 0.726*** 0.364**
Years of School 0.390*** -0.019 0.412*** -0.021
Experience 0.234 0.014 0.241 0.016
Tenure -0.042 -0.038*** -0.040 -0.041***
Union 0.259*** 0.055 0.256*** 0.103
Non-white 0.022 0.027 0.012 0.013
Female -0.317*** -0.227*** -0.314*** -0.206***
Married -0.278*** -0.162** -0.283*** -0.254***
Professional Occupation -0.742*** -0.451** -0.714*** -0.538***
Sales Occupation -0.855*** -0.404** -0.832*** -0.523***
Craft Occupation -0.729*** -0.494*** -0.721*** -0.566***
Ag/Construction Industry -0.528 -0.432 -0.413 -0.038
Manufacturing Industry -0.053 -0.026 -0.076 -0.518
Transportation Industry 0.130 0.082 0.139 0.073
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.006 0.108 0.162 0.079
Retail Trade Industry 0.025 -0.202 -0.238 -0.147
Constant -4.337*** -0.256 -4.602*** -0.487
Log-likelihood -1036.46 -1044.9792 -2894.75 -1045.85
Observations 5026 5026 5026 5026
Two-Step Maximum Likelihood
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. Table A1 in the Appendix reports additional variables and standard errors.
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Table 5.2 Two-Step and ML Wage Equations, 1990 Cross-Section with Unemployment Rate 
 
 
 
 
unemployment rate has a negative and significant impact on the wages of day workers but does 
not have a significant impact on the wages of night workers.  The selection term coefficients are 
estimates of the covariance between the error terms in the individual wage equations and the 
error term in reduced form of the selection equation.  In both two-step and maximum likelihood 
estimation, the coefficient on the selection term for night workers is positive, indicating a 
positive correlation between the error term of the night shift equation and the error term in the 
reduced form of the selection equation.  This coefficient is also significant indicating the 
presence of selection bias.  This paper is the first study to find significant positive selection into 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Night Worker Day Worker Night Worker Day Worker 
Unemployment Rate -0.001 -0.003*** -0.002 -0.003***
Selection Term 0.518* -0.142  0.401*** 0.120***
Firm Size 1 0.036 0.031** 0.031 0.031***
Firm Size 2 0.390*** 0.054*** 0.342*** 0.052***
Firm Size 3 0.647*** 0.129*** 0.561*** 0.123***
Firm Size 4 0.570*** 0.130*** 0.511*** 0.127***
Years of School 0.120 0.050** 0.080 0.049***
Experience -0.126 0.014 -0.086 0.013
Tenure 0.100*** 0.060*** 0.101*** 0.060***
Union 0.332*** 0.112*** 0.298*** 0.111***
Non-white -0.093** -0.092*** -0.079* -0.093***
Female -0.288*** -0.206*** -0.262*** -0.205***
Married -0.089 0.039*** -0.052 0.039***
Professional Occupation -0.053 0.329*** 0.002 0.333***
Sales Occupation -0.286 0.202*** -0.199** 0.207***
Craft Occupation -0.112 0.136*** -0.050 0.140***
Ag/Construction Industry 0.016 0.146*** 0.099 0.148***
Manufacturing Industry -0.012 0.014 0.003 0.013
Transportation Industry 0.151 0.122*** 0.164* 0.121***
Wholesale Trade Industry -0.101 0.016*** -0.083 0.016
Retail Trade Industry 0.150 -0.116 0.122 -0.118***
Constant 4.980*** 5.936*** 5.187*** 5.938***
R squared 0.60 0.44
Log-Likelihood -2894.75
Observations 352 4674 5026
Two-Step Coefficients Maximum Likelihood Coefficients
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.   Dependent Variable:Log Wage
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shift work, indicating that those who choose night shift work have a comparative advantage in 
working at night, earning above average wages at night.  Kostiuk finds no evidence of significant 
selection into shift work, while Lanfranchi, et al., find negative and significant selection into 
shift work.  In the two-step estimation, the coefficient on the selection term for day workers is 
insignificant, indicating no evidence of selection into day work.  Maximum likelihood results, 
however, indicate negative selection into day work and those choosing to work during the day 
earn below average wages in the day.  Both two-step and maximum likelihood results seem to 
suggest that those choosing to work at night earn above average wages at night.  Two-step and 
maximum likelihood results are inconclusive as to the direction of selection into day work. 
 The returns to education are significant for day workers but are not significant for night 
workers.  Union, non-white, female, and tenure variables are statistically significant for both day 
and night workers.  The returns to union membership are twice as high for night workers.  
Additionally, returns to tenure are higher for night shift workers.   The results also indicate a 
larger wage penalty for female night shift workers.  In maximum likelihood estimation, non-
white night workers are not penalized as much their daytime counterparts.   A majority of the 
occupation and industry variables are significant predictors of wages for day workers, while 
significant differences in wages are not prevalent for night workers based on occupation and 
industry.   Maximum likelihood results indicate that those employed in sales occupations earn 
significantly less at night than those employed in the base group of service occupations, while 
those working in the transportation industry earn significantly more than those employed in the 
base group of business and personal services industries. 
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5.2.1.3. Structural Equation  
The final step in the estimation of the Lee model is the estimation of the structural 
equation (5).  The parameter of interest to be estimated is   , the coefficient on the wage 
differential in the structural form of the selection equation.  First, the results of the wage 
regressions for day and night workers, which are provided in Table 5.2, are used to compute the 
unconditional expected night shift premium (13) for each individual.  Shift differentials 
calculated from this model are discussed in Section 5.8.  The expected wage differential is then 
used in the estimation of the structural probit (5).  These results are displayed in Table 5.1, 
columns 2 and 4 for ease of comparison with the reduced form results in columns 1 and 2.  
Tables A1_1 and A1_2 in the Appendix provides the full results including standard errors.   
Two goals of the current analysis are to determine the impact of the local unemployment 
rate on the decision to work a night shift and on the size of the compensating differential for 
night shift work.  The coefficients on the unemployment rate continue to be negligible and 
insignificant in the structural form estimation.  The wage differential, however, is a statistically 
significant predictor of shift choice in both two-step and maximum likelihood estimation.  These 
coefficients indicate that rising wage differentials for night shift work make individuals more 
likely to choose night shift work.  Additionally, these coefficients are also practically significant 
and provide evidence that individuals consider the size of the shift premium when deciding 
whether to work at night. 
The results for other variables included in the structural equation provide evidence of the 
factors influencing workers as they make choices regarding work hours after controlling for the 
wage differential.  In Table 5.1, the variables affecting shift choice not included in the wage 
equations, number of children and shift rate, are similar in both the reduced and structural 
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probits, which is expected if the model is correctly specified.  The inclusion of the wage 
differential causes the coefficient on education to change from positive to negative and to 
become statistically insignificant.  This result indicates that, after controlling for the wage 
differential, higher educated individuals are less likely to choose to work at night.  Thus, much of 
education’s impact on shift choice occurs through its impact on wages.  A similar effect is seen 
with union status.  After the wage differential for night shift work is accounted for, union status 
is not a significant predictor of shift choice.  Another personal characteristic variable, tenure, 
becomes statistically significant, indicating that those workers with seniority are less likely to 
work at night.   The firm size variables, female, married, and the occupational variables remain 
significant for shift choice.  These variables thus impact shift selection separately from their 
impact on the individual’s wage.  In maximum likelihood estimation, all of the firm size 
variables remain statistically significant for shift choice, while in the two-step results, those 
employed at firms with 25-99 employees, firm size 1, and those employed at firms with 500-999 
employees, firm size 3, are significantly more likely to select night shift work, probably due to 
the fact that larger firms are more likely to employ night shift work in order to better utilize 
capacity.  In both two-step and maximum likelihood results, the magnitude of the firm size 
variables is reduced, suggesting that firm size partially affects shift selection by impacting shift 
wages.  Gender and marital status highly influence one’s schedule and monetary needs, thus 
impacting one’s work schedule preferences.  Additionally, one’s occupation continues to 
significantly impact shift choice, most likely because individual’s work schedules are often 
dictated by their employer or job responsibilities.   
 
5.2.2. 1990 Cross-Section Switching Regression with Leading Index 
The local unemployment rate is only one indicator of labor market strength.  This section 
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recomputes the above regressions, replacing the local unemployment rate with the leading index.  
Tables A3_1, A3_2, A4_1, and A4_2 in the Appendix contain the complete results from these 
regressions.  When compared with the estimation of the model using the local unemployment 
rate, a majority of the results are similar.  Condensed versions of the results will be presented in 
the following pages to facilitate comparison between the two versions of the model.   
The main variables of interest from the two-step and maximum likelihood estimation of 
the reduced form of the selection equation (9) are reported in Table 5.3.  The top rows report the 
reduced and structural coefficients for the model using the local unemployment rate, which was 
discussed thoroughly in Section 5.2.1.1.  The bottom rows report the reduced and structural 
coefficients for the model using the leading index.  The structural equation coefficients are 
compared on the following page.  Table 5.3 indicates that the leading index has a larger impact 
on shift selection than the unemployment rate in the both the two-step and ML estimation of the 
reduced form.  The unemployment rate is a small and insignificant predictor of shift selection,  
 
Table 5.3 Unemployment Rate vs. Leading Index Selection Equations, 1990 Cross-Section 
 
 
Variable Reduced Structural Reduced Structural 
Wage Differential 0.933 0.831
(0.374**) (0.412**)
Unemployment Rate 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) 0.002 (0.002) (0.002)
Variable Reduced Structural Reduced Structural 
Wage Differential 0.864 0.743
(0.352**) 0.404*
Leading Index 0.079 0.069 0.092 0.096
(0.048) (0.040*) (0.047*) (0.038**)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Complete results for all variables for leading index model reported in Table A3. 
Two-Step Coefficients ML Coefficients
Two-Step Coefficients ML Coefficients
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable: Night Shift  
Complete results for all variables for unemployment rate model reported in Table A1. 
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however, maximum likelihood estimates of the reduced form indicate that the leading index has 
a statistically significant impact on shift selection.  The coefficient on the leading index is 
positive, suggesting that individuals in areas with higher projected growth are more likely to 
select night shift work, likely because of an increased availability of night shift jobs. 
The reduced form probit results are next used to control for self-selection into night work 
in the estimation of the individual expected wage equations (11) and (12).  Complete results for 
night and day wage regressions using the leading index are reported in Tables A4_1 and A4_2.  
The results for the two main variables of interest, the unemployment rate/leading index and the 
selection term, are provided in Table 5.4.  The top rows report the night and day coefficients for 
the model using the local unemployment rate, which was discussed in Section 5.2.1.2.  The 
bottom rows report the night and day coefficients for the model using the leading index.  Again, 
when compared to the magnitude of the coefficient on the unemployment rate, the leading index 
has a larger effect on the wages of night and day workers.  Like the unemployment rate, the 
leading index has a negative and significant impact on the wages of day workers, but not on the  
 
Table 5.4 Unemployment Rate vs. Leading Index Wage Equations, 1990 Cross-Section 
 
 
Variable Night Day Night Day
Unemployment Rate -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
(0.001) (0.000***) (0.001) (0.000***)
Selection Term 0.518 -0.142  0.401*** 0.120***
(0.275*) (0.096)
Variable Night Day Night Day
Leading Index -0.014 -0.052 -0.041 -0.052
(0.036) (0.008***) (0.032) (0.008***)
Selection Term 0.619 -0.127  0.431*** 0.121***
(0.270**) (0.097)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Two-Step Coefficients ML Coefficients
Two-Step Coefficients ML Coefficients
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable: Log Wage  
Complete results for all variables for leading index model reported in Table A4. 
Complete results for all variables for unemployment rate model reported in Table A2. 
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wages of night workers.  The leading index coefficients are negative, which indicates that those 
individuals living in states with larger projected growth have lower wages.  The selection term 
coefficients exhibit similar signs, magnitudes, and significance as the model using the 
unemployment rate.  The results indicate positive and significant selection into night shifts.    
The two-step results find no significant selection into day shifts, while the maximum likelihood 
results indicate negative and significant selection into day shifts.  In the estimation of both 
models, night shift workers choose to work at night because they have a comparative advantage 
in working at night, earning higher than average wages at night.  Again, the two-step and 
maximum likelihood results disagree as to the direction of selection into day work.  The models 
consistently find significant selection effects, indicating that it is important to control for self-
selection into shifts. 
The results of the wage regressions for day and night workers are next used to compute 
the unconditional expected night shift premium for each individual.  Shift differentials calculated 
from this model are discussed in Section 5.8.   The expected wage differential is then used in the 
estimation of the structural probit (5).  These results are displayed in Table 5.3 for ease of 
comparison with the reduced form results.  Tables A3_1 and A3_2 in the Appendix provide the 
full results including standard errors.  For both the two-step and maximum likelihood results, the 
model including the unemployment rate finds that the shift differential is a positive and 
significant predictor of shift choice.  The unemployment rate continues to be insignificant.  The 
wage differential for night shift work is also a significant predictor of shift choice in the model 
including the leading index.  The leading index coefficient is positive and significant, indicating 
that individuals living in states with higher projected growth are significantly more likely to 
select night shift work.  This result could be due to increased plant activity and greater 
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availability of night shift work in high growth regions.  These results provide evidence that 
individuals take both the size of the wage premium offered for night shift work and local 
economic conditions into account when determining whether to work at night.   
 
5.3 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section Switching Regression Results 
 The model outlined in Section 4.3 is next estimated using a pooled cross-section of data 
from 1990-2000.  Results are first presented using the local unemployment rate as an indicator of 
local economic conditions, followed by model results using the leading index.   
 
5.3.1. 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section Switching Regression with Unemployment Rate 
5.3.1.1 Reduced Form Selection Equation 
Selected coefficients from the two-step and maximum likelihood estimation of the 
reduced form of the selection equation (9) for the pooled cross-section are reported in columns 1 
and 3 of Table 5.5.  Columns 2 and 4 report the results from estimation of the structural equation 
(5), which will be discussed in Section 5.3.1.3.  Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix report 
coefficients and standard errors for all variables, offering a more complete version of the 
information provided in Table 5.5.   
Most of the coefficients for the variables in the reduced form estimation are similar 
between two-step and maximum likelihood methods.  The unemployment rate is insignificant for 
shift selection and the coefficient continues to be negligible.  Number of children and industry 
shift rate positively and significantly impact shift selection.  Firm size, years of school, and 
union status positively and significantly impact shift selection while tenure, female, and married 
are significant negative predictors of shift choice.  The pooled cross-section results permit a 
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more detailed analysis of shift selection by industry.  Significant differences in shift selection 
exist among the various industries.  Those employed in business, entertainment, and other 
service industries serve as the base group for comparison in the regression analysis.  Agriculture, 
farming, fishing, construction, durable manufacturing, finance, and professional industries are  
 
Table 5.5 Two-Step and ML Selection Equations, 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section with Unemployment Rate 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reduced Form Structural Form Reduced Form Structural Form
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Wage Differential 0.231 0.275
Unemployment Rate 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
Number of Children 0.026** 0.031*** 0.028** 0.031***
Industry Shift Rate 0.309** 0.312*** 0.270** 0.312***
Firm Size 1 0.219*** 0.201*** 0.233*** 0.198***
Firm Size 2 0.535*** 0.512*** 0.558*** 0.508***
Firm Size 3 0.738*** 0.719*** 0.754*** 0.714***
Firm Size 4 0.780*** 0.744*** 0.809*** 0.738***
Years of School 0.244*** -0.041*** 0.284*** -0.040***
Experience -0.005 0.011 -0.021 0.011*
Tenure -0.050*** -0.027*** -0.054*** -0.027***
Union 0.330*** 0.313*** 0.312*** 0.309***
Non-white 0.035*** 0.037 0.043 0.035
Female -0.229*** -0.240*** -0.220*** -0.243***
Married -0.183*** -0.195*** -0.184*** -0.195***
Professional Occupation -0.692*** -0.764*** -0.703*** -0.761***
Sales Occupation -0.718*** -0.708*** -0.713*** -0.700***
Craft Occupation -0.505*** -0.509*** -0.507*** -0.507***
Agriculture/Farm/Fish Industry -0.999*** -1.122*** -1.010*** -1.132***
Mining Industry 0.749*** 0.672*** 0.754*** 0.654***
Construction Industry -0.750*** -0.790*** -0.820*** -0.797***
Non-Durable Manufacturing Industry 0.190*** 0.173*** 0.212*** 0.170**
Durable Manufacturing Industry -0.103* -0.107* -0.079 -0.111*
Transportation Industry -0.003 -0.036 0.003 -0.041
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.005 -0.020 -0.002 -0.027
Retail Trade Industry 0.147** 0.136* 0.142** 0.132*
Finance Industry -0.667*** -0.695*** -0.668*** -0.701***
Prof. & Related Industry -0.208*** -0.233*** -0.198*** -0.238***
Public Administration Industry -0.046 -0.131 -0.080 -0.145
1992 -0.041 -0.006 -0.042 -0.004
1994 -0.106 -0.087 -0.114 -0.087
1996 -0.050 -0.031 -0.058 -0.031
1998 -0.068 -0.052 -0.077 -0.050
2000 -0.057 -0.030 -0.071 -0.029
Constant -2.655*** -0.888*** -2.722 -0.911***
Log-likelihood -4649.43 -4688.97 -15756.94^ -4688.87
Observations 24732 24732 24732 24732
^ denotes the log-likelihood from the simultaneous estimation of the wage equations and the reduced form of the selection equation.
Two-Step Maximum Likelihood
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. Tables A6 and A7 in the Appendix report additional variables and standard errors.
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less likely to select night shift work than the base group.  Those in mining, non-durable 
manufacturing, and retail trade industries are significantly more likely to select night shift work 
than those in the base group.  These results are consistent with industries known for high 
prevalence of night shift work.  When analyzing shift selection using the year dummy variables, 
there are not significant differences in shift selection from the base year of 1990.  Shift selection 
was not as prevalent in the years 1992-2000 as in 1990, with 1994 showing the largest difference 
in shift prevalence when compared to 1990. 
 
5.3.1.2. Individual Wage Equations 
The individual expected wage equations are next computed.  The coefficients from two- 
step and maximum likelihood estimation results for night and day workers are included in Table 
5.6.  Tables A7 and A8 in the Appendix provide the full results including standard errors.  Unlike 
the results for the 1990 cross-section, the unemployment rate has a statistically significant impact 
on the wages of both night and day workers.  In both two-step and maximum likelihood 
estimation, the coefficient on the selection term for night workers is negative, but insignificant.  
Thus, when the data are pooled over multiple years, there is no evidence of significant selection 
into night shifts and no evidence that night workers have a comparative advantage in working at 
night.  The two-step results indicate significant positive selection into day shifts while the 
maximum likelihood results indicate significant negative selection into day shifts.   In the two-
step model, individuals choosing to work during the day earn higher than average wages in the 
daytime.  In the maximum likelihood results, individuals choosing to work during the day earn 
lower than average wages.  This difference in the findings of two-step and maximum likelihood 
estimation is consistent from the 1990 cross-section to the pooled cross-section.   
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Other variables included in the wage equations provide evidence of differences between 
night and day workers.  The firm size variables continue to have a positive and significant impact 
on wages.  Experience significantly impacts day wages, while tenure significantly impacts the 
wages of both night and day workers.  Night shift workers belonging to unions earn 
approximately five percent higher than day workers belonging to unions.  Wage penalties for  
 
Table 5.6 Two-Step and ML Wage Equations, 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section with Unemployment Rate 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Night Worker Day Worker Night Worker Day Worker 
Unemployment Rate -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
Selection Term -0.014 -0.300*** -0.029 0.156***
Firm Size 1 0.097* 0.049*** 0.094** 0.045***
Firm Size 2 0.150 0.096*** 0.143** 0.084***
Firm Size 3 0.208 0.153*** 0.199** 0.135***
Firm Size 4 0.289** 0.199*** 0.279*** 0.180
Years of School 0.053 0.007 0.049 0.003
Experience 0.012 0.039*** 0.012 0.039***
Tenure 0.056*** 0.032*** 0.057*** 0.033***
Union 0.172*** 0.121*** 0.168*** 0.111***
Non-white -0.064*** -0.107*** -0.064*** -0.108***
Female -0.127*** -0.218*** -0.125*** -0.213***
Married 0.062* 0.053*** 0.064*** 0.057***
Professional Occupation 0.314*** 0.299*** 0.323*** 0.322***
Sales Occupation 0.075 0.144*** 0.083 0.168***
Craft Occupation 0.088 0.046*** 0.094* 0.064***
Agriculture/Farm/Fish Industry 0.124 -0.177*** 0.138 -0.153***
Mining Industry 0.393*** 0.094*** 0.385*** 0.074**
Construction Industry 0.346* 0.153*** 0.358*** 0.169***
Non-Durable Manufacturing Industry 0.027 -0.004 0.024 -0.015
Durable Manufacturing Industry 0.128*** 0.032*** 0.128*** 0.034***
Transportation Industry 0.230*** 0.114*** 0.230*** 0.115***
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.150** 0.003 0.151** 0.005
Retail Trade Industry -0.054 -0.122*** -0.057 -0.129***
Finance Industry 0.204 0.077*** 0.213* 0.086***
Prof. & Related Industry 0.000 -0.092*** 0.001 -0.090***
Public Administration Industry 0.345*** 0.035*** 0.347*** 0.038***
1992 0.035 0.088*** 0.036 0.090***
1994 0.173*** 0.154*** 0.175*** 0.158***
1996 0.239*** 0.214*** 0.240*** 0.216***
1998 0.246*** 0.265*** 0.248*** 0.267***
2000 0.327*** 0.345*** 0.328*** 0.347***
Constant 5.893*** 6.055*** 5.936*** 6.039***
R-Squared 0.55 0.51
Log-Likelihood -15756.94^
Observations 1472 23260 24732
Two-Step Coefficients Maximum Likelihood Coefficients
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. Tables A7 and A8 in the Appendix report additional variables and standard errors.
^ denotes the log-likelihood from the simultaneous estimation of the wage equations and the reduced form of the selection equation.
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non-white and female workers are lower for night workers.  Only night workers in professional 
occupations earn significantly higher than those in service occupations, while there are 
significant differences between wages for all occupations for day workers.  Mining, construction, 
manufacturing, transportation, and public administration workers earn significantly higher wages 
on night shifts than night workers in business, personal, and entertainment services.  When 
analyzing the time variables, night shift workers earned significantly higher wages in years 1994, 
1996, 1998, and 2000 when compared to the base year of 1990.  Relative to day workers, night 
workers experienced higher wage increases in 1994 and 1996.  Day workers experienced higher 
wage increases in 1992, 1998, and 2000.   
 
5.3.1.3. Structural Equation  
Two-step and maximum likelihood estimation of the structural equation (5) are shown in 
Table 5.5, columns 2 and 4 for ease of comparison with the reduced form results in columns 1 
and 2.  Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix provide the full results including standard errors.  
Shift differentials computed from this model are discussed in Section 5.8.  The coefficients on 
the unemployment rate continue to be negligible and insignificant in the structural form 
estimation.  The wage differential is an insignificant predictor of shift choice in both estimation 
methods.  The coefficients are, however, positive and are similar in magnitude.    These 
coefficients provide evidence that rising wage differentials for night shift work make individuals 
more likely to choose night shift work.   
After controlling for the wage differential, the firm size variables remain significant for 
shift choice, again indicating that larger firms are more likely to operate night shifts.  The 
magnitudes of the coefficients are slightly lower, which is expected since firm size also impacts 
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shift selection through worker wages.  Similar to the cross-section results, prior to the inclusion 
of the wage differential, education was a positive and significant predictor of shift choice.  When 
the wage differential is included in probit estimation, however, education is a negative and 
significant predictor of shift choice.  Thus, once wage differences are accounted for, those 
individuals with higher education are less likely to choose to work at night.  Tenure and union 
status remain significant although the coefficient magnitudes are slightly diminished, which is to 
be expected since these variables also influence worker wages.  Number of children, female, and 
married variables remain significant, but actually increase slightly in magnitude, which provides 
evidence that these variables have impacts on shift selection through another channel than 
through their impact on wages.  These variables impact shift selection likely because they are 
related to schedule preferences.  The occupation and industry variables that significantly 
influenced shift choice in the reduced form estimation continue to significantly impact shift 
selection even with the inclusion of the wage differential, most likely because the presence of 
shift work is largely dictated by one’s job responsibilities.   
 
5.3.2. 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section Switching Regression with Leading Index 
This section recomputes the above pooled cross-section regressions, replacing the local 
unemployment rate with the leading index.  When compared with the estimation of the model 
using the local unemployment rate, a majority of the results are similar.  Condensed versions of 
the results will be presented in the following pages to facilitate comparison between the two 
versions of the model.  Tables A9, A10, A11 and A12 in the Appendix contain the complete 
results from these regressions.   
The main variables of interest from the two-step and maximum likelihood estimation of 
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the reduced form of the selection equation (9) are reported in Table 5.7.  The top rows report the 
reduced and structural coefficients for the pooled cross-section using the local unemployment 
rate.  The bottom rows report the reduced and structural coefficients for the pooled cross-section  
using the leading index.  The structural equation coefficients are compared on the following 
page.  The leading index continues to have a larger impact on shift selection than the 
unemployment rate in the both the two-step and ML estimation of the reduced form.  Both the 
unemployment rate and the leading index are insignificant predictors of shift choice.  The 
coefficients on the leading index variables are positive, suggesting that individuals in areas with 
higher projected growth are more likely to select night shift work. 
 
Table 5.7 Unemployment Rate vs. Leading Index Selection Equations, 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section 
 
 
 
The complete results of the night and day wage regressions using the leading index are 
reported in Tables A11 and A12.  The results for the two main variables of interest, the 
unemployment rate/leading index and the selection term, are provided in Table 5.8.  The top 
Variable Reduced Structural Reduced Structural 
Wage Differential 0.231 0.275
(0.314) (0.317)
Unemployment Rate 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Variable Reduced Structural Reduced Structural 
Wage Differential 0.292 0.240
(0.320) (0.326)
Leading Index 0.019 0.014 0.019 0.015
(0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Complete results for all variables for leading index model reported in Tables A9 and A10. 
Two-Step Coefficients ML Coefficients
Two-Step Coefficients ML Coefficients
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable: Night Shift  
Complete results for all variables for unemployment rate model reported in Tables A5 and A6. 
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rows report the night and day coefficients for the model using the local unemployment rate.  The 
bottom rows report the night and day coefficients for the model using the leading index.  The 
unemployment rate has a small negative significant impact on the wages of both day and night 
workers.  The leading index, however, only has a significant impact on the wages of day 
workers.  Interestingly, the signs of the coefficients on the leading index are different for night 
and day workers.  For night workers, although insignificant, the coefficient is positive, which 
 
Table 5.8 Unemployment Rate vs. Leading Index Wage Equations, 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section 
 
 
 
seems to indicate that individuals in areas with higher projected economic growth have slightly 
higher wages.  For day workers, the coefficient is negative, which indicates that those day 
workers living in states with larger projected growth have lower wages.  The selection term 
coefficients exhibit similar magnitudes and significance as the model using the unemployment 
rate.  The results indicate insignificant selection into night shifts in both specifications of the 
Variable Night Day Night Day
Unemployment Rate -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000***) (0.000***) (0.000***) (0.000***)
Selection Term -0.014  -0.300 -0.029 0.156***
(0.208) (0.054***)
Variable Night Day Night Day
Leading Index 0.016 -0.014 0.016 -0.014
(0.012) (0.003***) (0.011) (0.003***)
Selection Term 0.008 -0.302 -0.020   0.159***
(0.206) (0.054***)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Complete results for all variables for leading index model reported in Tables A11 and A12. 
Two-Step Coefficients ML Coefficients
Two-Step Coefficients ML Coefficients
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable: Log Wage  
Complete results for all variables for unemployment rate model reported in Table A7 and A8. 
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model.  When both the unemployment rate and the leading indicator are used, the two-step 
results indicate positive selection into day shifts, while the maximum likelihood results indicate 
negative selection into day shifts. 
Structural probit results are displayed in Table 5.7 for ease of comparison with the 
reduced form results.  Shift differentials computed from this model are discussed in Section 5.8.   
The unemployment rate and the leading index continue to be insignificant predictors of shift 
choice.  For both the two-step and maximum likelihood results, the models find that the shift 
differential is a positive but insignificant predictor of shift choice.  The results of the pooled 
cross-section analysis do not provide evidence that shift differentials and local economic 
conditions significantly impact shift choice.   
 
5.4 Interaction Effects 
The results of the cross-section and pooled cross-section were also used to estimate 
interaction effects between the shift differential and the two measures of local economic 
conditions.  To investigate possible interaction effects, we consider the probability of selecting 
shift work conditional on the shift differential, local economic conditions, and the observed 
exogenous covariates, as outlined in Section 4.3.4.  We estimate the effect of changes in the shift 
differential on the selection probability (14) under different local economic conditions.   The 
estimated bounds of the selection probability are reported for different values of the local 
unemployment rate and the state leading index in the following four tables, all of which are 
formatted and interpreted in the same manner. 
 
5.4.1 1990 Cross-Section with Unemployment Rate 
Table 5.9 presents the results for the 1990 cross-section using the local unemployment 
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rate as the measure of local economic conditions.  The table presents the lower and upper bounds 
of the selection probability for different combinations of percentile values of the log wage 
differential and the local unemployment rate.  As a method of interpreting the bounds, the 
midpoint of the lower and upper bounds is presented below each interval.  The intervals in each 
row, represented by letters A-E, indicate how changes in the shift differential affect the selection 
probability for a given level of the unemployment rate.  For example, one can compare interval 
A2 to interval A3 to see how a rise in the shift differential from -1.097 to -0.88 impacts shift 
selection given an unemployment rate of 3.6%.  The intervals in each column, represented by 
numbers 1-5, indicate how changes in the unemployment rate affect the selection probability for 
a given shift differential.   For example, one can compare interval A2 to interval B2 to see how a 
rise in the unemployment rate from 3.6% to 4.4% impacts shift selection given a shift differential 
of -1.097.  Consequently, comparing intervals across two columns for two different rows reveals 
 
Table 5.9 Interaction Effects, 1990 Cross-Section using Unemployment Rate 
 
 
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Unemp. Rate Cell
3.6% A 5.640E-07 0.009599 0.000054 0.025714 0.000267 0.038217 0.000986 0.054535 0.002945 0.075474
Avg.*
4.4% B 5.760E-07 0.009640 0.000055 0.025810 0.000270 0.038351 0.000997 0.054713 0.002974 0.075702
Avg.
5.5% C 5.940E-07 0.009697 0.000056 0.025943 0.000275 0.038535 0.001013 0.054958 0.003014 0.076017
Avg.
6.2% D 6.050E-07 0.009733 0.000057 0.026028 0.000279 0.038652 0.001023 0.055114 0.003040 0.076219
Avg.
8.0% E 6.360E-07 0.009828 0.000059 0.026246 0.000287 0.038956 0.001049 0.055518 0.003107 0.076738
Avg.
-$3.72, and -$2.66.  From top to bottom, the values of the unemploymentrate indicate the 10th percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th 
percentile of the unemployment rate in 1990.
This table presents lower and upper bounds on the probability of working the night shift.  The bounds on the probability are computed for each combination
of the log wage differential and the unemployment rate.  For example, the lower bound for the log wage differential and unemployment rate combination A1 is
5.640E-07 while the upper bound is 0.009599.  *The average of the lower and upper bounds is reported below each combination. For example, the average 
probability for combination A1 is 0.004800.  From left to right, the values of the log wage differential indicate the 10th percentile, 25th percentil, mean,
75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the predicted log wage differential in 1990.  This corresponds to approximate wage differentials of -$8.39, -$6.57, -$5.31,
0.004914 0.013153 0.019621 0.028283 0.039922
0.004867 0.013042 0.019465 0.028069 0.039629
0.004849 0.013000 0.019405 0.027985 0.039516
0.004820 0.012933 0.019310 0.027855 0.039338
0.004800 0.012884 0.019242 0.027761 0.039209
1 2 3 4 5
Log Wage Differential
-1.577154 -1.097199 -0.8826764 -0.6764674 -0.4742174
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how the impact of changing shift differentials varies for two different unemployment rates, while 
comparing intervals across two rows for two different columns reveals how the impact of 
changing unemployment rates varies for two different shift differentials.  This method will be 
used to analyze possible interaction effects with examples provided in the following pages. 
First, reading the rows in Table 5.9 from left to right indicates that, for a given 
unemployment rate, increases in the wage differential for night shift work lead to a higher 
average probability of selecting night shift work.  Reading the columns from top to bottom 
indicates that, for a given wage differential, increases in the unemployment rate lead to a higher 
average probability of selecting night shift work.  Thus, both the wage differential and the local 
unemployment rate have a positive impact on shift selection.  These positive impacts on 
selection probability follow from the results of maximum likelihood estimation of the structural 
probit, provided above in Table 5.1, in which the coefficients on the wage differential and the 
unemployment rate were both positive.   
 Intervals are next compared across two rows for two columns to determine interaction 
effects, which can be considered for many different combinations of changes in the wage 
differential and changes in the unemployment rate.  For example, comparing the interval in A2, 
which has an average value of approximately 1.29%, to the interval in A3, which has an average 
value of approximately 1.92%, indicates that, for an unemployment rate of 3.6%, increasing the 
wage differential from approximately -1.097 to -0.883 leads to an increase in the average 
selection probability of approximately 0.636%.  Comparing the interval in E2, which has an 
average value of 1.32%, to the interval in E3, which has an average value of 1.96%, indicates 
that, for an unemployment rate of 8%, increasing the wage differential from approximately 
-1.097 to -0.883 leads to an increase in the average selection probability of approximately 
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0.647%.  When comparing the effect of increasing the wage differential from -1.097 to -0.883 at 
3.6% unemployment to the effect of increasing the wage differential from -1.097 to -0.883 at 8% 
unemployment, the probability of night shift selection is 0.011% higher.  In a similar fashion, 
comparing the intervals in A3 and A4 to those in E3 and E4 indicates that the average probability 
of night shift selection is 0.014% higher for an unemployment rate of 8% compared to an 
unemployment rate of 3.6%.  Comparing the intervals in A4 and A5 to those in E4 and E5 
indicates that the average probability of night shift selection is 0.019% higher for an 
unemployment rate of 8% compared to an unemployment rate of 3.6%.  These interaction 
effects, although small, indicate that at higher levels of the unemployment rate, an increase in the 
wage differential has a larger impact on shift selection.  This result would seem to suggest that 
individuals value shift differentials when determining whether to work at night even in weak 
economies.  This result lies counter to the hypothesis that employers can offer lower 
compensating differentials in times of high unemployment.        
 Similar results are obtained when intervals are compared across two columns.  For 
example, comparing the interval in A2, which has an average value of approximately 1.288%, to 
the interval in B2, which has an average value of approximately 1.29%, indicates that, for a wage 
differential of approximately -1.097, increasing the unemployment rate from 3.6% to 4.4% leads 
to an increase in the average selection probability of approximately 0.005%.  Comparing the 
interval in A5, which has an average value of 3.92%, to the interval in B5, which has an average 
value of 3.93%, indicates that, for a wage differential of approximately -0.474, increasing the 
unemployment rate from 3% to 6% leads to an increase in the average selection probability of 
approximately 0.012%.  When comparing the effect of increasing the unemployment rate from 
3.6% to 4.4% at a wage differential of -1.097 to the effect of increasing the unemployment rate 
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from 3.6% to 4.4% at a wage differential of -0.474, the probability of night shift selection is 
0.008% higher.  Thus, at higher values of the wage differential, increases in the unemployment 
rate have a larger impact on shift selection.   
    
5.4.2 1990 Cross-Section with Leading Index 
Next, interaction effects are analyzed for the 1990 cross-section with the leading index 
serving as the indicator of local labor market conditions.  Table 5.10 provides the average 
interaction effect for each combination of the wage differential and the leading index.  Like the 
results for the model using the unemployment rate, examining the rows in Table 5.10 indicates 
that, for a given value of the leading index, increases in the wage differential for night shift work 
lead to a higher probability of selecting night shift work.  Examining the columns indicates that, 
for a given wage differential, increases in the leading index lead to a higher average probability 
of night shift selection.  Thus, both the wage differential and the leading index have a positive 
 
Table 5.10 Interaction Effects, 1990 Cross-Section using Leading Index 
 
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Leading Index Cell
0.22 A 1.640E-05 0.014375 0.000061 0.020069 0.000238 0.029222 0.000773 0.041445 0.002141 0.057512
Avg.*
0.9 B 3.130E-05 0.016915 0.000108 0.023435 0.000394 0.033816 0.001195 0.047537 0.003125 0.065390
Avg.
1.2 C 4.120E-05 0.018153 0.000138 0.025065 0.000487 0.036024 0.001437 0.050444 0.003667 0.069123
Avg.
1.65 D 6.150E-05 0.020154 0.000197 0.027687 0.000664 0.039556 0.001879 0.055069 0.004627 0.075027
Avg.
2.42 E 1.180E-04 0.024013 0.000352 0.032705 0.001097 0.046252 0.002903 0.063755 0.006756 0.086014
Avg.
-$3.92, and -$2.86.  From top to bottom, the values of the leading indicate the 10th percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile
of the leading index in 1990.
This table presents lower and upper bounds on the probability of working the night shift.  The bounds on the probability are computed for each combination
of the log wage differential and the unemployment rate.  For example, the lower bound for the log wage differential and unemployment rate combination A1 is
1.640E-05 while the upper bound is 0.014375.  *The average of the lower and upper bounds is reported below each combination. For example, the average 
probability for combination A1 is 0.007196.  From left to right, the values of the log wage differential indicate the 10th percentile, 25th percentile, mean,
75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the predicted log wage differential in 1990.  This corresponds to approximate wage differentials of -$8.58, -$6.79, -$5.52,
0.012066 0.016528 0.023675 0.033329 0.046385
0.008473 0.011772 0.017105 0.024366 0.034258
0.007196 0.010065 0.014730 0.021109 0.029826
1 2 3 4 5
Log Wage Differential
-1.339548 -1.157821 -0.9419208 -0.7285666 -0.51542
0.009097 0.012601 0.018256 0.025941 0.036395
0.010108 0.013942 0.020110 0.028474 0.039827
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impact on shift selection.  These positive impacts on the selection probability follow from the 
results of the structural probit, provided above in Table 5.3, in which the coefficients on the 
wage differential and the leading index were both positive.   
 Intervals are next compared across two rows.  For example, comparing the interval in A2, 
which has an average value of approximately 1.01%, to the interval in A3, which has an average 
value of approximately 1.47%, indicates that, for a leading index value of 0.22, increasing the 
wage differential from approximately -1.158 to -0.942 leads to an increase in the average 
selection probability of approximately 0.47%.  Comparing the interval in E2, which has an 
average value of 1.65%, to the interval in E3, which has an average value of 2.37 %, indicates 
that, for a leading index value of 2.42, increasing the wage differential from approximately  
-1.158 to -0.942 leads to an increase in the average selection probability of approximately 0.71%.  
When comparing the effect of increasing the wage differential at a leading index value of 0.22 to 
the effect of increasing the wage differential at a leading index value of 2.42, the probability of 
night shift selection is 0.25% higher.  This interaction effect implies that, at higher levels of the 
leading index, an increase in the wage differential has a larger impact on shift selection.  In other 
words, in areas projected to have higher growth and, therefore, stronger economies, individuals 
are more likely to consider the size of the shift premium when determining whether to work at 
night. Conversely, in regions with weaker economies, individuals are less likely to consider the 
size of the shift differential when determining whether to work at night.  This result provides 
evidence that compensating differentials for night shift work may be lower in weak economies. 
 
5.4.3 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section with Unemployment Rate 
Interaction effects are next considered for the 1990-2000 pooled cross-section with the 
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local unemployment rate serving as the indicator of local labor market conditions.  Table 5.11 
provides the average interaction effect for each combination of the wage differential and the 
unemployment rate.  Like the cross-section results, examining the rows in Table 5.10 indicates 
that, for a given unemployment rate, increases in the wage differential for night shift work lead 
to a higher probability of selecting night shift work.  Examining the columns, however, indicates 
that, for a given wage differential, increases in the unemployment rate lead to a lower probability 
 
Table 5.11 Interaction Effects, 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section using Unemployment Rate 
 
 
 
of selecting night shift work.  Thus, the wage differential continues to have a positive impact on 
shift selection, while the unemployment rate has a negative impact on shift selection.  These 
results follow from the results of the structural probit, provided above in Table 5.5.   
Intervals are next compared across two rows.  For example, comparing the interval in A2, 
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Unemp. Rate Cell
3.1% A 0.000281 0.044254 0.0003351 0.0462621 0.000398 0.048395 0.000471 0.050643 0.000547 0.052786
Avg.*
4.1% B 0.000276 0.044059 0.000330 0.046060 0.000392 0.048185 0.000464 0.050426 0.000539 0.052562
Avg.
6.0% C 0.000267 0.043691 0.000319 0.045678 0.000380 0.047790 0.000450 0.050016 0.000524 0.052138
Avg.
7.3% D 0.000261 0.043440 0.000312 0.045419 0.000372 0.047520 0.000441 0.049736 0.000513 0.051849
Avg.
9.6% E 0.000250 0.042999 0.000300 0.044962 0.000358 0.047047 0.000425 0.049246 0.000495 0.051342
Avg.
-$0.84, $0.05, $1.07, and $2.22.  From top to bottom, the values of the unemploymentrate indicate the 10th percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, 
and 90th percentile of the unemployment rate in the pooled dataset.
This table presents lower and upper bounds on the probability of working the night shift.  The bounds on the probability are computed for each combination
of the log wage differential and the unemployment rate.  For example, the lower bound for the log wage differential and unemployment rate combination A1 is
0.000281 while the upper bound is 0.044254.  *The average of the lower and upper bounds is reported below each combination. For example, the average 
probability for combination A1 is 0.022267.  From left to right, the values of the log wage differential indicate the 10th percentile, 25th percentile, mean,
75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the predicted log wage differential in the pooled dataset.  This corresponds to approximate wage differentials of -$2.10, 
0.021624 0.022631 0.023702 0.024835 0.025919
0.021850 0.022865 0.023946 0.025089 0.026181
0.021979 0.022999 0.024085 0.025233 0.026331
0.022167 0.023195 0.024288 0.025445 0.026550
0.022267 0.022167 0.024396 0.025557 0.026667
1 2 3 4 5
Log Wage Differential
-0.1675968 -0.0813582 0.0070029 0.096875 0.1796389
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which has an average value of approximately 2.22%, to the interval in A3, which has an average  
value of approximately 2.44%, indicates that, for an unemployment rate of 3.1%, increasing the 
wage differential from approximately -0.081 to 0.007 leads to an increase in the average 
selection probability of approximately 0.22%.  Comparing the interval in E2, which has an 
average value of 2.26%, to the interval in E3, which has an average value of 2.37%, indicates 
that, for an unemployment rate of 9.6%, increasing the wage differential from approximately  
-0.081 to 0.007 leads to an increase in the average selection probability of approximately 0.11%.   
When comparing the effect of increasing the wage differential from -0.081 to 0.007 at 3.1% 
unemployment to the effect of the same size increase in the wage differential at 9.6% 
unemployment, the probability of night shift selection is 0.12% lower.  This interaction effect 
implies that, at higher levels of the unemployment rate, an increase in the wage differential has a 
smaller impact on shift selection; thus, individuals are less likely to consider shift differentials 
when determining whether to work at night in weak economies.  This result is consistent with the 
hypothesis that compensating differentials for night shift work may be lower when the local 
unemployment rate rises.  As mentioned previously, this is only one combination of interaction 
effects that may be compared.  For instance, comparing the intervals in A3 and A4 to those in E3 
and E4 indicates that the probability of night shift selection is 0.0028% lower for an 
unemployment rate of 9.6% compared to an unemployment rate of 3.1%.  Comparing the 
intervals in A4 and A5 to those in E4 and E5 indicates that the probability of night shift selection 
is 0.0026% lower for an unemployment rate of 9.6% compared to an unemployment rate of 
3.1%.  In each case, at higher levels of the unemployment rate, an increase in the wage 
differential has a smaller impact on shift selection.   
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5.4.4 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section with Leading Index 
Table 5.12 provides the interaction effects for the pooled cross-section using the leading 
index as an indicator of local economic conditions.  While the wage differential continues to 
have a positive impact on shift selection for a given leading index value, unlike the results for the 
pooled cross-section model using the unemployment rate, examining the columns of Table 5.12 
indicates that, for a given wage differential, increases in the leading index lead to a higher 
probability of selecting night shift work.  For the pooled cross-section using the leading index, 
both the wage differential and the leading index have a positive impact on shift selection.   
Comparing the interval in A2, which has an average value of approximately 2.24%, to the 
interval in A3, which has an average value of approximately 2.33%, indicates that, for a leading 
index value of 0.46, increasing the wage differential from approximately -0.104 to -0.015 leads 
to an increase in the average selection probability of approximately 0.093%.  Comparing the  
     
Table 5.12 Interaction Effects, 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section using Leading Index 
 
 
 
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Leading Index Cell
0.46 A 0.000244 0.042764 0.000286 0.044500 0.000335 0.046315 0.000391 0.04824 0.000448 0.050044
Avg.*
1.18 B 0.000265 0.043649 0.000310 0.045414 0.000362 0.047258 0.000421 0.049215 0.000481 0.051047
Avg.
1.71 C 0.000282 0.044310 0.000329 0.046096 0.000383 0.047962 0.000444 0.049942 0.000507 0.051796
Avg.
2.27 D 0.000300 0.045017 0.000349 0.046825 0.000405 0.048715 0.000470 0.050720 0.000536 0.052596
Avg.
2.67 E 0.000313 0.045527 0.000365 0.047352 0.000422 0.049259 0.000489 0.051281 0.000557 0.053174
Avg.
Log Wage Differential
$0.82, and $1.90.  From top to bottom, the values of the leading indicate the 10th percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile
of the leading index in 1990.
This table presents lower and upper bounds on the probability of working the night shift.  The bounds on the probability are computed for each combination
of the log wage differential and the unemployment rate.  For example, the lower bound for the log wage differential and unemployment rate combination A1 is
0.000244 while the upper bound is 0.042764.  *The average of the lower and upper bounds is reported below each combination. For example, the average 
probability for combination A1 is 0.021504.  From left to right, the values of the log wage differential indicate the 10th percentile, 25th percentile, mean,
75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the predicted log wage differential in 1990.  This corresponds to approximate wage differentials of -$2.43, -$1.10, -$0.22,
0.022920 0.023858 0.024841 0.025885 0.026865
0.022658 0.023587 0.024560 0.025595 0.026566
0.022296 0.023212 0.024172 0.025193 0.026152
0.021957 0.022862 0.023810 0.024818 0.025764
0.021504 0.022393 0.023325 0.023810 0.025246
1 2 3 4 5
-0.1921215 -0.1041496 -0.0150659 0.0764587 0.159587
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interval in E2, which has an average value of 2.39%, to the interval in E3, which has an average 
value of 2.48 %, indicates that, for a leading index value of 2.67, increasing the wage differential 
from approximately -0.104 to -0.015 leads to an increase in the average selection probability of 
approximately 0.098%.  When comparing the effect of increasing the wage differential from     
-0.104 to -0.014 at a leading index value of 0.46 to the effect of increasing the wage differential  
from -0.104 to -0.015 at a leading index value of 2.67, the probability of night shift selection is 
0.005% higher.  This interaction effect implies that, at higher levels of the leading index, an 
increase in the wage differential has a larger impact on shift selection.  Similar to the results of 
the 1990 cross-section using the leading index, these results indicate that individuals are less 
likely to consider shift differentials in weak economic conditions.   
 In all of the models analyzed, the interaction effects were small. At average probabilities 
for both models in the 1990 cross-section, the interaction effects were positive.  In the pooled 
cross-section model with the unemployment rate, the interaction effects were negative, while in 
the pooled cross-section model with the leading index, the interaction effects were positive.  Of 
the four sets of interaction effects estimated, three lend support to the hypothesis established in 
this paper: shift differentials have a smaller impact on shift choice as local economic conditions 
weaken.  Thus, individual’s choices regarding work hours are impacted by local economic 
conditions.     
 
 
5.5 Tests for Pooling  
Estimating the individual wage equations separately for day and night workers in the 
endogenous switching regression model allows for the possibility that the returns to individual 
characteristics of workers are different.  As a way to test whether data on day and night workers 
should instead be pooled, the expected wage equation (15) and the treatment effects model (17) 
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are estimated for the both the two-step and maximum likelihood estimation of the cross-section 
and pooled cross-section models discussed above.   
 
5.5.1 1990 Cross-Section 
For the two-step model, estimates of the expected wage equation (15) may be used to test 
pooling in two ways: 1) variable by variable or 2) by determining the joint significance of the 
variables that indicate the difference between the returns to day and night work.  If these 
variables are jointly insignificant, the data on day and night workers may be pooled, and the 
treatment effects model (16) may be more appropriate. 
First, pooling may be tested variable by variable by using the results of the two-step 
switching regression expected wage equation (15), which is reported for the model using the  
unemployment rate in Table 5.13.  The left columns indicate the coefficients for day workers and  
the right columns indicate the difference in coefficients between day and night workers.  The 
impact of a variable differs between day and night workers if the estimated coefficients of the 
variables in the right column of Table 5.13 are significant.  Variables that are significantly 
different between day and night workers include the tenure variables, as well as union status, 
sales occupation, retail trade, finance, and public administration industries.  These results 
indicate that night workers in sales occupations and finance industries have significantly lower 
wages than day workers in the same professions.  Those night workers in retail trade and public 
administration industries earn significantly higher wages than their daytime counterparts.  
Preliminary evaluation of the expected wage equation results indicate that several variables are 
significantly different between night and day workers, suggesting that the data should not be 
pooled.   
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Table 5.13 Expected Wage Equation (Test for Pooling), 1990 Cross-Section with Unemployment Rate 
 
 
 
The results of the expected wage equation for the two-step model using the leading index 
as an indicator of local economic conditions are presented in Table 5.14.  Again, the impact on 
wages of the tenure, union status, sales occupations, retail trade, finance, and public 
administration occupation variables differ significantly between day and night workers.  
Additionally, married night shift workers earn significantly less than married day workers.  
Interaction between
Variable Ф(¥) and
Firm Size 1 0.030 0.018* Firm Size 1 0.011 0.262
Firm Size 2 0.052 0.027** Firm Size 2 0.594 0.479
Firm Size 3 0.117 0.054** Firm Size 3 1.077 0.838
Firm Size 4 0.145 0.029*** Firm Size 4 0.542 0.529
Years of School 0.046 0.026* Years of School 0.015 0.383
Years of School
2
0.001 0.001 Years of School
2
-0.001 0.016
Experience 0.031 0.027 Experience -0.481 0.391
Experience
2
-0.003 0.002 Experience
2
0.040 0.030
Experience
3
0.000 0.000 Experience
3
-0.001 0.001
Tenure 0.051 0.007*** Tenure 0.138 0.071*
Tenure
2
-0.002 0.001*** Tenure
2
-0.013 0.006**
Union 0.117 0.023*** Union 0.355 0.207*
Non-white -0.085 0.016*** Non-white -0.022 0.144
North East 0.029 0.023 North East -0.314 0.258
North Central -0.095 0.021*** North Central -0.239 0.251
South -0.165 0.019*** South -0.190 0.211
Female -0.206 0.018*** Female -0.195 0.226
Married 0.046 0.016*** Married -0.338 0.210
MSA Resident 0.020 0.013 MSA Resident -0.097 0.109
Professional Occ. 0.363 0.049*** Professional Occ. -0.736 0.614
Sales Occ. 0.274 0.051*** Sales Occ. -1.764 0.691**
Craft Occ. 0.177 0.047*** Craft Occ. -0.847 0.553
Ag/Construct Ind. 0.176 0.037*** Ag/Construct Ind. -1.328 0.902
Manufacturing Ind. 0.039 0.028 Manufacturing Ind. -0.324 0.238
Transportation Industry 0.108 0.034*** Transportation Industry 0.245 0.271
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.033 0.037 Wholesale Trade Industry -0.762 0.575
Retail Trade Industry -0.160 0.037*** Retail Trade Industry 0.777 0.326**
Finance Industry 0.078 0.035** Finance Industry -2.090 1.247*
Prof. & Related Industry -0.040 0.029 Prof. & Related Industry -0.047 0.254
Public Administration Industry 0.012 0.033 Public Administration Industry 0.817 0.273***
Unemployment Rate -0.003 0.000*** Unemployment Rate 0.001 0.003
Constant 5.828 0.187*** Constant 1.602 1.213
Ø(¥) -0.543 4.411
R squared 0.450
Observations 5026 Chi-Square(31) 87.11
Robust
Std. Error
Robust
Std. Error
Day  Workers
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%  Dependent Variable: Log Wage
Difference Between Night and Day Workers
Coefficient Coefficient
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Those working in craft occupations and agriculture/construction industries earn significantly 
lower wages than their daytime counterparts.  Also, the impact of the leading index on worker 
wages is significantly different for night workers.  Those living in regions with higher projected  
 
Table 5.14 Expected Wage Equation (Test for Pooling), 1990 Cross-Section with Leading Index 
 
 
Interaction between
Variable Ф(¥) and
Firm Size 1 0.031 0.018* Firm Size 1 0.083 0.265
Firm Size 2 0.059 0.027** Firm Size 2 0.672 0.483
Firm Size 3 0.125 0.054** Firm Size 3 1.277 0.841
Firm Size 4 0.152 0.029*** Firm Size 4 0.655 0.532
Years of School 0.035 0.026 Years of School 0.182 0.385
Years of School
2
0.001 0.001 Years of School
2
-0.008 0.016
Experience 0.030 0.027 Experience -0.447 0.401
Experience
2
-0.002 0.002 Experience
2
0.036 0.031
Experience
3
0.000 0.000 Experience
3
-0.001 0.001
Tenure 0.050 0.007*** Tenure 0.144 0.071**
Tenure
2
-0.002 0.001*** Tenure
2
-0.014 0.005***
Union 0.117 0.023*** Union 0.409 0.211*
Non-white -0.090 0.016*** Non-white 0.041 0.147
North East -0.058 0.027** North East 0.052 0.264
North Central -0.100 0.022*** North Central -0.170 0.255
South -0.173 0.020*** South -0.038 0.218
Female -0.206 0.018*** Female -0.259 0.226
Married 0.044 0.016*** Married -0.374 0.213*
MSA Resident 0.046 0.013*** MSA Resident -0.177 0.111
Professional Occ. 0.378 0.049*** Professional Occ. -0.907 0.612
Sales Occ. 0.288 0.051*** Sales Occ. -1.986 0.696***
Craft Occ. 0.181 0.048*** Craft Occ. -0.953 0.561*
Ag/Construct Ind. 0.174 0.037*** Ag/Construct Ind. -1.549 0.907*
Manufacturing Ind. 0.036 0.028 Manufacturing Ind. -0.378 0.237
Transportation Industry 0.099 0.035*** Transportation Industry 0.283 0.273
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.029 0.038 Wholesale Trade Industry -0.977 0.619
Retail Trade Industry -0.170 0.037*** Retail Trade Industry 0.875 0.330***
Finance Industry 0.077 0.035** Finance Industry -2.038 1.205*
Prof. & Related Industry -0.049 0.029* Prof. & Related Industry -0.053 0.255
Public Administration Industry 0.004 0.033 Public Administration Industry 0.806 0.268***
Leading Index -0.061 0.010*** Leading Index 0.252 0.103**
Constant 1.841 1.212 Constant -2.423 4.444
Ø(¥) 5.803 0.190***
R squared 0.440
Observations 5026 Chi-Square(31) 93.62
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%  Dependent Variable: Log Wage.  The chi-square test statistic refers to the statistic computed by the Wald test
of the above estimates with the hypothesis that the variables indicating a difference between day and night workers equal zero.
Day  Workers Difference Between Night and Day Workers
Coefficient
Robust
Coefficient
Robust
Std. Error Std. Error
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growth, as indicated by the leading index, earn significantly higher wages as night workers than 
they earn as day workers.   
Pooling for both versions of the cross-section may also be tested by a Wald test of the  
expected wage equation (15), with the hypothesis that the coefficients on all of the variables 
indicating the difference between the returns to day and night work in the expected wage 
equation equal zero.  For the 1990 cross-section using the unemployment rate as the indicator of  
local economic conditions, the   
  statistic is 87.11, providing evidence that the coefficients of 
day and night workers are significantly different.  A test statistic of 93.62 is obtained for the 
1990 cross-section with the leading index.  Overall, the results of the pooled expected wage 
equation indicate that returns to characteristics of night and day workers are significantly 
different, providing evidence that data on night and day workers should not be pooled.  The 
treatment effects model (16) is therefore an inappropriate model for estimating the current 
sample since it assumes that all of the wage equation coefficients are identical for night and day 
workers.   
Pooling is also tested for the maximum likelihood estimates of the unemployment rate 
and leading index versions of the 1990 cross-section.  This is accomplished by comparing the 
results obtained from the maximum likelihood estimates of the individual wage equations (3) and 
(4), which were provided in Tables A2 and A4, to the results obtained from maximum likelihood 
estimates of the treatment effects model (17).  Using the fact that the maximum likelihood 
treatment effects model (17) is a restricted version of the maximum likelihood individual wage 
equations; a likelihood ratio test is computed.  For the current analysis, a statistically significant 
likelihood ratio test statistic is obtained for both models.  This test provides evidence that the 
data on day and night shift workers should not be pooled.  The switching regression model is 
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again appropriate in this case.  The results of the treatment effects model, including both the 
selection equation and the wage equation for the cross-section using the unemployment rate and 
leading index and the LR test statistics, are provided in Tables A13 and A14 in the Appendix. 
 
5.5.2 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section 
The expected wage equation (15) is also estimated for the pooled cross-section results. 
Table 5.15 provides the results for the two-step model using the local unemployment rate.   
Interpreting the variables in the right column indicates that many of the variables that were 
significantly different between night and day workers in the cross-sectional analysis remain  
significant in the pooled cross-section, including the tenure variables, union status, sales 
occupation, retail trade, and public administration industries.   None of the year indicator 
variables are significantly different for night workers.  The pooled cross-section estimates 
results also indicate that more educated night shift workers earn significantly less than their 
daytime counterparts.   The Wald test statistic for the pooled cross-section using the  
unemployment rate indicates that there are significant differences between night and day 
workers, and that the data should not be pooled.   
The results of the expected wage equation for the two-step model using the leading index 
as an indicator of local economic conditions are presented in Table 5.16.  Similar to the cross- 
section results, the leading index has a significantly higher impact on the wages of night workers 
relative to day workers.  Those living in regions with higher project growth, as indicated by the 
leading index, earn significantly higher wages as night workers than they earn as day workers.  
The Wald test statistic for the pooled cross-section using the leading index indicates that there 
are significant differences between night and day workers, and that the data should not be 
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Table 5.15 Expected Wage Equation (Test for Pooling), 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section, Unemployment Rate 
 
 
 
pooled.  The treatment effects model (16) would be an inappropriate model for evaluating the 
current dataset. 
Interaction between
Variable Ф(¥) and
Firm Size 1 0.042 0.009*** Firm Size 1 0.148 0.171
Firm Size 2 0.093 0.013*** Firm Size 2 -0.146 0.279
Firm Size 3 0.124 0.020*** Firm Size 3 -0.057 0.378
Firm Size 4 0.195 0.018*** Firm Size 4 -0.276 0.390
Years of School 0.015 0.010 Years of School -0.525 0.197***
Years of School
2
0.002 0.000*** Years of School
2
0.021 0.009**
Experience 0.041 0.011*** Experience 0.025 0.180
Experience
2
-0.002 0.001*** Experience
2
-0.003 0.011
Experience
3
0.000 0.000** Experience
3
0.000 0.000
Tenure 0.025 0.002*** Tenure 0.172 0.031***
Tenure
2
-0.001 0.000*** Tenure
2
-0.008 0.001***
Union 0.073 0.012*** Union 0.287 0.172*
Non-white -0.107 0.008*** Non-white 0.056 0.078
North East 0.017 0.012 North East -0.112 0.139
North Central -0.128 0.011*** North Central -0.051 0.143
South -0.181 0.010*** South 0.014 0.126
Female -0.213 0.009*** Female 0.213 0.126*
Married 0.050 0.008*** Married 0.142 0.108
MSA Resident -0.005 0.007 MSA Resident 0.025 0.070
Professional Occ. 0.293 0.023*** Professional Occ. 0.784 0.376**
Sales Occ. 0.163 0.024*** Sales Occ. -0.078 0.373
Craft Occ. 0.054 0.021*** Craft Occ. 0.293 0.251
Agriculture/Farm/Fish Industry -0.192 0.032*** Agriculture/Farm/Fish Industry 0.302 1.488
Mining Industry 0.074 0.062 Mining Industry 0.362 0.466
Construction Industry 0.095 0.021*** Construction Industry 4.251 0.988***
Non-Durable Manufacturing Ind. -0.005 0.019 Non-Durable Manufacturing Ind. 0.041 0.195
Durable Manufacturing Industry 0.003 0.016 Durable Manufacturing Industry 0.558 0.169***
Transportation Industry 0.085 0.018*** Transportation Industry 0.599 0.195***
Wholesale Trade Industry -0.181 0.018*** Wholesale Trade Industry 0.713 0.193***
Retail Trade Industry -0.033 0.021 Retail Trade Industry 0.774 0.272***
Finance Industry 0.052 0.019*** Finance Industry -0.876 1.188
Prof. & Related Industry -0.116 0.015*** Prof. & Related Industry 0.503 0.136***
Public Administration Industry -0.051 0.016*** Public Administration Industry 1.788 0.176***
1992 0.087 0.011*** 1992 0.007 0.114
1994 0.161 0.014*** 1994 0.003 0.175
1996 0.221 0.014*** 1996 -0.053 0.146
1998 0.264 0.016*** 1998 0.044 0.168
2000 0.349 0.018*** 2000 -0.019 0.189
Unemployment Rate -0.001 0.000*** Unemployment Rate 0.001 0.001
Constant 6.030 0.094*** Constant 2.712 2.149
Ø(¥) -0.814 0.693
R squared 0.51
Observations 34732 Chi-Square(39) 374.79
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%  Dependent Variable: Log Wage.  The chi-square test statistic refers to the statistic computed by the Wald test
of the above estimates with the hypothesis that the variables indicating a difference between day and night workers equal zero.
Day  Workers Difference Between Night and Day Workers
Coefficient
Robust
Coefficient
Robust
Std. Error Std. Error
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A likelihood ratio test of the maximum likelihood wage equations from the pooled cross-
section models with the unemployment rate and the leading index are compared to results from 
the estimation of a treatment effects model (17).  The results again indicate that data on day and  
night shift workers should not be pooled.  The results of the treatment effects model, including  
both the selection equation and the wage equation for the pooled cross-section using the 
 
 
Table 5.16 Expected Wage Equation (Test for Pooling), 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section, Leading Index 
 
 
Interaction between
Variable Ф(¥) and
Firm Size 1 0.043 0.009*** Firm Size 1 0.208 0.170
Firm Size 2 0.096 0.013*** Firm Size 2 -0.057 0.278
Firm Size 3 0.130 0.020*** Firm Size 3 0.045 0.375
Firm Size 4 0.199 0.018*** Firm Size 4 -0.164 0.387
Years of School 0.017 0.010 Years of School -0.482 0.194**
Years of School
2 0.002 0.000*** Years of School
2
0.019 0.009**
Experience 0.042 0.011*** Experience 0.023 0.182
Experience
2 -0.002 0.001*** Experience
2
-0.002 0.011
Experience
3 0.000 0.000** Experience
3 0.000 0.000
Tenure 0.024 0.002*** Tenure 0.170 0.031***
Tenure
2 -0.001 0.000*** Tenure
2
-0.008 0.001***
Union 0.070 0.012*** Union 0.319 0.172*
Non-white -0.109 0.008*** Non-white 0.084 0.078
North East 0.028 0.012** North East -0.067 0.135
North Central -0.102 0.011*** North Central -0.029 0.132
South -0.149 0.009*** South 0.021 0.113
Female -0.214 0.009*** Female 0.194 0.125
Married 0.048 0.008*** Married 0.123 0.108
MSA Resident 0.000 0.007 MSA Resident 0.012 0.070
Professional Occ. 0.295 0.024*** Professional Occ. 0.721 0.375*
Sales Occ. 0.163 0.024*** Sales Occ. -0.148 0.371
Craft Occ. 0.055 0.021*** Craft Occ. 0.235 0.250
Agriculture/Farm/Fish Industry -0.216 0.032*** Agriculture/Farm/Fish Industry -0.027 1.612
Mining Industry 0.080 0.062 Mining Industry 0.322 0.467
Construction Industry 0.090 0.021*** Construction Industry 4.297 0.984***
Non-Durable Manufacturing Ind. -0.008 0.019 Non-Durable Manufacturing Ind. 0.070 0.195
Durable Manufacturing Industry -0.001 0.016 Durable Manufacturing Industry 0.567 0.169***
Transportation Industry 0.079 0.018*** Transportation Industry 0.651 0.193***
Wholesale Trade Industry -0.187 0.018*** Wholesale Trade Industry 0.786 0.193***
Retail Trade Industry -0.039 0.021* Retail Trade Industry 0.778 0.275***
Finance Industry 0.051 0.019*** Finance Industry -1.055 1.152
Prof. & Related Industry -0.127 0.015*** Prof. & Related Industry 0.535 0.135***
Public Administration Industry -0.060 0.016*** Public Administration Industry 1.799 0.174***
1992 0.059 0.011*** 1992 0.006 0.119
1994 0.163 0.016*** 1994 -0.108 0.195
1996 0.214 0.014*** 1996 -0.098 0.153
1998 0.286 0.016*** 1998 -0.053 0.176
2000 0.369 0.018*** 2000 -0.096 0.192
Leading Index -0.018 0.004*** Leading Index 0.088 0.045**
Constant 5.942 0.094*** Constant 2.112 2.119
Ø(¥) -0.693 0.688
R squared 0.51
Observations 24732 Chi-Square(39) 381.81
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%  Dependent Variable: Log Wage.  The chi-square test statistic refers to the statistic computed
by the Wald test of the above estimates with the hypothesis that the variables indicating a difference between day & night workers is zero.
Day  Workers Difference Between Night and Day Workers
Coefficient
Robust
Coefficient
Robust
Std. Error Std. Error
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unemployment rate and leading index and the LR test statistics, are provided in Tables A15 and 
A16 in the Appendix.   
 
5.6 Additional Cross-Sectional Analysis 
This paper focuses on an analysis of the 1990 cross-section for reasons highlighted in 
Section 3.2.4.    The switching regression model is also applied to other cross-sectional datasets 
from 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000.  The same variable specifications that were employed in 
the 1990 analysis are used to model shift wages and shift selection in data from additional years.   
The focus of this dissertation is to analyze the impact of shift differentials and local economic 
conditions on shift choice and to determine the impact of interaction effects between the shift 
differential and local economic conditions on the selection probability.  This section will thus 
focus on a discussion of the main variables of interest, the unemployment rate and the shift 
differential, and the interaction effects.  Shift differentials calculated from these models are 
discussed in Section 5.8.   
Table 5.17 displays the results of cross-sectional analysis for the local economic 
condition variables from the reduced and structural forms of the selection equation.  The results 
for the unemployment rate indicate extremely small impacts on the selection probability, with 
similar results for all of the years.  The unemployment rate does not have a significant impact on 
shift selection in any year.  The results are much stronger when the leading index is included in 
the regression.  In 1990, the impact of the leading index is positive and statistically significant.  
Additionally, comparing the results of the reduced form to those of the structural form indicate 
that the magnitude of the leading index variable is unchanged.  This suggests that local economic 
conditions have an impact on shift selection apart from their impact on worker wages.  The 
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Table 5.17 Cross-Section Two-Step and ML, Selection Model Results, Local Economic Conditions 
 
   
 
 
leading index remains a positive predictor of shift selection in 1992, but the magnitude of the 
effect is not as large.  In 1994, a greater impact of the leading indicator is apparent, with the 
leading index statistically significant in the maximum likelihood reduced form of the selection 
equation.  In both 1992 and 1994, the magnitude of the leading index coefficient is smaller in 
structural equation estimation, indicating that the leading index impacts shift choice largely 
through its impact on wages.  In 1990-1994, the leading index positively predicts shift choice, 
Model Reduced Structural Reduced Structural 
Using Unemployment Rate
1990 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1992 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1994 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1996 -0.000 -0.000 --- ---
(0.002) (0.001) --- ---
1998 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Using Leading Index
1990 0.079 0.069 0.092 0.096
(0.048)   (0.400*) (0.047**) (0.038***)
1992 0.015 0.016 0.006 0.030
(0.045) (0.036) (0.045) (0.035)
1994 0.078 0.013 0.100 0.049
(0.053) (0.085)   0.053* (0.078)
1996 -0.016 -0.115 --- ---
(0.057) (0.058**) --- ---
1998 -0.072 -0.096 --- ---
(0.072) (0.060) --- ---
2000 -0.083 -0.051 -0.073 -0.053
(0.054) (0.037) (0.055) (0.037)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Coefficient on Local Economic Condition Variable
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable: Night Shift  
Two-Step ML
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indicating that individuals in regions with higher predicted growth were more likely to select 
night shift work.  In 1996, the impact of the leading index becomes negative, and is larger in 
structural equation estimation.  Thus, the leading index has a significant impact on shift choice 
apart from any impact that it has on the individual’s wage.  The leading index remains a negative 
predictor of shift choice in 1998 and 2000, indicating that those living in areas with higher 
projected growth were less likely to choose night shift work.  One possible explanation for the 
reversal in sign of the leading index in the selection equations is that economic growth in the 
later years of the decade may have been more concentrated in industries that rely less on night 
shift work.  The data reveal smaller percentages of workers employed on night shifts in 1996 and 
1998 relative to 1990 and 1992.  Hatch and Clinton (2000) summarize job growth during the 
1990’s, noting that the manufacturing industry suffered job losses that continued long after the 
recession of 1990-1991.  They surmise that “technological improvements allowed fewer worker 
to generate more output than in the past, the Asian economic crisis reduced demand for goods 
manufacturing the United States, and the U.S. government reduced defense spending.”  
Additionally, the retail sales industry, known for larger percentages of night shift workers, 
experienced slow job growth.  In the 1990’s job growth was driven by service producing 
industries relative to goods producing industries.  However, service growth was most 
pronounced in business services such as personnel supply services and computer and data 
processing services.  These industries are not known for a high prevalence of night shift work.   
 Table 5.18 displays the results of cross-sectional analysis for the wage differential 
variable in the structural equation estimation.  In the model with the local unemployment rate, 
the wage differential has a positive and significant impact on shift selection in 1990, 1992, 1994, 
and 1996.  The impact is large, with its largest impact occurring in 1996.  These results indicate 
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that rising wage differentials for night shift work make individuals more likely to select night 
shift work.  Interestingly, in the 1998 and 2000 cross-sections, the impact of the wage differential 
is insignificant and negative in three of the four cases.  This suggests that in later years of the 
dataset, individuals did not consider shift differentials when choosing whether to work at night.  
Similar results are found in the model when the leading index is used as the indicator of local 
economic conditions.   
Interaction effects were also considered for the 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000 cross- 
 
Table 5.18 Cross-Section Two-Step and ML, Structural Model Results, Wage Differential Coefficients 
 
 
 
Model Two-Step ML
with Unemployment Rate
1990 0.933 0.831
(0.374**) (0.412**)
1992 0.917 0.832
(0.285***) (0.283***)
1994 1.535 1.484
(0.621**) (0.751**)
1996 0.913 ---
(0.235***) ---
1998 -0.036 0.014
(0.218) (0.226)
2000 -0.322 -0.238
(0.661) (0.664)
with Leading Index
1990 0.864 0.743
(0.352**) (0.404*)
1992 0.779 0.666
(0.283***) (0.263**)
1994 1.141 0.916
(0.702) (0.782)
1996 1.004 ---
(0.230**) ---
1998 0.027 ---
(0.214) ---
2000 -0.353 -0.257
(0.603) (0.606)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable: Night Shift  
Coefficient on Wage Differential
Structural Selection Equation
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sections.  Interaction effects for the 1990 cross-section were discussed in Section 5.4.  The 
interaction terms for each year are reported in Tables A17-A23.
4
  Again, the computed 
interaction effects are negligible, but it is useful to interpret the sign of the interaction effects at 
average values of the probability.  In the models including the leading index in 1990, 1992, and 
1994 the interaction effect is positive, while in the model including the unemployment rate in 
1996 the interaction effect is negative.  These results suggest that shift differentials have a 
smaller impact on shift choice in areas experiencing high unemployment and less regional 
growth.  Individuals in these regions may be more likely to work at night regardless of shift 
differentials in order to remain employed, leading to a decreased impact of shift differentials and 
local economic conditions on shift choice. For the models including the unemployment rate, the 
interaction effect was small and positive for years 1990, 1992, 1994, 1998, and 2000.  In 2000, 
for the model including the leading index, the interaction effect is negative.  These results 
suggest that shift differentials have a larger impact on shift choice in weak labor markets.  Thus, 
the cross-sectional results do not agree as to the direction of the interaction effect between local 
economic conditions and shift differentials, and the interaction effects are small.   
 
5.7 Additional Analysis by Industry 
As discussed in Section 3.2.5.3 and demonstrated in the above regressions, industry plays 
a role in shift choice and shift wages.  In order to further investigate shift choice and shift 
differentials, pooled cross-section datasets for four industries in which shift work is known to be 
prevalent are analyzed using the switching regression model outlined in Section 4.3.  The 
industries analyzed are manufacturing, retail trade, professional and related, and service 
                                                          
4
 Maximum likelihood results were unavailable due to convergence issues for the leading index models in1996 and 
1998. 
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industries.  The same variable specifications that were employed in the cross-section and pooled 
cross-section regressions, including controls for occupation, were used in the analysis.  The main 
variables of interest from the regression models are reported in Tables 5.19 and 5.20.  Shift 
differentials calculated from these regressions are discussed in Section 5.8. 
 Table 5.19 displays the results of pooled cross-section analysis for the local economic  
condition variables from the two-step and maximum likelihood reduced and structural forms of 
the selection equation.  The results for the unemployment rate indicate extremely small impacts 
on the selection probability, with similar results for all of the industries except for the 
manufacturing industry.  For manufacturing workers, in the reduced form of the selection 
 
Table 5.19 Selection Equation Coefficients for Local Economic Condition Variables, Pooled Cross-Section 
Industry Regressions 
 
 
Model Reduced Structural Reduced Structural 
Using Unemployment Rate
Manufacturing Industry 0.074 -0.017 0.077 -0.019
(0.033**) (0.042) (0.033**) (0.041)
Retail Trade Industry 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Prof. & Related Industry 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Service Industry -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 --0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Using Leading Index
Manufacturing Industry 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Retail Trade Industry -0.043 0.004 -0.041 0.022
(0.046) (0.044) (0.047) (0.044)
Prof. & Related Industry 0.096 0.086 0.096 0.087
(0.041**) (0.039**) (0.045**) (0.039**)
Service Industry -0.022 -0.001 -0.014 0.011
(0.053) (0.051) (0.056) (0.051)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Coefficient on Local Economic Condition Variable
Two-Step ML
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable: Night Shift  
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equation, the unemployment rate has a positive and significant impact on shift selection.  Thus, 
manufacturing workers are more likely to select night shift work in areas of high unemployment.  
In the structural equation estimation, however, the unemployment rate becomes negative and is 
no longer significant for shift choice for manufacturing workers, which suggests that the 
unemployment rate has an impact on shift choice, but this impact occurs mainly through changes 
in wages.  After controlling for the shift differential, manufacturing workers are less likely to 
work at night as the unemployment rate rises.  This result reflects the procyclical nature of the 
manufacturing industry.  When the economy weakens and unemployment rises, night shifts in 
manufacturing are more likely to be cancelled and individuals are less likely to be able to choose 
night shift work.  When the leading index is used in the analysis, it is only significant for shift 
choice for professional and related workers.  The coefficient on the leading index maintains its 
significance in the structural equation estimation in both two step and maximum likelihood 
estimation.  This indicates that the leading index is a strong positive predictor of shift choice 
even after controlling for shift differentials.  The professional and related industry includes 
doctors, nurses, and other hospital staff, who are highly likely to work at night.  Hatch and 
Clinton (2000) indicate that hospitals and doctor’s offices were one of the top industries gaining 
the most jobs in the 1990’s.  The regression results indicate that the professional industry is 
highly impacted by projected growth, and that professional workers in areas with higher 
projected economic growth are likely to see a higher prevalence of night shift work.   
 Table 5.20 displays the results of pooled cross-sectional analysis for the wage differential 
variable in the structural equation estimation.  In the two-step model both with the local 
unemployment rate and the model with the leading index, the wage differential has a positive and 
significant impact on shift selection in the manufacturing and retail trade industries.  Rising wage 
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differentials for night shift work make individuals more likely to select night shift work in these  
industries.  Service industries are not significantly impacted by shift differentials.  In the model 
with the unemployment rate, shift differentials have a negative and significant impact on shift 
choice for those in professional industries, while in the model with the leading index, the wage 
differential is insignificant for predicting shift choice.  Thus, when controlling for projected 
growth in the professional industry, the shift differential is no longer significant for shift choice.    
   Interaction effects were also considered for the industries discussed in this section.  The 
interaction effects for each year are reported in Tables A25-A32.   Similar to the results outlined 
above, interaction effects computed at the average probabilities are small.  Examining the sign  
 
Table 5.20 Structural Equation Estimation, Industry Pooled Cross-Section, Wage Differential Coefficients 
 
 
Model Two-Step ML
with Unemployment Rate
Manufacturing Industry 0.732 0.799
(0.327**) (0.263***)
Retail Trade Industry 0.502 1.087
(0.377**) (0.316***)
Prof. & Related Industry -0.937 -0.839
(0.379**) (0.393**)
Service Industry -0.436 -0.397
(0.288) (0.295)
with Leading Index
Manufacturing Industry 0.980 0.925
(0.335***) (0.276***)
Retail Trade Industry 0.804 1.190
(0.354**) (0.324***)
Prof. & Related Industry -0.495 -0.394
(0.422) (0.425)
Service Industry 0.264 -0.248
(0.340) (0.323)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Coefficient on Wage Differential
Structural Selection Equation
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable: Night Shift  
119 
 
of the interaction effects provides some insight into the impact of shift differentials on shift 
choice when local economic conditions change.  Interaction terms for the manufacturing industry 
were positive for the unemployment rate and negative for the leading index model.  These results 
suggest that shift differentials remain important for shift choice in manufacturing industries even 
when the economy is weak.  Interaction effects were positive for both the unemployment rate 
and leading index model for the retail trade industry, providing no conclusive direction for the 
interaction effects.  These inconclusive results could be driven by differing impacts of economic 
conditions on the various sub-industries within the retail trade industry.  Apparel and accessory 
stores experienced declining employment during the 1990’s, while discount department stores 
and eating and drinking establishments experienced growth (Hatch and Clinton 2000).  For the 
models including the unemployment rate, the interaction effects were negative for professional 
and related services industries and for service industries, while the interaction effects in the 
model with the leading index were positive.  These results suggest that shift differentials have a 
smaller impact on shift choice in weak labor markets, and that compensating differentials offered 
for night shift work may be lower in these industries. 
 
5.8 Shift Differentials 
As noted above, the shift differential is calculated for each individual in the sample and is 
included in the estimation of the structural equation to determine the impact of shift differentials 
on shift choice.  Wage differentials are calculated using equations (18) and (21) for the two-step 
and maximum likelihood estimation results with the results for both the cross-section and the 
pooled cross-section displayed in Table 5.21.  The average shift differential for all of the models 
is negative indicating that night workers actually earn lower wages on average than day workers 
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in the sample.  The wage differentials for the 1990 cross-section are considerably larger when 
compared to the results for the pooled cross-section.  The two-step results indicate that night 
workers earn approximately $6.50 less per hour than day workers, while maximum likelihood 
results indicate that night workers earn approximately $5.50 less per hour.  Night shift workers 
earn approximately half of day wages in the 1990 sample.  In pooled cross-section two-step 
estimation, night shift workers earn from an average of $1 to $1.67, or 7-11% lower wages than 
day workers.    In pooled cross-section maximum likelihood estimation, night shift workers earn 
an average of -$0.38 to -$0.68, or 2-4% less than day workers.  Maximum likelihood estimation 
provides smaller estimates of wage differentials than those obtained from the two-step model. 
The wage differentials in Table 5.21 indicate that shift differentials are higher in pooled cross-
section analysis than in cross-sectional analysis.  Possible explanations for the negative wage 
differentials include sample homogeneity and low demand for shift work.  According to the 
theory of compensating differentials, the size and sign of the wage premium depends on the 
underlying distribution of worker tastes and on the demand for certain job characteristics.  If 
worker preferences for night shift work are homogenous, and every worker agrees that night shift 
work is inconvenient and undesirable the compensating differential is expected to be positive.  
However, if some workers actually prefer night shift work, the compensating differential may be 
negative.   
 
Table 5.21 Shift Differentials, Cross-Section and Pooled Cross-Section 
 
 
Two-Step ML Two-Step ML
1990 Cross Section (Unemployment Rate) -$6.28 -$5.47 -62.5 -54.5
1990 Cross Section (Leading Index) -$6.79 -$5.65 -67.8 -56.5
1990-2000 Pooled Cross Section (Unemployment Rate) -$1.03 -$0.38 -6.6 -1.7
1990-2000 Pooled Cross Section (Leading Index) -$1.67 -$0.68 -11.3 -3.8
Average Shift Differential % Difference*
*Refers to the percent difference in night and day wages calculated using equation (21).
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Section 1.2.2 provides evidence that preferences for shift work are not homogenous.  As 
detailed in Table 1.3, voluntary reasons motivate approximately half of night shift workers to 
choose nighttime employment in the CPS sample.  Table 1.3 also indicates that some workers 
actually prefer night shift work; personal preference was the primary reason for working a night 
shift for 10%-20% of night shift workers in the sample.  As summarized in Borjas (2008) 
compensating differentials can “go the wrong way” in cases where workers actually prefer a 
certain type of work and where demand for certain types of workers is low.  See Figure 1.1 in 
Section 1.1.1.  In the current analysis, those choosing night shift work might prefer to work at 
night.  Firms do not need to induce workers to work a shift; since night shift work is preferred, 
being able to work at night might actually be considered an amenity for some workers.  The 1990 
cross-section results indicate positive selection into night shifts.  Thus, workers in the sample 
appear to have a comparative advantage in working at night and don’t require a compensating 
differential.  In the 1990-2000 pooled cross-section results, selection into night shifts is 
insignificant and negative, which provides weak evidence that individuals’ preferences may have 
changed over time throughout the sample and that they may require higher wages to be induced 
to work at night in later years of the sample.   
An additional factor that may contribute to the negative night shift differentials obtained 
in the current analysis is the breadth of the dataset.  The NLSY79 sample includes both male and 
female workers from different regional labor markets in every occupation and industry.  It is 
possible that worker preferences, earnings potential, and labor supply decisions are so diverse 
that estimated shift differentials for night shift work are negative.  Additionally, the demand for 
night shift workers may be low.  In other words, a small number of firms offer night shift work 
and those firms may be matched with individuals that prefer night shifts, making a compensating 
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differential unnecessary.   
As a supplement to the previous analysis, wage differentials for night shift workers are 
calculated for various worker characteristics from both the two-step and maximum likelihood  
estimates for the 1990 cross-section and the pooled cross-section results.  These shift 
differentials are presented in Table 5.22.  Even when shift differentials are analyzed by job 
classification and other personal worker characteristics, day workers earn consistently higher 
wages in the sample.  Again, the shift differentials estimated for the 1990 cross-section are 
significantly larger than the premiums estimated for the pooled cross-sections.  The shift 
 
Table 5.22 Shift Differentials by Worker Characteristics, 1990 Cross-Section and 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-
Section 
 
 
Category Two-Step ML Two-Step ML
Union -5.79 -4.77 0.12 1.01
Non-Union -6.39 -5.61 -1.27 -0.66
Male -6.60 -5.72 -1.44 -0.73
Female -5.88 -5.15 -0.54 0.04
Married -6.82 -5.94 -1.14 -0.45
Non-Married -5.66 -4.93 -0.90 -0.29
White -6.74 -4.43 -1.38 -0.70
Non-White -5.22 -5.92 -0.35 0.27
Non-High School Graduate -4.45 -3.81 -0.63 0.19
High School Graduate -5.75 -4.98 -1.12 -0.09
College Graduate -9.30 -8.24 -3.80 -2.28
Category Two-Step ML Two-Step ML
Union -6.42 -5.00 -0.62 0.66
Non-Union -6.88 -5.80 -1.90 -0.95
Male -7.16 -5.93 -2.12 -1.04
Female -6.35 5.32 -1.15 -0.24
Married -7.36 -6.14 -1.87 -0.79
Non-Married -6.15 -5.11 -1.44 -0.53
White -7.27 -6.11 -2.10 -1.05
Non-White -5.71 -4.63 -0.87 0.05
Non-High School Graduate -4.88 -4.00 -0.67 0.08
High School Graduate -6.23 -5.16 -1.16 -0.22
College Graduate -10.01 -8.47 -3.87 -2.53
Average Shift Differential, Leading Index Model ($)
1990 Cross-Section Pooled Cross-Sections
1990 Cross-Section
Average Shift Differential, Unemployment Rate Model ($)
Pooled Cross-Sections
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differentials presented in Table 5.22 offer interesting information on the distribution of shift 
premiums.  On average, night shift workers belonging to unions earn higher premiums than non-
union night shift workers.  This result is consistent with the prevalence of collective bargaining 
agreements that ensure higher night wages for union workers.  Female night shift workers are not 
penalized as much for working night shifts as male workers.   Similar patterns are observed for 
non-married and non-white individuals, with non-married and non-white night shift workers 
receiving wages that are closer to those of their daytime counterparts.  Workers who did not 
graduate high school earn larger shift premiums than those with higher education.  Kostiuk 
(1990) finds a similar result, noting that estimates of shift differentials indicate that those who 
are paid less in the labor market, such as non-whites and those with less than a high school 
diploma, “earn consistently larger shift premiums.”  He posits that larger shift premiums occur 
for these workers because shift work jobs offer smaller pay changes for personal characteristics.  
This paper provides the first analysis of shift work that includes female workers, thus it is the 
first to find a similar result for female shift workers. 
Table 5.23 presents wage differential estimates for the remaining cross-sections.  
Negative wage differentials are estimated for each year except for the 2000 cross-section.  The 
gap between night and day wages seems to widen and then gradually begin to close by the year 
1998.  As a whole, the two-step shift differentials are larger than those obtained by maximum 
likelihood estimation.  Shift differentials in 1990, 1992, and 1994 are relatively similar, with 
1990 offering the smallest deficit below day wages.  Estimated shift wages are far below those of 
day wages in 1996.  According to the two-step results, night wages were only approximately 
20% below day wages in 1998.  By 2000, night wages were higher than day wages by 7.4-11%.   
The shift differentials in Table 5.23 indicate a change over time in shift compensation. 
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The negative gap between night and day wages in the beginning of the decade widens through 
1996, but by 2000, shift differentials become positive.  The 1990’s began in a recession with a 
relatively sluggish recovery.  Real GDP grew at an average annual rate of 2.4% from 1990-1995 
before averaging 4.3% from 1996-2000.  By the end of the decade, non-supervisory workers in 
the services sector and production workers in the goods sector enjoyed higher earnings than at 
the beginning of the 1990’s even after adjusting for inflation (Hatch and Clinton, 2000).  The 
dataset indicates that wages for both day and night workers increased over time.  Towards the 
end of the 1990’s the wage differentials calculated in the sample begin to rise, eventually 
becoming positive.  This could be the result of changing preferences for night shift work among 
the individuals in the sample.  By 2000, the sample respondents are older and more experienced, 
thus those choosing to work at night may be able to command a higher shift premium.  
Additionally, the United States economy began to rely less on goods-producing industries during 
 
Table 5.23 Shift Differentials, Cross-Section Results 
 
 
Cross Section (Unemployment Rate) Two-Step ML Two-Step ML
1990 -$6.28 -$5.47 -62.5 -54.5
1992 -$7.15 -$4.56 -62.6 -39.5
1994 -$7.91 -$5.85 -60.6 -43.8
1996 -$11.17 -$10.50 -78.5 -74.9
1998 -$3.16 -$2.58 -17.1 -12.1
2000 $1.80 $1.44 11.1 9.1
Cross Section (Leading Index) Two-Step ML Two-Step ML
1990 -$6.79 -$5.65 -67.8 -56.5
1992 -$7.16 -$4.50 -62.9 -39.0
1994 -$7.49 -$4.36 -57.4 -32.2
1996 -$11.21 --- -78.7 ---
1998 -$3.71 --- -20.5 ---
2000 $1.57 $1.20 9.4 7.4
Average Shift Differential % Difference*
*Refers to the percent difference in night and day wages calculated using equation (21).
--- indicates that the maximum likelihood estimation did not converge.
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this time and more on service-producing industries.  Higher wage premiums for night shift work 
towards the end of the decade may reflect the need to attract individuals to night shift work as 
more opportunities for higher paid jobs in the services sector, particularly the technology sector, 
became available. 
Table 5.24 presents wage differential estimates for pooled cross-sectional regressions for 
the four major industry groups outlined in Section 5.7.   Negative wage differentials are 
estimated for each industry except for the professional industry.  In both the model with the 
unemployment rate and the model with the leading index, night workers in the professional 
industry enjoy modest pay premiums.  Two-step shift differentials are smaller than those 
estimated by maximum likelihood for the manufacturing and retail trade industries.  Night shift 
service industry workers have the largest wage disadvantage of the four industry groups.  
Overall, the estimated shift differentials vary significantly by industry.  Future studies could 
consider a more detailed treatment of shift differentials by industry. 
 
Table 5.24 Shift Differentials, Industry Regressions 
 
 
 
  
Cross Section (Unemployment Rate) Two-Step ML ML
Manufacturing Industry -$2.55 -$7.88 -15.7 -55.7
Retail Trade Industry -$3.19 -$6.37 -29.1 -60.0
Prof. & Related Industry $2.66 $0.57 17.0 2.3
Service Industry -$3.02 -$4.27 -17.3 -27.3
Cross Section (Leading Index) Two-Step ML Two-Step ML
Manufacturing Industry -$3.48 -$7.58 -22.5 -53.2
Retail Trade Industry -$4.58 -$6.40 -42.4 -60.3
Prof. & Related Industry $0.67 -$0.24 3.9 -2.6
Service Industry -$9.29 -$6.30 -68.8 -43.7
Average Shift Differential % Difference*
*Refers to the percent difference in night and day wages calculated using equation (21).
Two-Step
126 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
6.1 Summary  
 Non-standard shift workers comprise nearly 20% of the United States work force, yet 
relatively little is known about this labor market phenomenon.  It is important that economists 
continue to question the motivations for shift work, the wages paid for shift work, and the impact 
of labor market conditions upon work schedules.  This dissertation seeks to provide a more 
comprehensive study of American shift workers using more recent data than previous studies to 
analyze shift choice and shift wages.  We consider a variation of the theory of compensating 
differentials in which labor markets are weak.  A switching regression model with endogenous 
switching is estimated using NLSY79 data.  The main results of the analysis are as follows: 
1) The results emphasize the importance of correcting for self-selection.  All versions of the 
models estimated indicate the presence of selection bias.  The endogenous switching 
regression model corrects for self-selection into shift work.   
2) The models provide evidence that shift differentials significantly impact shift choice.  In 
the 1990 cross-section model using both the unemployment rate and the leading index, 
both two-step and maximum likelihood estimation indicates positive and significant 
impacts of shift differentials on shift choice.  Estimates of the 1990-2000 pooled cross-
sections fail to find significant impacts of shift differentials on shift choice; however, the 
estimated coefficients are positive, suggesting that individuals are more likely to select 
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night shift work as wage differentials for night shift work rise.  Thus, compensating 
differentials for night shift work motivate individuals to work at night.  Shift differentials 
also positively and significantly influence shift choice for the 1992, 1994, and 1996 
cross-sections.  When the pooled cross-section is analyzed by industry, shift differentials 
positively and significantly predict shift choice for manufacturing and retail trade 
workers.   
3) The models provide evidence that local economic conditions impact shift selection.  
Estimation of the 1990 cross-section finds a statistically significant impact of the leading 
index on shift selection, indicating that individuals in regions with higher projected 
growth are more likely to select night shift work.  Estimation of the 1990-2000 pooled 
cross-sections indicates no significant impacts of local economic conditions on shift 
selection.  The leading index has a larger impact on shift selection than the local 
unemployment rate in all of the models.  This difference in magnitudes suggests that 
regional growth, which likely results in a greater number of shift positions offered, is a 
better predictor of shift selection than local unemployment rates.   
4) The models provide weak evidence that compensating differentials for night shift work 
may be lower when local economies are weak.  This paper offers a new estimation 
method for determining interaction effects in the endogenous switching regression model.  
To investigate possible interaction effects, we estimate the effect of changes in the shift 
differential on the probability of selecting night shift work under different local economic 
conditions.  In all of the samples, the interaction effects are small.  Examining the sign of 
the interaction effects at the average probabilities, however, provides some insight into 
the impact of shift differentials on shift choice when local economic conditions change.  
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In the 1990 cross-section, for both the model with the local unemployment rate and the 
model with the leading index, the interaction effects are positive.  In the pooled cross-
section model with the unemployment rate, the interaction effects are negative, while in 
the pooled cross-section model with the leading index, the interaction effects are positive.  
Of the four major samples studied in this paper, results from three lend support to the 
hypothesis established in this paper: shift differentials have a smaller impact on shift 
choice as local economic conditions weaken.  Thus, compensating wages for night shift 
work may be lower in weak economies.  When investigating interaction effects for the 
1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000 cross-sections, results were inconclusive as to the 
direction of the interaction effect.  When analyzing the pooled cross-sections by industry, 
interaction terms for professional and related services industries and service industries 
also provide evidence that shift differentials have a smaller impact on shift choice in 
weak economies.  Interaction terms for the manufacturing industry, however, suggest that 
shift differentials remain an important predictor of shift choice even in weak economies. 
5) Estimated wage premiums are negative for night shift workers.  The wage differentials 
for the 1990 cross-section are considerably larger when compared to the results for the 
pooled cross-section.  The two-step results using both the unemployment rate and the 
leading index indicate that night workers earn approximately $6.50 less per hour than day 
workers, while maximum likelihood results indicate that night workers earn 
approximately $5.50 less per hour.  Night shift workers earn approximately half of day 
wages in the 1990 sample.  In pooled cross-section two-step estimation, night shift 
workers earn from an average of $1 to $1.67, or 7-11% lower wages than day workers.    
In pooled cross-section maximum likelihood estimation, night shift workers earn an 
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average of -$0.38 to -$0.68, or 2-4% less than day workers.  Maximum likelihood 
estimation provides smaller estimates of wage differentials than those obtained from the 
two-step model.  Analyzing shift differentials for cross-sections from 1992, 1994, 1996, 
1998, and 2000 indicate that shift differentials fall from 1990 to 1996, then rise through 
2000.  By 2000, shift differentials are positive and approximately 7.4-11% above day 
wages.  Rising shift differentials over the years could be a product of the growing 
economy of the 1990’s or the result of better job opportunities for the NLSY79 
respondents as they age. 
6) The 1990 cross-section models and the pooled cross-section model with the leading index 
indicate positive selection into night work, suggesting that night workers earn higher than 
average wages at night.  These results also suggest that workers have preferences for shift 
work, and possibly do not require a compensating differential to work at night.  In both 
cross-section and pooled cross-section models, selection into day work is positive in the 
two-step estimation and negative in the maximum likelihood estimation. 
 The current analysis is relevant, economically interesting, and improves upon existing 
research.  Although many economic studies evaluate capacity utilization and demand-side issues 
associated with shift work, few studies attempt to analyze shift workers.  Because shift work is 
widespread, this dissertation seeks to provide a better understanding of labor supply in response 
to shift work.  This paper is differentiated from the shift work studies of Kostiuk (1990) and 
Lanfranchi, et al. (2002) by its focus on the sensitivity of the impact of shift differentials and 
local economic conditions on shift choice.  Future studies could explore whether compensating 
differentials for other job characteristics are sensitive to local economic conditions.      
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Table A1_1. Two-Step Reduced and Structural Equations, Unemployment Rate, 1990 Cross-Section 
 
 
  
Reduced Form Structural Form
Variable Coefficient Coefficient
Wage Differential 0.933 0.374**
Unemployment Rate 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002
Number of Children 0.045 0.027* 0.051 0.027*
Shift Rate 0.456 0.692 0.430 0.676
Firm Size 1 0.194 0.093** 0.185 0.093**
Firm Size 2 0.610 0.090*** 0.280 0.158*
Firm Size 3 1.057 0.122*** 0.549 0.229**
Firm Size 4 0.706 0.099*** 0.274 0.188
Years of School 0.390 0.120*** -0.019 0.020
Years of School
2 -0.017 0.005***
Experience 0.234 0.148 0.014 0.014
Experience
2 -0.022 0.012*
Experience
3 0.001 0.000**
Tenure -0.042 0.029 -0.038 0.010***
Tenure
2 0.000 0.003
Union 0.259 0.074*** 0.055 0.107
Non-white 0.022 0.069 0.027 0.066
North East -0.164 0.113
North Central 0.130 0.089
South 0.063 0.084
Female -0.317 0.071*** -0.227 0.075***
Married -0.278 0.065*** -0.162 0.083**
MSA Resident -0.009 0.063
Professional Occupation -0.742 0.111*** -0.451 0.180**
Sales Occupation -0.855 0.099*** -0.404 0.205**
Craft Occupation -0.729 0.089*** -0.494 0.122***
Ag/Construction Industry -0.528 0.394 -0.432 0.390
Manufacturing Industry -0.053 0.125 -0.026 0.125
Transportation Industry 0.130 0.155 0.082 0.153
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.006 0.379 0.108 0.375
Retail Trade Industry 0.025 0.528 -0.202 0.530
Finance Industry -0.493 0.408 -0.172 0.425
Prof. & Related Industry -0.237 0.214 -0.268 0.211
Public Administration Industry 0.126 0.261 -0.160 0.279
Constant -4.337 1.114*** -0.256 0.651
Log-Likelihood -1036.46 -1044.9792
Observations 5026 5026
A summary of this information is provided in Table 5.1.
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable: Night Shift.  
Std. Error Std. Error
Two-Step
Robust Robust
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Table A1_2. ML Reduced and Structural Equations, Unemployment Rate, 1990 Cross-Section 
 
Reduced Form Structural Form
Variable Coefficient Coefficient
Wage Differential 0.831 0.412**
Unemployment Rate 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002
Number of Children 0.048 0.024** 0.052 0.027*
Shift Rate 0.756 0.466 0.421 0.675
Firm Size 1 0.203 0.094** 0.189 0.093**
Firm Size 2 0.627 0.092*** 0.352 0.153**
Firm Size 3 1.059 0.122*** 0.668 0.218***
Firm Size 4 0.726 0.101*** 0.364 0.184**
Years of School 0.412 0.130*** -0.021 0.020
Years of School
2 -0.018 0.005***
Experience 0.241 0.182 0.016 0.014
Experience
2 -0.023 0.015
Experience
3 0.001 0.000*
Tenure -0.040 0.030 -0.041 0.010***
Tenure
2 0.000 0.003
Union 0.256 0.076*** 0.103 0.103
Non-white 0.012 0.069 0.013 0.067
North East -0.169 0.112
North Central 0.132 0.092
South 0.062 0.087
Female -0.314 0.070*** -0.254 0.073***
Married -0.283 0.065*** -0.206 0.077***
MSA Resident 0.001 0.064
Professional Occupation -0.714 0.108*** -0.538 0.175***
Sales Occupation -0.832 0.100*** -0.523 0.191***
Craft Occupation -0.721 0.095*** -0.566 0.112***
Ag/Construction Industry -0.413 0.289 -0.038 0.125
Manufacturing Industry -0.076 0.128 -0.518 0.387
Transportation Industry 0.139 0.145 0.073 0.154
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.162 0.288 0.079 0.375
Retail Trade Industry -0.238 0.375 -0.147 0.528
Finance Industry -0.347 0.325 -0.286 0.417
Prof. & Related Industry -0.360 0.179** -0.288 0.212
Public Administration Industry 0.182 0.206 -0.142 0.287
Constant -4.602 1.166*** -0.487 0.633
Log-Likelihood -2894.75 -1045.85
Observations 5026 5026
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable: Night Shift.  
A summary of this information is provided in Table 5.1.
Std. Error Std. Error
Maximum Likelihood
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Table A2_1. Two-Step Wage Equations, Unemployment Rate, 1990 Cross-Section 
 
Night Worker Day Worker Robust
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Std. Error
Unemployment Rate -0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.000***
Selection Term 0.518 0.275* -0.142 0.096
Firm Size 1 0.036 0.072 0.031 0.014**
Firm Size 2 0.390 0.148*** 0.054 0.018***
Firm Size 3 0.647 0.243*** 0.129 0.031***
Firm Size 4 0.570 0.173*** 0.130 0.021***
Years of School 0.120 0.114 0.050 0.021**
Years of School
2
-0.003 0.005 0.001 0.001
Experience -0.126 0.153 0.014 0.022
Experience
2
0.011 0.012 -0.001 0.002
Experience
3
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Tenure 0.100 0.023*** 0.060 0.005***
Tenure
2
-0.007 0.002*** -0.003 0.000***
Union 0.332 0.078*** 0.112 0.016***
Non-white -0.093 0.040** -0.092 0.012***
North East 0.017 0.083 0.016 0.019
North Central -0.012 0.072 -0.121 0.016***
South -0.077 0.060 -0.186 0.015***
Female -0.288 0.073*** -0.206 0.013***
Married -0.089 0.069 0.039 0.012***
MSA Resident 0.018 0.039 0.014 0.011
Professional Occupation -0.053 0.188 0.329 0.030***
Sales Occupation -0.286 0.199 0.202 0.031***
Craft Occupation -0.112 0.165 0.136 0.029***
Ag/Construct Industry 0.016 0.223 0.146 0.027***
Manufacturing Industry -0.012 0.086 0.014 0.021
Transportation Industry 0.151 0.093 0.122 0.026***
Wholesale Trade Industry -0.101 0.184 0.016 0.029
Retail Trade Industry 0.150 0.111 -0.116 0.026***
Finance Industry -0.298 0.196 0.063 0.027**
Prof. & Related Industry -0.024 0.077 -0.045 0.023**
Public Administration Industry 0.347 0.089*** 0.059 0.026**
Constant 4.980 1.286*** 5.936 0.159***
R-Squared 0.60 0.44
Log-Likelihood
Observations 352 4674
Two-Step
Robust
Std. Error
A summary of this information is provided in Table 5.2.  
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable:Log Wage.  
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Table A2_2. ML Wage Equations, Unemployment Rate, 1990 Cross-Section 
 
Night Worker Day Worker
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Unemployment Rate -0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.000***
Selection Term        0.401***         0.120***
Firm Size 1 0.031 0.066 0.031 0.014**
Firm Size 2 0.342 0.072*** 0.052 0.016***
Firm Size 3 0.561 0.096*** 0.123 0.027***
Firm Size 4 0.511 0.079*** 0.127 0.018***
Years of School 0.080 0.093 0.049 0.019***
Years of School
2
-0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001
Experience -0.086 0.150 0.013 0.023
Experience
2
0.008 0.012 -0.001 0.002
Experience
3
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Tenure 0.101 0.021*** 0.060 0.005***
Tenure
2
-0.007 0.002*** -0.003 0.000***
Union 0.298 0.052*** 0.111 0.015***
Non-white -0.079 0.047* -0.093 0.012***
North East 0.052 0.076 0.016 0.018
North Central 0.001 0.063 -0.122 0.016***
South -0.062 0.059 -0.187 0.015***
Female -0.262 0.048*** -0.205 0.012***
Married -0.052 0.043 0.039 0.011***
MSA Resident 0.020 0.043 0.014 0.011
Professional Occupation 0.002 0.083 0.333 0.022***
Sales Occupation -0.199 0.081** 0.207 0.022***
Craft Occupation -0.050 0.077 0.140 0.021***
Ag/Construct Industry 0.099 0.139 0.148 0.023***
Manufacturing Industry 0.003 0.083 0.013 0.021
Transportation Industry 0.164 0.097* 0.121 0.026***
Wholesale Trade Industry -0.083 0.148 0.016 0.029
Retail Trade Industry 0.122 0.076 -0.118 0.023***
Finance Industry -0.207 0.185 0.064 0.025**
Prof. & Related Industry 0.003 0.079 -0.045 0.021**
Public Administration Industry 0.362 0.105*** 0.059 0.030**
Constant 5.187 0.862*** 5.938 0.158***
R-Squared
Log-Likelihood -2894.75
Observations 5026
Maximum Likelihood
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable:Log Wage.  
A summary of this information is provided in Table 5.2.  
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Table A3_1. Two-Step Reduced and Structural Selection Equations, Leading Index, 1990 Cross-Section 
 
Reduced Form Structural Form
Variable Coefficient Coefficient
Wage Differential 0.864 0.352**
Leading Index 0.079 0.048 0.069 0.040*
Number of Children 0.045 0.027* 0.049 0.027*
Shift Rate 0.465 0.694 0.445 0.683
Firm Size 1 0.197 0.093** 0.183 0.093*
Firm Size 2 0.615 0.090*** 0.278 0.163*
Firm Size 3 1.062 0.122*** 0.528 0.242**
Firm Size 4 0.712 0.099*** 0.267 0.195
Years of School 0.386 0.119*** -0.020 0.020
Years of School
2 -0.017 0.005***
Experience 0.234 0.148 0.010 0.014
Experience
2 -0.022 0.012*
Experience
3 0.001 0.000**
Tenure -0.042 0.029 -0.035 0.010***
Tenure
2 0.000 0.003
Union 0.261 0.074*** 0.055 0.110
Non-white 0.034 0.069 0.046 0.065
North East -0.038 0.138
North Central 0.140 0.089
South -0.318 0.071***
Female 0.090 0.085 -0.211 0.079***
Married -0.279 0.065*** -0.150 0.087*
MSA Resident -0.029 0.063
Professional Occupation -0.749 0.110*** -0.425 0.195**
Sales Occupation -0.858 0.099*** -0.384 0.217*
Craft Occupation -0.734 0.089*** -0.471 0.133***
Ag/Construction Industry -0.521 0.396 -0.341 0.398
Manufacturing Industry -0.053 0.125 -0.031 0.125
Transportation Industry 0.135 0.155 0.090 0.154
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.013 0.380 0.114 0.378
Retail Trade Industry 0.024 0.529 -0.209 0.532
Finance Industry -0.492 0.409 -0.137 0.429
Prof. & Related Industry -0.240 0.214 -0.269 0.212
Public Administration Industry 0.128 0.261 -0.152 0.281
Constant -4.389 1.112*** -0.259 0.673
Log-Likelihood -1035.15 -1041.4681
Observations 5026 5026
Two-Step
Robust Robust
Std. Error Std. Error
A summary of this information is provided in Table 5.3. 
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable: Night Shift. 
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Table A3_2. ML Reduced and Structural Selection Equations, Leading Index, 1990 Cross-Section 
 
  
Reduced Form Structural Form
Variable Coefficient Coefficient
Wage Differential 0.743 0.404*
Leading Index 0.092 0.047* 0.096 0.038**
Number of Children 0.049 0.024** 0.050 0.027*
Shift Rate 0.796 0.454* 0.430 0.683
Firm Size 1 0.207 0.094** 0.200 0.093**
Firm Size 2 0.635 0.093*** 0.390 0.148***
Firm Size 3 1.068 0.122*** 0.712 0.218***
Firm Size 4 0.735 0.102*** 0.399 0.183**
Years of School 0.400 0.129*** -0.025 0.020
Years of School
2 -0.017 0.005***
Experience 0.243 0.182 0.014 0.014
Experience
2 -0.023 0.015
Experience
3 0.001 0.000*
Tenure -0.038 0.030 -0.040 0.010***
Tenure
2 0.000 0.003
Union 0.259 0.076*** 0.121 0.104
Non-white 0.022 0.069 0.040 0.065
North East -0.021 0.136
North Central 0.139 0.092
South 0.090 0.088
Female -0.314 0.070*** -0.250 0.075***
Married -0.285 0.065*** -0.207 0.079***
MSA Resident -0.021 0.064
Professional Occupation -0.721 0.108*** -0.561 0.179***
Sales Occupation -0.835 0.100*** -0.556 0.192***
Craft Occupation -0.728 0.095*** -0.586 0.114***
Ag/Construction Industry -0.401 0.284 -0.039 0.125
Manufacturing Industry -0.079 0.128 -0.470 0.393
Transportation Industry 0.143 0.144 0.091 0.155
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.185 0.283 0.077 0.378
Retail Trade Industry -0.266 0.365 -0.121 0.530
Finance Industry -0.341 0.321 -0.286 0.420
Prof. & Related Industry -0.378 0.176** -0.296 0.213
Public Administration Industry 0.183 0.204 -0.134 0.294
Constant -4.662 1.161*** -0.581 0.640
Log-Likelihood -2925.24 -1042.53
Observations 5026 5026
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable: Night Shift. 
A summary of this information is provided in Table 5.3. 
Maximum Likelihood
Std. Error Std. Error
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Table A4_1. Two-Step Wage Equations, Leading Index, 1990 Cross-Section 
 
 
 
 
  
Night Worker Day Worker Robust
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Std. Error
Leading Index -0.014 0.036 -0.052 0.008***
Selection Term 0.619 0.270** -0.127 0.097
Firm Size 1 0.044 0.071 0.034 0.015**
Firm Size 2 0.430 0.145*** 0.055 0.018***
Firm Size 3 0.726 0.238*** 0.131 0.031***
Firm Size 4 0.624 0.170*** 0.130 0.021***
Years of School 0.149 0.114 0.043 0.021**
Years of School
2 -0.004 0.005 0.001 0.001
Experience -0.123 0.156 0.011 0.023
Experience
2 0.010 0.012 -0.001 0.002
Experience
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Tenure 0.099 0.023*** 0.060 0.005***
Tenure
2 -0.007 0.002*** -0.003 0.000***
Union 0.353 0.077*** 0.109 0.016***
Non-white -0.098 0.040** -0.094 0.012***
North East -0.013 0.075 -0.055 0.022**
North Central -0.013 0.071 -0.123 0.017***
South -0.072 0.062 -0.185 0.016***
Female -0.313 0.072*** -0.205 0.013***
Married -0.114 0.068* 0.039 0.012***
MSA Resident 0.024 0.041 0.038 0.011***
Professional Occupation -0.102 0.187 0.344 0.030***
Sales Occupation -0.342 0.197* 0.214 0.031***
Craft Occupation -0.162 0.162 0.144 0.029***
Ag/Construct Industry -0.081 0.208 0.144 0.028***
Manufacturing Industry -0.014 0.085 0.008 0.021
Transportation Industry 0.150 0.091 0.114 0.026***
Wholesale Trade Industry -0.116 0.182 0.006 0.030
Retail Trade Industry 0.171 0.111 -0.124 0.026***
Finance Industry -0.356 0.197* 0.067 0.027**
Prof. & Related Industry -0.033 0.077 -0.053 0.023**
Public Administration Industry 0.352 0.088*** 0.049 0.027*
Constant 4.575 1.274*** 5.868 0.162***
R-Squared 0.60 0.43
Log-Likelihood
Observations 352 4674
A summary of this information is provided in Table 5.4.  
Two-Step
Robust
Std. Error
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable: Log Wage.  
148 
 
Table A4_2. ML Wage Equations, Leading Index, 1990 Cross-Section 
 
 
Night Worker Day Worker
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Leading Index -0.041 0.032 -0.052 0.008***
Selection Term         0.431***         0.121***
Firm Size 1 0.020 0.067 0.034 0.014**
Firm Size 2 0.339 0.072*** 0.054 0.016***
Firm Size 3 0.572 0.095*** 0.129 0.027***
Firm Size 4 0.521 0.079*** 0.130 0.018***
Years of School 0.086 0.094 0.042 0.019**
Years of School
2 -0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001
Experience -0.097 0.151 0.010 0.024
Experience
2 0.009 0.012 -0.001 0.002
Experience
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Tenure 0.102 0.021*** 0.060 0.005***
Tenure
2 -0.007 0.002*** -0.003 0.000***
Union 0.303 0.053*** 0.109 0.015***
Non-white -0.090 0.048* -0.095 0.012***
North East 0.001 0.090 -0.055 0.023**
North Central -0.008 0.063 -0.124 0.016***
South -0.064 0.061 -0.186 0.015***
Female -0.273 0.049*** -0.204 0.013***
Married -0.062 0.044 0.039 0.011***
MSA Resident 0.033 0.044 0.038 0.011***
Professional Occupation -0.001 0.083 0.346 0.023***
Sales Occupation -0.200 0.080** 0.216 0.022***
Craft Occupation -0.054 0.076 0.145 0.021***
Ag/Construct Industry 0.045 0.138 0.144 0.023***
Manufacturing Industry 0.000 0.084 0.008 0.021
Transportation Industry 0.154 0.098 0.114 0.026***
Wholesale Trade Industry -0.091 0.150 0.006 0.030
Retail Trade Industry 0.116 0.077 -0.125 0.023***
Finance Industry -0.229 0.185 0.067 0.026***
Prof. & Related Industry 0.009 0.080 -0.054 0.021**
Public Administration Industry 0.376 0.106*** 0.048 0.030
Constant 5.082 0.860*** 5.868 0.159***
R-Squared
Log-Likelihood -2925.24
Observations 5026
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable: Log Wage.  
A summary of this information is provided in Table 5.4.  
Maximum Likelihood
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Table A5. Two-Step Reduced & Structural Equations, Unemployment Rate, 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section 
 
 
  
Reduced Form Structural Form
Variable Coefficient Coefficient
Wage Differential 0.231 0.314
Unemployment Rate 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001
Number of Children 0.026 0.012** 0.031 0.012***
Shift Rate 0.309 0.121** 0.312 0.121***
Firm Size 1 0.219 0.044*** 0.201 0.046***
Firm Size 2 0.535 0.042*** 0.512 0.046***
Firm Size 3 0.738 0.058*** 0.719 0.060***
Firm Size 4 0.780 0.049*** 0.744 0.056***
Years of School 0.244 0.052*** -0.041 0.012***
Years of School
2 -0.012 0.002***
Experience -0.005 0.063 0.011 0.007
Experience
2 0.001 0.004
Experience
3 0.000 0.000
Tenure -0.050 0.009*** -0.027 0.004***
Tenure
2 0.002 0.001***
Union 0.330 0.036*** 0.313 0.038***
Non-white 0.035 0.032 0.037 0.034
North East 0.003 0.053
North Central 0.180 0.046***
South 0.106 0.044**
Female -0.229 0.033*** -0.240 0.044***
Married -0.183 0.031*** -0.195 0.031***
MSA Resident 0.021 0.030
Professional Occupation -0.692 0.054*** -0.764 0.053***
Sales Occupation -0.718 0.049*** -0.708 0.053***
Craft Occupation -0.505 0.044*** -0.509 0.046***
Agriculture/Farm/Fish Industry -0.999 0.198*** -1.122 0.220***
Mining Industry 0.749 0.144*** 0.672 0.175***
Construction Industry -0.750 0.115*** -0.790 0.129***
Non-Durable Manufacturing Industry 0.190 0.066*** 0.173 0.066***
Durable Manufacturing Industry -0.103 0.057* -0.107 0.064*
Transportation Industry -0.003 0.063 -0.036 0.074
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.005 0.102 -0.020 0.112
Retail Trade Industry 0.147 0.072** 0.136 0.075*
Finance Industry -0.667 0.133*** -0.695 0.141***
Prof. & Related Industry -0.208 0.071*** -0.233 0.076***
Public Administration Industry -0.046 0.076 -0.131 0.125
1992 -0.041 0.051 -0.006 0.053
1994 -0.106 0.069 -0.087 0.068
1996 -0.050 0.063 -0.031 0.061
1998 -0.068 0.070 -0.052 0.068
2000 -0.057 0.080 -0.030 0.078
Constant -2.655 0.482*** -0.888 0.205***
Log-Likelihood -4649.430 -4688.969
Observations 24732 24732
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable: Night Shift . A summary of this information is provided in Table 5.5.
Std. Error Std. Error
Two-Step
Robust Robust
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Table A6. ML Reduced & Structural Equations, Unemployment Rate, 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section 
 
Reduced Form Structural Form
Variable Coefficient Coefficient
Wage Differential 0.275 0.317
Unemployment Rate 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001
Number of Children 0.028 0.011** 0.031 0.012***
Shift Rate 0.270 0.118** 0.312 0.121***
Firm Size 1 0.233 0.044*** 0.198 0.046***
Firm Size 2 0.558 0.043*** 0.508 0.046***
Firm Size 3 0.754 0.058*** 0.714 0.061***
Firm Size 4 0.809 0.049*** 0.738 0.058***
Years of School 0.284 0.052*** -0.040 0.012***
Years of School
2 -0.014 0.002***
Experience -0.021 0.065 0.011 0.007*
Experience
2 0.002 0.004
Experience
3 0.000 0.000
Tenure -0.054 0.009*** -0.027 0.004***
Tenure
2 0.002 0.001***
Union 0.312 0.037*** 0.309 0.039***
Non-white 0.043 0.032 0.035 0.035
North East 0.011 0.053
North Central 0.190 0.046***
South 0.114 0.044***
Female -0.220 0.032*** -0.243 0.044***
Married -0.184 0.030*** -0.195 0.031***
MSA Resident 0.011 0.030
Professional Occupation -0.703 0.050*** -0.761 0.053***
Sales Occupation -0.713 0.048*** -0.700 0.055***
Craft Occupation -0.507 0.046*** -0.507 0.045***
Agriculture/Farm/Fish Industry -1.010 0.188*** -1.132 0.219***
Mining Industry 0.754 0.154*** 0.654 0.178***
Construction Industry -0.820 0.114*** -0.797 0.129***
Non-Durable Manufacturing Industry 0.212 0.068*** 0.170 0.067**
Durable Manufacturing Industry -0.079 0.060 -0.111 0.064*
Transportation Industry 0.003 0.064 -0.041 0.074
Wholesale Trade Industry -0.002 0.102 -0.027 0.112
Retail Trade Industry 0.142 0.072** 0.132 0.076*
Finance Industry -0.668 0.136*** -0.701 0.141***
Prof. & Related Industry -0.198 0.071*** -0.238 0.076***
Public Administration Industry -0.080 0.078 -0.145 0.126
1992 -0.042 0.051 -0.004 0.053
1994 -0.114 0.069* -0.087 0.068
1996 -0.058 0.062 -0.031 0.061
1998 -0.077 0.069 -0.050 0.068
2000 -0.071 0.079 -0.029 0.078
Constant -2.722 0.496*** -0.911 0.210***
Log-Likelihood -15756.94^ -4688.87
Observations 24732 24732
^ denotes the log-likelihood from the simultaneous estimation of the wage equations and the reduced form of the selection equation.
Maximum Likelihood
Std. Error Std. Error
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable: Night Shift . A summary of this information is provided in Table 5.5
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  Table A7. Two-Step Wage Equations, Unemployment Rate, 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section 
 
 
 
 
 
Night Worker Day Worker Robust
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Std. Error
Unemployment Rate -0.001 0.000*** -0.001 0.000***
Selection Term -0.014 0.208 -0.300 0.054***
Firm Size 1 0.097 0.050* 0.049 0.007***
Firm Size 2 0.150 0.095 0.096 0.009***
Firm Size 3 0.208 0.130 0.153 0.013***
Firm Size 4 0.289 0.139** 0.199 0.011***
Years of School 0.053 0.061 0.007 0.008
Years of School
2 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.000***
Experience 0.012 0.047 0.039 0.009***
Experience
2 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.001***
Experience
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000**
Tenure 0.056 0.010*** 0.032 0.002***
Tenure
2 -0.002 0.000*** -0.001 0.000***
Union 0.172 0.059*** 0.121 0.008***
Non-white -0.064 0.020*** -0.107 0.006***
North East 0.013 0.033 0.011 0.009
North Central -0.124 0.043*** -0.125 0.008***
South -0.144 0.033*** -0.180 0.008***
Female -0.127 0.043*** -0.218 0.006***
Married 0.062 0.035* 0.053 0.006***
MSA Resident -0.017 0.020 0.000 0.005
Professional Occupation 0.314 0.120*** 0.299 0.014***
Sales Occupation 0.075 0.129 0.144 0.014***
Craft Occupation 0.088 0.089 0.046 0.013***
Agriculture/Farm/Fish Industry 0.124 0.332 -0.177 0.022***
Mining Industry 0.393 0.126*** 0.094 0.036***
Construction Industry 0.346 0.190* 0.153 0.015***
Non-Durable Manufacturing Industry 0.027 0.060 -0.004 0.013
Durable Manufacturing Industry 0.128 0.044*** 0.032 0.011***
Transportation Industry 0.230 0.044*** 0.114 0.012***
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.150 0.072** 0.003 0.015
Retail Trade Industry -0.054 0.059 -0.122 0.013***
Finance Industry 0.204 0.185 0.077 0.014***
Prof. & Related Industry 0.000 0.042 -0.092 0.011***
Public Administration Industry 0.345 0.050*** 0.035 0.013***
1992 0.035 0.033 0.088 0.009***
1994 0.173 0.051*** 0.154 0.011***
1996 0.239 0.043*** 0.214 0.011***
1998 0.246 0.048*** 0.265 0.012***
2000 0.327 0.053*** 0.345 0.014***
Constant 5.893 0.711*** 6.055 0.076***
R-Squared 0.55 0.51
Log-Likelihood
Observations 1472 23260
Two-Step
Robust
Std. Error
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable: Night Shift . A summary of this information is provided in Table 5.6.
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Table A8. ML Wage Equations, Unemployment Rate, 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section 
 
 
  
Night Worker Day Worker
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Std. Error
Unemployment Rate -0.001 0.000*** -0.001 0.000***
Selection Term -0.029       0.156***
Firm Size 1 0.094 0.037** 0.045 0.007***
Firm Size 2 0.143 0.060** 0.084 0.007***
Firm Size 3 0.199 0.079** 0.135 0.012***
Firm Size 4 0.279 0.082*** 0.180 0.009***
Years of School 0.049 0.043 0.003 0.008
Years of School
2 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000***
Experience 0.012 0.044 0.039 0.009***
Experience
2 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.001***
Experience
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000**
Tenure 0.057 0.008*** 0.033 0.002***
Tenure
2 -0.002 0.000*** -0.001 0.000***
Union 0.168 0.036*** 0.111 0.008***
Non-white -0.064 0.020*** -0.108 0.006***
North East 0.013 0.034 0.011 0.009
North Central -0.126 0.034*** -0.129 0.008***
South -0.145 0.029*** -0.183 0.008***
Female -0.125 0.028*** -0.213 0.006***
Married 0.064 0.024*** 0.057 0.005***
MSA Resident -0.017 0.020 -0.001 0.005
Professional Occupation 0.323 0.073*** 0.322 0.010***
Sales Occupation 0.083 0.075 0.168 0.010***
Craft Occupation 0.094 0.056* 0.064 0.010***
Agriculture/Farm/Fish Industry 0.138 0.188 -0.153 0.019***
Mining Industry 0.385 0.100*** 0.074 0.036**
Construction Industry 0.358 0.124*** 0.169 0.012***
Non-Durable Manufacturing Industry 0.024 0.046 -0.015 0.012
Durable Manufacturing Industry 0.128 0.040*** 0.034 0.011***
Transportation Industry 0.230 0.042*** 0.115 0.012***
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.151 0.063** 0.005 0.016
Retail Trade Industry -0.057 0.041 -0.129 0.011***
Finance Industry 0.213 0.128* 0.086 0.012***
Prof. & Related Industry 0.001 0.036 -0.090 0.010***
Public Administration Industry 0.347 0.047*** 0.038 0.013***
1992 0.036 0.031 0.090 0.009***
1994 0.175 0.044*** 0.158 0.011***
1996 0.240 0.038*** 0.216 0.011***
1998 0.248 0.043*** 0.267 0.012***
2000 0.328 0.049*** 0.347 0.014***
Constant 5.936 0.454*** 6.039 0.075***
Log-Likelihood -15756.94^
Observations 24732
Maximum Likelihood
Std. Error
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable: Log Wage.  ^ denotes the log-likelihood from simultaneous 
estimation of the wage equations and the reduced form selection equation. A summary of this information is provided in Table 5.6.
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Table A9. Two-Step Selection Equations, Leading Index, 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section 
 
 
 
Reduced Form Structural Form
Variable Coefficient Coefficient
Wage Differential 0.292 0.320
Leading Index 0.019 0.018 0.014 0.020
Number of Children 0.027 0.012** 0.031 0.012***
Shift Rate 0.309 0.121** 0.312 0.121***
Firm Size 1 0.219 0.044*** 0.196 0.047***
Firm Size 2 0.533 0.042*** 0.506 0.047***
Firm Size 3 0.736 0.058*** 0.714 0.061***
Firm Size 4 0.779 0.049*** 0.736 0.059***
Years of School 0.242 0.052*** -0.039 0.012***
Years of School
2 -0.012 0.002***
Experience -0.006 0.063 0.011 0.007*
Experience
2 0.001 0.004
Experience
3 0.000 0.000
Tenure -0.050 0.009*** -0.027 0.004***
Tenure
2 0.002 0.001***
Union 0.331 0.036*** 0.309 0.039***
Non-white 0.035 0.032 0.034 0.035
North East 0.008 0.053
North Central 0.173 0.044***
South 0.094 0.041**
Female -0.228 0.033*** -0.244 0.044***
Married -0.183 0.031*** -0.195 0.030***
MSA Resident 0.020 0.030
Professional Occupation -0.693 0.054*** -0.759 0.053***
Sales Occupation -0.719 0.049*** -0.700 0.055***
Craft Occupation -0.506 0.044*** -0.509 0.045***
Agriculture/Farm/Fish Industry -0.989 0.197*** -1.136 0.215***
Mining Industry 0.756 0.144*** 0.651 0.173***
Construction Industry -0.749 0.115*** -0.795 0.127***
Non-Durable Manufacturing Industry 0.192 0.066*** 0.170 0.067**
Durable Manufacturing Industry -0.102 0.057* -0.113 0.065*
Transportation Industry -0.002 0.063 -0.044 0.075
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.006 0.102 -0.031 0.113
Retail Trade Industry 0.149 0.072** 0.131 0.076*
Finance Industry -0.668 0.133*** -0.695 0.139***
Prof. & Related Industry -0.206 0.071*** -0.240 0.076***
Public Administration Industry -0.043 0.076 -0.150 0.126
1992 -0.038 0.051 -0.014 0.055
1994 -0.125 0.073* -0.108 0.073
1996 -0.055 0.064 -0.043 0.062
1998 -0.082 0.071 -0.057 0.072
2000 -0.064 0.080 -0.027 0.079
Constant -2.622 0.480*** -0.916 0.199***
Log-Likelihood -4649.25 -4688.07
Observations 24732 24732
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable: Night Shift . A summary of these results are provided in Table 5.7.
Two-Step
Robust Robust
Std. Error Std. Error
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Table A10. ML Selection Equations, Leading Index, 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section 
 
 
Reduced Form Structural Form
Variable Coefficient Coefficient
Wage Differential 0.240 0.326
Leading Index 0.019 0.018 0.015 0.020
Number of Children 0.030 0.011*** 0.031 0.012***
Shift Rate 0.268 0.119** 0.311 0.121***
Firm Size 1 0.231 0.044*** 0.199 0.047***
Firm Size 2 0.556 0.043*** 0.510 0.047***
Firm Size 3 0.752 0.058*** 0.717 0.061***
Firm Size 4 0.806 0.049*** 0.742 0.059***
Years of School 0.282 0.052*** -0.040 0.012***
Years of School
2 -0.014 0.002***
Experience -0.022 0.065 0.011 0.007
Experience
2 0.002 0.004
Experience
3 0.000 0.000
Tenure -0.054 0.009*** -0.026 0.004***
Tenure
2 0.002 0.001***
Union 0.313 0.037*** 0.311 0.039***
Non-white 0.042 0.032 0.037 0.036
North East 0.017 0.054
North Central 0.184 0.044***
South 0.103 0.042**
Female -0.219 0.032*** -0.239 0.044***
Married -0.185 0.030*** -0.195 0.030***
MSA Resident 0.011 0.030
Professional Occupation -0.705 0.050*** -0.759 0.054***
Sales Occupation -0.713 0.048*** -0.702 0.056***
Craft Occupation -0.507 0.046*** -0.506 0.045***
Agriculture/Farm/Fish Industry -1.004 0.188*** -1.124 0.217***
Mining Industry 0.761 0.153*** 0.665 0.175***
Construction Industry -0.826 0.115*** -0.788 0.129***
Non-Durable Manufacturing Industry 0.214 0.068*** 0.171 0.067**
Durable Manufacturing Industry -0.078 0.060 -0.108 0.065*
Transportation Industry 0.002 0.064 -0.037 0.075
Wholesale Trade Industry -0.003 0.103 -0.023 0.114
Retail Trade Industry 0.141 0.072** 0.135 0.076*
Finance Industry -0.668 0.136*** -0.693 0.140***
Prof. & Related Industry -0.198 0.071*** -0.236 0.076***
Public Administration Industry -0.079 0.077 -0.134 0.127
1992 -0.042 0.050 -0.018 0.055
1994 -0.134 0.073* -0.110 0.073
1996 -0.064 0.063 -0.043 0.062
1998 -0.091 0.070 -0.059 0.072
2000 -0.078 0.079 -0.029 0.079
Constant -2.686 0.492*** -0.931 0.202***
Log-Likelihood -15841.38^ -4688.21
Observations 24732 24732
^ denotes the log-likelihood from simultaneous estimation of the wage equations and the reduced form selection equation.
Maximum Likelihood
Std. Error
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable: Night Shift . A summary of these results are provided in Table 5.7.
Std. Error
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Table A11. Two-Step Wage Equations, Leading Index, 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section 
 
 
 
 
 
Night Worker Day Worker Robust
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Std. Error
Leading Index 0.016 0.012 -0.014 0.003***
Selection Term 0.008 0.206 -0.302 0.054***
Firm Size 1 0.106 0.050** 0.051 0.007***
Firm Size 2 0.164 0.094* 0.100 0.009***
Firm Size 3 0.224 0.129* 0.159 0.013***
Firm Size 4 0.305 0.137** 0.203 0.011***
Years of School 0.058 0.061 0.008 0.008
Years of School
2 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.000***
Experience 0.009 0.047 0.038 0.009***
Experience
2 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.001***
Experience
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000**
Tenure 0.055 0.010*** 0.031 0.002***
Tenure
2 -0.002 0.000*** -0.001 0.000***
Union 0.172 0.058*** 0.118 0.008***
Non-white -0.058 0.021*** -0.107 0.006***
North East 0.044 0.034 0.024 0.010**
North Central -0.093 0.041** -0.097 0.008***
South -0.114 0.031*** -0.147 0.007***
Female -0.131 0.043*** -0.219 0.006***
Married 0.057 0.035 0.052 0.006***
MSA Resident -0.011 0.020 0.004 0.005
Professional Occupation 0.299 0.118** 0.301 0.014***
Sales Occupation 0.062 0.128 0.144 0.014***
Craft Occupation 0.078 0.089 0.047 0.013***
Agriculture/Farm/Fish Industry 0.073 0.333 -0.199 0.022***
Mining Industry 0.370 0.126*** 0.083 0.036**
Construction Industry 0.326 0.188* 0.152 0.015***
Non-Durable Manufacturing Industry 0.027 0.060 -0.008 0.013
Durable Manufacturing Industry 0.128 0.044*** 0.029 0.011**
Transportation Industry 0.233 0.044*** 0.112 0.013***
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.152 0.072** -0.001 0.016
Retail Trade Industry -0.051 0.059 -0.124 0.013***
Finance Industry 0.183 0.182 0.078 0.014***
Prof. & Related Industry -0.008 0.042 -0.099 0.011***
Public Administration Industry 0.335 0.049*** 0.028 0.013**
1992 -0.004 0.033 0.061 0.008***
1994 0.127 0.057** 0.152 0.012***
1996 0.212 0.044*** 0.205 0.011***
1998 0.236 0.050*** 0.282 0.012***
2000 0.325 0.054*** 0.363 0.014***
Constant 5.705 0.705*** 5.958 0.076***
R-Squared 0.54 0.50
Observations 1472 23260
Two-Step
Robust
Std. Error
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable: Log Wage. A summary of these results are provided in Table 5.8.
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Table A12. ML Wage Equations, Leading Index, 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-Section 
 
 
 
 
Night Worker Day Worker
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Std. Error
Leading Index 0.016 0.011 -0.014 0.003***
Selection Term -0.020        0.159***
Firm Size 1 0.100 0.039*** 0.047 0.007***
Firm Size 2 0.151 0.064** 0.088 0.007***
Firm Size 3 0.207 0.085** 0.141 0.012***
Firm Size 4 0.287 0.088*** 0.185 0.009***
Years of School 0.051 0.044 0.005 0.008
Years of School
2 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000***
Experience 0.009 0.044 0.038 0.009***
Experience
2 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.001***
Experience
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000**
Tenure 0.056 0.008*** 0.033 0.002***
Tenure
2 -0.002 0.000*** -0.001 0.000***
Union 0.165 0.038*** 0.108 0.008***
Non-white -0.059 0.020*** -0.109 0.006***
North East 0.044 0.035 0.024 0.009***
North Central -0.098 0.034*** -0.102 0.008***
South -0.116 0.028*** -0.150 0.007***
Female -0.126 0.029*** -0.214 0.006***
Married 0.060 0.025** 0.056 0.005***
MSA Resident -0.011 0.020 0.003 0.005
Professional Occupation 0.315 0.078*** 0.325 0.010***
Sales Occupation 0.078 0.080 0.169 0.010***
Craft Occupation 0.089 0.059 0.064 0.010***
Agriculture/Farm/Fish Industry 0.100 0.193 -0.176 0.019***
Mining Industry 0.355 0.104*** 0.063 0.036*
Construction Industry 0.349 0.130*** 0.168 0.012***
Non-Durable Manufacturing Industry 0.020 0.048 -0.019 0.012
Durable Manufacturing Industry 0.129 0.040*** 0.030 0.011***
Transportation Industry 0.233 0.042*** 0.112 0.012***
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.154 0.063** 0.001 0.016
Retail Trade Industry -0.057 0.043 -0.132 0.011***
Finance Industry 0.202 0.132 0.086 0.012***
Prof. & Related Industry -0.006 0.036 -0.098 0.010***
Public Administration Industry 0.338 0.047*** 0.031 0.013**
1992 -0.002 0.030 0.063 0.009***
1994 0.131 0.047*** 0.156 0.012***
1996 0.214 0.038*** 0.207 0.011***
1998 0.239 0.044*** 0.285 0.013***
2000 0.328 0.050*** 0.365 0.014***
Constant 5.783 0.467*** 5.941 0.075***
Log-Likelihood -15841.37^
Observations 24732
Maximum Likelihood
Std. Error
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  Dependent Variable: Log Wage. A summary of these results are provided in Table 5.8.
^ denotes log-likelihood from simultaneous estimation of the wage equations and the reduced form selection equation.
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Table A13. ML Treatment Effects Model, 1990 Cross-section, Unemployment Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Number of Children 0.045 0.027*
Shift Rate 0.214 0.535
Firm Size 1 0.018 0.014 0.182 0.094*
Firm Size 2 0.036 0.015** 0.605 0.092***
Firm Size 3 0.080 0.026*** 1.041 0.121***
Firm Size 4 0.111 0.017*** 0.693 0.100***
Years of School 0.042 0.018** -0.034 0.021
Years of School 2 0.001 0.001
Experience 0.002 0.023 0.019 0.014
Experience 2 0.000 0.002
Experience 3 0.000 0.000
Tenure 0.066 0.005*** -0.033 0.010***
Tenure 2 -0.003 0.000***
Union 0.111 0.014*** 0.260 0.073***
Non-white -0.099 0.012*** 0.041 0.066
North East 0.023 0.017
North Central -0.124 0.015***
South -0.183 0.014***
Female -0.189 0.012*** -0.266 0.069***
Married 0.051 0.011*** -0.265 0.065***
MSA Resident 0.015 0.010
Professional Occupation 0.369 0.022*** -0.820 0.106***
Sales Occupation 0.245 0.021*** -0.893 0.101***
Craft Occupation 0.180 0.021*** -0.713 0.094***
Ag/Construct Industry 0.182 0.023*** -0.626 0.311**
Manufacturing Industry 0.017 0.020 0.003 0.135
Transportation Industry 0.121 0.025*** 0.130 0.144
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.027 0.029 -0.084 0.309
Retail Trade Industry -0.132 0.022*** 0.247 0.431
Finance Industry 0.085 0.025*** -0.580 0.343*
Prof. & Related Industry -0.035 0.020* -0.154 0.199
Public Administration Industry 0.086 0.029*** 0.139 0.211
Unemployment Rate -0.003 0.000*** 0.002 0.002
Shift Worker 0.224 0.072***
Selection term -0.086 0.036**
Constant 5.930 0.152*** -1.018 0.503**
Log Likelihood -2950.93
LR Test Statistic 112.36***
Observations 5026
by comparing the log-likelihood of the unrestricted model (the endogenous switching model, results 
shown in Table A2) to the log-likelihood of the restricted model (the treatment effects model, results
shown above.)  
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  The LR Test Statistic refers to the statistic obtained 
Wage Equation Selection Equation
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Table A14. ML Treatment Effects Model, 1990 Cross-section, Leading Index 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Number of Children 0.041 0.027
Shift Rate 0.192 0.537
Firm Size 1 0.020 0.014 0.182 0.094*
Firm Size 2 0.038 0.015** 0.611 0.092***
Firm Size 3 0.084 0.026*** 1.048 0.121***
Firm Size 4 0.113 0.017*** 0.699 0.100***
Years of School 0.036 0.018** -0.034 0.021*
Years of School 2 0.001 0.001*
Experience -0.001 0.023 0.019 0.014
Experience 2 0.000 0.002
Experience 3 0.000 0.000
Tenure 0.066 0.005*** -0.033 0.010***
Tenure 2 -0.004 0.000***
Union 0.109 0.014*** 0.268 0.073***
Non-white -0.103 0.012*** 0.059 0.066
North East -0.050 0.022**
North Central -0.128 0.015***
South -0.183 0.014***
Female -0.189 0.012*** -0.266 0.070***
Married 0.050 0.011*** -0.265 0.065***
MSA Resident 0.039 0.011***
Professional Occupation 0.383 0.022*** -0.828 0.105***
Sales Occupation 0.255 0.022*** -0.899 0.101***
Craft Occupation 0.186 0.021*** -0.721 0.094***
Ag/Construct Industry 0.178 0.023*** -0.635 0.312**
Manufacturing Industry 0.011 0.020 0.008 0.136
Transportation Industry 0.114 0.025*** 0.144 0.144
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.017 0.029 -0.094 0.309
Retail Trade Industry -0.141 0.022*** 0.279 0.433
Finance Industry 0.088 0.025*** -0.587 0.344*
Prof. & Related Industry -0.043 0.021** -0.145 0.200
Public Administration Industry 0.077 0.029*** 0.137 0.211
Leading Index -0.055 0.008*** 0.103 0.037***
Shift Worker 0.234 0.073***
Selection term -0.091 0.037**
Constant 5.858 0.153*** -1.052 0.495**
Log Likelihood -2981.36
LR Test Statistic 112.24***
Observations 5026
shown in Table A4) to the log-likelihood of the restricted model (the treatment effects model, results
shown above.)  
Selection EquationWage Equation
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  The LR Test Statistic refers to the statistic obtained 
by comparing the log-likelihood of the unrestricted model (the endogenous switching model, results 
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 Table A15. ML Treatment Effects Model, 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-section, Unemployment Rate 
 
  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Number of Children 0.028 0.011***
Shift Rate 0.245 0.112**
Firm Size 1 0.036 0.007*** 0.239 0.043***
Firm Size 2 0.058 0.007*** 0.532 0.042***
Firm Size 3 0.095 0.011*** 0.751 0.057***
Firm Size 4 0.143 0.009*** 0.779 0.048***
Years of School 0.004 0.007 -0.058 0.010***
Years of School
2 0.002 0.000***
Experience 0.036 0.009*** 0.004 0.006
Experience
2 -0.002 0.001***
Experience
3 0.000 0.000**
Tenure 0.037 0.002*** -0.020 0.003***
Tenure
2 -0.001 0.000***
Union 0.094 0.007*** 0.326 0.035***
Non-white -0.112 0.006*** 0.067 0.030**
North East 0.013 0.009
North Central -0.132 0.008***
South -0.181 0.007***
Female 0.068 0.005*** -0.173 0.031***
Married -0.195 0.006*** -0.173 0.029***
MSA Resident -0.003 0.005
Professional Occupation 0.378 0.010*** -0.743 0.048***
Sales Occupation 0.221 0.010*** -0.733 0.048***
Craft Occupation 0.108 0.010*** -0.475 0.045***
Agriculture/Farm/Fish Industry -0.086 0.019*** -0.924 0.180***
Mining Industry 0.076 0.034** 0.812 0.147***
Construction Industry 0.214 0.012*** -0.646 0.110***
Non-Durable Manufacturing Industry -0.036 0.012*** 0.240 0.068***
Durable Manufacturing Industry 0.046 0.011*** 0.007 0.060
Transportation Industry 0.124 0.012*** 0.076 0.064
Wholesale Trade Industry -0.145 0.011*** 0.244 0.072***
Retail Trade Industry 0.021 0.015 0.089 0.100
Finance Industry 0.115 0.012*** -0.601 0.132***
Prof. & Related Industry -0.080 0.010*** -0.107 0.071
Public Administration Industry 0.063 0.013*** 0.116 0.075
1992 0.090 0.009*** -0.033 0.049
1994 0.168 0.011*** -0.093 0.065
1996 0.222 0.011*** -0.023 0.059
1998 0.272 0.012*** -0.053 0.066
2000 0.351 0.014*** -0.038 0.076
Unemployment Rate -0.001 0.000*** 0.000 0.001
Shift Worker 0.346 0.025***
Selection term -0.168 0.012***
Constant 5.941 0.072*** -0.752 0.199***
Log Likelihood -15911.96
LR Test Statistic 310.04***
Observations 24732
Wage Equation Selection Equation
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  The LR Test Statistic refers to the statistic obtained by
comparing the log-likelihood of the unrestricted model (the endogenous switching model, results shown in
Table A8) to the log-likelihood of the restricted model (the treatment effects model, results shown above.)
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Table A16. ML Treatment Effects Model, 1990-2000 Pooled Cross-section, Leading Index 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Number of Children 0.026 0.011**
Shift Rate 0.246 0.112**
Firm Size 1 0.038 0.007*** 0.239 0.043***
Firm Size 2 0.062 0.007*** 0.532 0.042***
Firm Size 3 0.100 0.012*** 0.751 0.057***
Firm Size 4 0.146 0.009*** 0.779 0.048***
Years of School 0.006 0.007 -0.058 0.010***
Years of School
2
0.002 0.000***
Experience 0.036 0.009*** 0.005 0.006
Experience
2
-0.002 0.001***
Experience
3
0.000 0.000**
Tenure 0.036 0.002*** -0.019 0.003***
Tenure
2
-0.001 0.000***
Union 0.090 0.007*** 0.329 0.034***
Non-white -0.112 0.006*** 0.072 0.030**
North East 0.027 0.009***
North Central -0.105 0.008***
South -0.148 0.007***
Female -0.196 0.006*** -0.171 0.031***
Married 0.067 0.005*** -0.173 0.029***
MSA Resident 0.002 0.005
Professional Occupation 0.381 0.010*** -0.744 0.048***
Sales Occupation 0.222 0.010*** -0.733 0.048***
Craft Occupation 0.109 0.010*** -0.476 0.045***
Agriculture/Farm/Fish Industry -0.108 0.019*** -0.944 0.180***
Mining Industry 0.061 0.034* 0.801 0.147***
Construction Industry 0.214 0.012*** -0.645 0.110***
Non-Durable Manufacturing Industry -0.040 0.012*** 0.239 0.067***
Durable Manufacturing Industry 0.044 0.011*** 0.010 0.060
Transportation Industry 0.122 0.012*** 0.080 0.064
Wholesale Trade Industry -0.149 0.011*** 0.247 0.072***
Retail Trade Industry 0.017 0.015 0.089 0.100
Finance Industry 0.116 0.012*** -0.596 0.132***
Prof. & Related Industry -0.087 0.010*** -0.106 0.071
Public Administration Industry 0.056 0.013*** 0.116 0.075
1992 0.063 0.009*** -0.050 0.048
1994 0.166 0.012*** -0.139 0.069**
1996 0.213 0.011*** -0.043 0.059
1998 0.288 0.012*** -0.077 0.067
2000 0.367 0.014*** -0.050 0.076
Leading Index -0.014 0.003*** 0.033 0.017**
Shift Worker 0.349 0.025***
Selection term -0.170 0.011***
Constant 5.841 0.072*** -0.816 0.195***
Log Likelihood -15995.94
LR Test Statistic 309.14***
Observations 24732
Wage Equation Selection Equation
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  The LR Test Statistic refers to the statistic obtained by
comparing the log-likelihood of the unrestricted model (the endogenous switching model, results shown in
Table A12) to the log-likelihood of the restricted model (the treatment effects model, results shown above.)
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Table A17. Interaction Effects, 1992 Cross-Section with Unemployment Rate 
 
 
 
Table A18. Interaction Effects, 1992 Cross-Section with Leading Index 
 
 
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Unemp. Rate Cell
5.3% A 0.001682 0.025110 0.003144 0.033841 0.005364 0.043783 0.009532 0.057978 0.013738 0.069459
Avg.*
6.2% B 0.001718 0.025367 0.003208 0.034170 0.005467 0.044188 0.009702 0.058484 0.013971 0.070041
Avg.
7.9% C 0.001789 0.025858 0.003333 0.034798 0.005666 0.044962 0.010030 0.059450 0.014420 0.071152
Avg.
9.0% D 0.001836 0.026180 0.003415 0.035209 0.005798 0.045469 0.010248 0.060082 0.014717 0.071877
Avg.
10.4% E 0.001898 0.026595 0.003523 0.035739 0.005970 0.046120 0.010530 0.060893 0.015102 0.072809
Avg.
Log Wage Differential
-0.8279705 -0.6562409 -0.5004471 -0.3213925 -0.2003775
0.013396 0.018493 0.024573 0.033755 0.041598
1 2 3 4 5
0.013824 0.019065 0.025314 0.034740 0.042786
0.013543 0.018689 0.024828 0.034093 0.042006
-$2.38, and -$1.48.  From top to bottom, the values of the unemploymentrate indicate the 10th percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th 
0.014008 0.019312 0.025633 0.035165 0.043297
0.014247 0.019631 0.026045 0.035712 0.043956
This table presents lower and upper bounds on the probability of working the night shift.  The bounds on the probability are computed for each combination
of the log wage differential and the unemployment rate.  For example, the lower bound for the log wage differential and unemployment rate combination A1 is
0.001682 while the upper bound is 0.025110.  *The average of the lower and upper bounds is reported below each combination. For example, the average 
probability for combination A1 is 0.013396.  From left to right, the values of the log wage differential indicate the 10th percentile, 25th percentile, mean,
75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the predicted log wage differential in 1992.  This corresponds to approximate wage differentials of -$7.26, -$5.10, -$4.01,
percentile of the unemployment rate in 1992.
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Index Cell
0.23 A 0.001873 0.026984 0.003051 0.034015 0.004674 0.041720 0.007547 0.052599 0.010316 0.061265
Avg.*
0.43 B 0.001924 0.027330 0.003131 0.034434 0.004790 0.042215 0.007724 0.053194 0.010547 0.061936
Avg.
1.64 C 0.002262 0.029501 0.003651 0.037058 0.005546 0.045307 0.008871 0.056907 0.012047 0.066115
Avg.
2.51 D 0.002536 0.031150 0.004071 0.039044 0.006154 0.047641 0.009785 0.059701 0.013236 0.069252
Avg.
3.01 E 0.002707 0.032131 0.004332 0.040224 0.006529 0.049025 0.010347 0.061354 0.013964 0.071106
Avg.
Log Wage Differential
-0.8146973 -0.6465068 -0.4923245 -0.3098512 -0.1848998
0.014429 0.018533 0.023197 0.030073 0.035790
1 2 3 4 5
0.015882 0.020355 0.025427 0.032889 0.039081
0.014627 0.018782 0.023502 0.030459 0.036241
percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the unemployment rate in 1992.
For explanation of how to interpret these results, see footnote on Table A17.  From left to right, the values of the log wage differential indicate the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the predicted log wage differential in 1992.  This corresponds to approximate wage 
differentials of -$7.23, -$5.09, -$3.96, -$2.30, and -$1.42.  From top to bottom, the values of the unemploymentrate indicate the 10th percentile, 25th
0.016843 0.021558 0.026897 0.034743 0.042535
0.017419 0.022278 0.027777 0.035850 0.042535
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Table A19. Interaction Effects, 1994 Cross-Section with Unemployment Rate 
 
 
 
 
Table A20. Interaction Effects, 1994 Cross-Section with Leading Index 
 
 
 
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Unemp. Rate Cell
4.4% A 0.005686 0.007173 0.011066 0.013431 0.022565 0.026300 0.041791 0.047069 0.074906 0.081754
Avg.*
5.2% B 0.005997 0.007542 0.011623 0.014067 0.023588 0.027423 0.043488 0.048873 0.077585 0.084521
Avg.
7.0% C 0.006752 0.008432 0.012965 0.015593 0.026030 0.030096 0.047509 0.053136 0.083878 0.091003
Avg.
8.3% D 0.007348 0.009132 0.014015 0.016782 0.027922 0.032158 0.050595 0.056393 0.088656 0.095909
Avg.
10.3% E 0.008356 0.010308 0.015774 0.018761 0.031057 0.035556 0.055650 0.061710 0.096397 0.103831
Avg.
Log Wage Differential
-0.9487352 -0.7812395 -0.5849081 -0.396421 -0.1961932
0.006430 0.012249 0.024433 0.044430 0.078330
1 2 3 4 5
0.007592 0.014279 0.028063 0.050323 0.087440
0.006769 0.012845 0.025505 0.046181 0.081053
0.008240 0.015398 0.030040 0.053494 0.092282
0.009332 0.017268 0.033306 0.058680 0.100114
For explanation of how to interpret these results, see footnote on Table A17.  From left to right, the values of the log wage differential indicate the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the predicted log wage differential in 1994.  This corresponds to approximate wage 
differentials of -$9.12, -$6.78, -$5.07, -$2.96, and -$1.53.  From top to bottom, the values of the unemploymentrate indicate the 10th percentile, 25th
percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the unemployment rate in 1994.
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Index Cell
1.57 A 0.000000 0.005276 0.000000 0.008568 0.000000 0.014572 0.000000 0.023608 9.78E-09 0.036168
Avg.*
1.87 B 0.000000 0.005276 0.000000 0.008938 0.000000 0.015158 0.000000 0.024490 2.32E-08 0.037423
Avg.
2.58 C 0.000000 0.006127 0.000000 0.009869 0.000000 0.016625 0.000000 0.026687 1.56E-07 0.040535
Avg.
3.16 D 0.000000 0.006669 0.000000 0.010692 0.000000 0.017913 0.000000 0.028603 6.30E-07 0.043231
Avg.
3.86 E 0.000000 0.007380 0.000000 0.011764 0.000000 0.019579 1.42E-10 0.031066 2.84E-06 0.046675
Avg.
Log Wage Differential
-0.7668033 -0.5879579 -0.3794389 -0.1761456 0.0170426
0.002638 0.004284 0.007286 0.011804 0.018084
1 2 3 4 5
0.003064 0.004935 0.008313 0.013344 0.020268
0.002638 0.004469 0.007579 0.012245 0.018712
0.003690 0.005882 0.009789 0.015533 0.023339
0.003335 0.005346 0.008956 0.014302 0.023339
For explanation of how to interpret these results, see footnote on Table A17.  From left to right, the values of the log wage differential indicate the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the predicted log wage differential in 1994.  This corresponds to approximate wage 
differentials of -$7.67, -$5.27, -$3.52, -$1.35, and $0.13.  From top to bottom, the values of the unemploymentrate indicate the 10th percentile, 25th
percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the unemployment rate in 1994.
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 Table A21. Interaction Effects, 1996 Cross-Section with Unemployment Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A22. Interaction Effects, 1998 Cross-Section with Unemployment Rate 
 
 
 
    
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Unemp. Rate Cell
3.6% A 0.000000 0.000177 8.24E-11 0.000966 6.67E-08 0.004022 0.000016 0.017144 0.000493 0.044684
Avg.*
4.5% B 0.000000 0.000174 5.49E-11 0.000950 6.29E-08 0.003965 0.000016 0.016942 0.000476 0.044238
Avg.
6.8% C 0.000000 0.000166 5.49E-11 0.000911 5.43E-08 0.003823 0.000014 0.016435 0.000436 0.043113
Avg.
7.6% D 0.000000 0.000163 5.49E-11 0.000911 5.16E-08 0.003775 0.000013 0.016262 0.000422 0.042727
Avg.
13.3% E 0.000000 0.000145 4.12E-11 0.000809 3.60E-08 0.003447 0.000010 0.015072 0.000338 0.040057
Avg.
Log Wage Differential
-2.24473 -1.951395 -1.670115 -1.335699 -1.072526
0.000089 0.000483 0.002011 0.008580 0.022589
1 2 3 4 5
0.000083 0.000456 0.001912 0.008225 0.021774
0.000087 0.000475 0.001983 0.008479 0.022357
0.000082 0.000456 0.001888 0.008138 0.021575
0.000073 0.000405 0.001723 0.007541 0.020197
For explanation of how to interpret these results, see footnote on Table A17.  From left to right, the values of the log wage differential indicate the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the predicted log wage differential in 1996.  This corresponds to approximate wage 
differentials of -$16.20, -$12.18, -$10.10, -$6.92, and -$5.63.  From top to bottom, the values of the unemploymentrate indicate the 10th percentile, 25th
percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the unemployment rate in 1996.
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Unemp. Rate Cell
2.8% A 0.000120 0.040518 0.000123 0.040694 0.000125 0.040836 0.000128 0.041006 0.000130 0.041159
Avg.*
3.3% B 0.000121 0.040550 0.000123 0.040727 0.000125 0.040869 0.000128 0.041039 0.000131 0.041192
Avg.
5.1% C 0.000122 0.040669 0.000125 0.040846 0.000127 0.040988 0.000130 0.041159 0.000133 0.041313
Avg.
5.8% D 0.000123 0.040715 0.000126 0.040892 0.000128 0.041035 0.000131 0.041205 0.000133 0.041359
Avg.
7.9% E 0.000125 0.040854 0.000128 0.041031 0.000130 0.041175 0.000133 0.041346 0.000136 0.041500
Avg.
Log Wage Differential
-0.401019 -0.2483997 -0.1253796 0.0209112 0.1527381
0.020319 0.020408 0.020480 0.020567 0.020645
1 2 3 4 5
0.020396 0.020485 0.020558 0.020644 0.020723
0.020335 0.020425 0.020497 0.020583 0.020661
0.020419 0.020509 0.020581 0.020668 0.020746
0.020490 0.020580 0.020652 0.020739 0.020818
For explanation of how to interpret these results, see footnote on Table A17.  From left to right, the values of the log wage differential indicate the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the predicted log wage differential in 1998.  This corresponds to approximate wage 
differentials of -$6.02, -$3.07, -$1.67, $0.23, and $1.96.  From top to bottom, the values of the unemploymentrate indicate the 10th percentile, 25th
percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the unemployment rate in 1998.
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     Table A23. Interaction Effects, 2000 Cross-Section with Unemployment Rate 
  
 
 
 
 
Table A24. Interaction Effects, 2000 Cross-Section with Leading Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Unemp. Rate Cell
2.4% A 0.000236 0.044681 0.000175 0.042035 0.000110 0.038344 0.000071 0.035272 0.000040 0.031771
Avg.*
2.9% B 0.000256 0.045451 0.000190 0.042769 0.000120 0.039026 0.000078 0.035910 0.000045 0.032357
Avg.
4.5% C 0.000332 0.047988 0.000249 0.045186 0.000160 0.041274 0.000105 0.038012 0.000061 0.034289
Avg.
5.3% D 0.000377 0.049297 0.000284 0.046435 0.000183 0.042435 0.000122 0.039100 0.000071 0.035291
Avg.
6.4% E 0.000448 0.051143 0.000339 0.048197 0.000221 0.044076 0.000148 0.040636 0.000088 0.036705
Avg.
Log Wage Differential
-0.2001662 -0.0716219 0.119007 0.2893047 0.4987311
0.022458 0.021105 0.019227 0.017672 0.015906
1 2 3 4 5
0.024160 0.022718 0.020717 0.019059 0.017175
0.022854 0.021480 0.019573 0.017994 0.016201
0.024837 0.023360 0.021309 0.019611 0.017681
0.025796 0.024268 0.022148 0.020392 0.018397
For explanation of how to interpret these results, see footnote on Table A17.  From left to right, the values of the log wage differential indicate the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the predicted log wage differential in 2000.  This corresponds to approximate wage 
differentials of -$2.93, -$0.96, $2.48, $4.86, and $9.77.  From top to bottom, the values of the unemploymentrate indicate the 10th percentile, 25th
percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the unemployment rate in 2000.
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Index Cell
0.15 A 0.000717 0.055476 0.000550 0.052283 0.000369 0.047879 0.000258 0.044356 0.000152 0.039708
Avg.*
1.11 B 0.000462 0.050315 0.000351 0.047360 0.000230 0.043290 0.000159 0.040041 0.000091 0.035764
Avg.
1.52 C 0.000381 0.048230 0.000287 0.045373 0.000187 0.041441 0.000128 0.038304 0.000072 0.034179
Avg.
2.13 D 0.000284 0.045254 0.000212 0.042539 0.000136 0.038807 0.000092 0.035833 0.000051 0.031928
Avg.
2.27 E 0.000265 0.044592 0.000198 0.041909 0.000126 0.038222 8.47E-05 0.035285 0.000047 0.031429
Avg.
Log Wage Differential
-0.2102375 -0.0815539 0.1065317 0.2671175 0.4953103
0.028096 0.026417 0.024124 0.022307 0.019930
1 2 3 4 5
0.024305 0.022830 0.020814 0.019216 0.017126
0.025389 0.023855 0.021760 0.020100 0.017927
0.022429 0.021053 0.019174 0.017685 0.015738
0.022769 0.021376 0.019472 0.017962 0.015738
For explanation of how to interpret these results, see footnote on Table A18.  From left to right, the values of the log wage differential indicate the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the predicted log wage differential in 2000.  This corresponds to approximate wage 
differentials of -$3.04, -$1.11, $2.24, $4.53, and $9.41.  From top to bottom, the values of the unemploymentrate indicate the 10th percentile, 25th
percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the unemployment rate in 2000.
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Table A25. Interaction Effects, Manufacturing Industry, Pooled Cross-Section with Unemployment Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A26. Interaction Effects, Manufacturing Industry, Pooled Cross-Section with Leading Index 
 
 
 
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Unemp. Rate Cell
3.2% A 2.54E-08 0.019398 7.92E-07 0.030819 0.000023 0.050940 0.000250 0.075429 0.000772 0.092534
Avg.*
4.2% B 3.05E-08 0.019873 9.28E-07 0.031520 0.000027 0.051992 0.000278 0.076854 0.000849 0.094194
Avg.
6.0% C 4.27E-08 0.020755 1.23E-06 0.032814 0.000034 0.053928 0.000335 0.079472 0.001004 0.097238
Avg.
7.2% D 5.31E-08 0.021360 1.49E-06 0.033700 0.000039 0.055250 0.000380 0.081253 0.001121 0.099307
Avg.
9.3% E 7.77E-08 0.022456 2.05E-06 0.035299 0.000051 0.057624 0.000470 0.084443 0.001355 0.103004
Avg.
Log Wage Differential
-1.396927 -1.157729 -0.8751326 -0.6332769 -0.4982467
0.009699 0.015410 0.025482 0.037839 0.046653
1 2 3 4 5
0.010377 0.016407 0.026981 0.039903 0.049121
0.009937 0.015760 0.026009 0.038566 0.047522
0.011228 0.017650 0.028837 0.042457 0.052179
0.010680 0.016851 0.027644 0.040816 0.050214
For explanation of how to interpret these results, see footnote on Table A17.  From left to right, the values of the log wage differential indicate the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the predicted log wage differential in the pooled cross-section.  This corresponds to 
approximate wage differentials of -$14.22, -$9.21, -$7.57, -$4.23, and -$3.20.  From top to bottom, the values of the unemploymentrate indicate the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the unemployment rate in the pooled cross-section.
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Leading Index Cell
0.43 A 2.47E-09 0.021263 2.50E-07 0.035562 1.02E-05 0.056564 0.000285 0.091340 0.001205 0.115690
Avg.*
1.16 B 1.73E-09 0.020567 1.93E-07 0.034492 8.26E-06 0.055008 0.000243 0.089092 0.001051 0.113019
Avg.
1.70 C 1.41E-09 0.020064 1.59E-07 0.033717 7.06E-06 0.053879 0.000215 0.087455 0.000949 0.111072
Avg.
2.32 D 1.02E-09 0.019500 1.27E-07 0.032846 5.88E-06 0.052605 0.000187 0.085604 0.000842 0.108866
Avg.
2.68 E 8.49E-10 0.019179 1.11E-07 0.032348 5.29E-06 0.051877 0.000173 0.084543 0.000786 0.107600
Avg.
-1.323801 -1.084101 -0.8477175 -0.5775213 -0.4317508
Log Wage Differential
0.010632 0.017781 0.028287 0.045812 0.058448
1 2 3 4 5
0.010032 0.016859 0.026943 0.043835 0.056011
0.010283 0.017246 0.027508 0.044667 0.057035
For explanation of how to interpret these results, see footnote on Table A17.  From left to right, the values of the log wage differential indicate the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the predicted log wage differential in the pooled cross-section.  This corresponds to 
approximate wage differentials of -$13.78, -$8.84, -$7.21, -$3.90, and -$2.88.  From top to bottom, the values of the unemploymentrate indicate the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the unemployment rate in the pooled cross-section.
0.009750 0.016423 0.026305 0.042896 0.054854
0.009589 0.016174 0.025941 0.042358 0.054193
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Table A27. Interaction Effects, Retail Trade Industry, Pooled Cross-Section with Unemployment Rate 
 
 
 
 
Table A28. Interaction Effects, Retail Trade Industry, Pooled Cross-Section with Leading Index 
 
 
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Unemp. Rate Cell
3.2% A 1.67E-07 0.018676 2.18E-06 0.029548 0.000031 0.048539 0.000327 0.077603 0.002026 0.114144
Avg.*
4.2% B 1.91E-07 0.019127 2.46E-06 0.030211 0.000034 0.049531 0.000357 0.079032 0.002184 0.116042
Avg.
6.0% C 2.44E-07 0.019962 3.05E-06 0.031434 0.000041 0.051358 0.000418 0.081656 0.002498 0.119514
Avg.
7.3% D 2.91E-07 0.020584 3.56E-06 0.032343 0.000047 0.052710 0.000469 0.083591 0.002748 0.122067
Avg.
9.6% E 3.94E-07 0.021724 4.67E-06 0.034005 0.000059 0.055171 0.000571 0.087098 0.003247 0.126678
Avg.
Log Wage Differential
-1.368292 -1.206698 -1.016966 -0.8193297 -0.6393297
0.009338 0.014775 0.024285 0.038965 0.058085
1 2 3 4 5
0.009981 0.015719 0.025699 0.041037 0.061006
0.009563 0.015107 0.024783 0.039695 0.059113
0.010862 0.017005 0.027615 0.043834 0.064963
0.010292 0.016173 0.026378 0.042030 0.062408
For explanation of how to interpret these results, see footnote on Table A17.  From left to right, the values of the log wage differential indicate the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the predicted log wage differential in the pooled cross-section.  This corresponds to 
approximate wage differentials of -$9.49, -$7.27, -$5.97, -$4.06, and -$2.95.  From top to bottom, the values of the unemploymentrate indicate the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the unemployment rate in the pooled cross-section.
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Leading Index Cell
0.41 A 8.05E-08 0.016311 1.42E-06 0.027305 2.66E-05 0.047413 0.000328 0.078236 0.002810 0.123528
Avg.*
1.15 B 1.04E-07 0.017061 1.78E-06 0.028463 3.23E-05 0.049228 0.000387 0.080914 0.003214 0.127260
Avg.
1.66 C 1.24E-07 0.017595 2.08E-06 0.029285 3.68E-05 0.050511 0.000432 0.082800 0.003522 0.129877
Avg.
2.27 D 1.53E-07 0.018253 2.50E-06 0.030294 4.31E-05 0.052080 0.000493 0.085098 0.003924 0.133056
Avg.
2.65 E 1.73E-07 0.018673 2.80E-06 0.030936 4.75E-05 0.053078 0.000535 0.086554 0.004195 0.135063
Avg.
-1.374762 -1.212662 -1.022833 -0.8315372 -0.6356616
Log Wage Differential
0.008155 0.013653 0.023720 0.039282 0.063169
1 2 3 4 5
0.008798 0.014644 0.025274 0.041616 0.066699
0.008531 0.014233 0.024630 0.040650 0.065237
For explanation of how to interpret these results, see footnote on Table A17.  From left to right, the values of the log wage differential indicate the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the predicted log wage differential in the pooled cross-section.  This corresponds to 
approximate wage differentials of -$9.54, -$7.27, -$5.98, -$4.11, and -$2.96.  From top to bottom, the values of the unemploymentrate indicate the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the unemployment rate in the pooled cross-section.
0.009127 0.015148 0.026062 0.042796 0.068490
0.009337 0.015470 0.026563 0.043545 0.069629
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Table A29. Interaction Effects, Professional and Related Industry, Pooled Cross-Section with Unemployment 
Rate 
 
 
 
 
Table A30. Interaction Effects, Professional and Related Industry, Pooled Cross-Section with Leading Index 
 
 
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Unemp. Rate Cell
3.1% A 0.0059974 0.057129 0.0041699 0.048961 0.002466 0.039229 0.001508 0.031893 0.000870 0.025295
Avg.*
4.1% B 0.0055283 0.055182 0.0038314 0.047239 0.002257 0.037789 0.001375 0.030679 0.000791 0.024294
Avg.
6.1% C 0.0046867 0.051445 0.0032277 0.043940 0.001886 0.035040 0.001142 0.028365 0.000653 0.022392
Avg.
7.3% D 0.0042387 0.049301 0.0029084 0.042052 0.001691 0.033470 0.001020 0.027048 0.000581 0.021312
Avg.
9.6% E 3.49E-03 0.045392 0.0023755 0.038616 0.001369 0.030623 0.000820 0.024666 0.000463 0.019365
Avg.
Log Wage Differential
-0.1782866 -0.0771141 0.0628313 0.1883903 0.3236609
0.031563 0.026565 0.020847 0.016700 0.013083
1 2 3 4 5
0.028066 0.023584 0.018463 0.014754 0.011522
0.030355 0.025535 0.020023 0.016027 0.012543
0.024439 0.020496 0.015996 0.012743 0.009914
0.026770 0.022480 0.017581 0.014034 0.010947
For explanation of how to interpret these results, see footnote on Table A17.  From left to right, the values of the log wage differential indicate the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the predicted log wage differential in the pooled cross-section.  This corresponds to 
approximate wage differentials of -$1.74, -$0.75, $1.30, $2.58, and $5.56.  From top to bottom, the values of the unemploymentrate indicate the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the unemployment rate in the pooled cross-section.
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Leading Index Cell
0.51 A 0.0020927 0.036428 0.0017937 0.034122 0.0014320 0.031008 0.001166 0.028406 0.000952 0.026043
Avg.*
1.26 B 0.0028033 0.041226 0.0024104 0.038674 0.0019327 0.035220 0.001579 0.032328 0.001294 0.029695
Avg.
1.72 C 0.003343 0.044415 0.0028805 0.041703 0.0023163 0.038028 0.001898 0.034946 0.001558 0.032138
Avg.
2.27 D 0.004112 0.048485 0.0035527 0.045574 0.0028674 0.041622 0.002356 0.038303 0.001940 0.035273
Avg.
2.64 E 0.0047161 0.051387 0.0040824 0.048336 0.0033034 0.044192 0.002720 0.040706 0.002244 0.037521
Avg.
For explanation of how to interpret these results, see footnote on Table A17.  From left to right, the values of the log wage differential indicate the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentil, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the predicted log wage differential in the pooled cross-section.  This corresponds to 
approximate wage differentials of -$1.94, -$1.02, $0.51, $1.69, and $3.60.  From top to bottom, the values of the unemploymentrate indicate the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the unemployment rate in the pooled cross-section.
0.026298 0.024563 0.022245 0.020330 0.018606
0.028051 0.026209 0.023747 0.021713 0.019882
0.022015 0.020542 0.018576 0.016954 0.015494
0.023879 0.022292 0.020172 0.018422 0.016848
1 2 3 4 5
0.019260 0.017958 0.016220 0.014786 0.013498
Log Wage Differential
-0.191062 -0.1053805 0.018251 0.1296821 0.2384944
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Table A31. Interaction Effects, Services Industry, Pooled Cross-Section with Unemployment Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A32. Interaction Effects, Services Industry, Pooled Cross-Section with Leading Index 
 
 
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Unemp. Rate Cell
3.1% A 0.0426596 0.087289 0.0351066 0.076655 0.029660 0.068572 0.024584 0.060632 0.020956 0.054652
Avg.*
4.0% B 0.0414188 0.085582 0.0340431 0.075107 0.028731 0.067150 0.023786 0.059340 0.020256 0.053461
Avg.
5.8% C 0.0390223 0.082242 0.0319931 0.072083 0.026943 0.064376 0.022252 0.056821 0.018911 0.051142
Avg.
7.0% D 0.0374862 0.080071 0.030682 0.070119 0.025801 0.062577 0.021275 0.055189 0.018057 0.049640
Avg.
9.0% E 0.0350327 0.076548 0.0285926 0.066938 0.023986 0.059665 0.019725 0.052552 0.016703 0.047216
Avg.
Log Wage Differential
-0.6528068 -0.4444704 -0.2708984 -0.0843472 0.0691571
0.064974 0.055881 0.049116 0.042608 0.037804
1 2 3 4 5
0.060632 0.052038 0.045660 0.039537 0.035027
0.063500 0.054575 0.047941 0.041563 0.036858
0.055790 0.047765 0.041825 0.036138 0.031959
0.058778 0.050401 0.044189 0.038232 0.033848
For explanation of how to interpret these results, see footnote on Table A17.  From left to right, the values of the log wage differential indicate the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the predicted log wage differential in the pooled cross-section.  This corresponds to 
approximate wage differentials of -$8.65, -$4.47, -$3.12, -$0.62, and $0.57.  From top to bottom, the values of the unemploymentrate indicate the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the unemployment rate in the pooled cross-section.
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Leading Index Cell
0.47 A 0.0752863 0.077636 0.0684688 0.070730 0.0630284 0.065210 0.057545 0.059639 0.053806 0.055834
Avg.*
1.26 B 0.0763756 0.078738 0.0694818 0.071757 0.0639787 0.066175 0.058431 0.060539 0.054646 0.056689
Avg.
1.75 C 0.0770572 0.079428 0.070116 0.072399 0.0645738 0.066779 0.058985 0.061103 0.055172 0.057225
Avg.
2.31 D 0.0778419 0.080222 0.0708461 0.073139 0.065259 0.067474 0.059624 0.061752 0.055778 0.057841
Avg.
2.68 E 0.0783636 0.080750 0.0713317 0.073631 0.0657149 0.067937 0.060049 0.062184 0.056181 0.058252
Avg.
For explanation of how to interpret these results, see footnote on Table A17.  From left to right, the values of the log wage differential indicate the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentil, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the predicted log wage differential in the pooled cross-section.  This corresponds to 
approximate wage differentials of -$1.94, -$1.02, $0.51, $1.69, and $3.60.  From top to bottom, the values of the unemploymentrate indicate the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile of the unemployment rate in the pooled cross-section.
0.079032 0.071993 0.066367 0.060688 0.056810
0.079557 0.072481 0.066826 0.061116 0.057216
0.077557 0.070619 0.065077 0.059485 0.055667
0.078243 0.071258 0.065676 0.060044 0.056198
1 2 3 4 5
0.076461 0.069599 0.064119 0.058592 0.054820
Log Wage Differential
-0.9832497 -0.7466455 -0.5444499 -0.3264408 -0.1682181
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Table A33. OLS Regressions, Coefficients for Main Variables of Interest, 1990 Cross-Section and 1990-2000 
Pooled Cross-Sections 
 
Sample Model Nshift LEC Nshift*LEC
Cross-Section (Unemployment Rate) (1)  0.060***
(1a) 0.061** -0.003***
(2) -0.011 -0.003*** 0.001
Cross-Section (Leading Index) (1)  0.060***
(1a) 0.063** -0.053***
(2) 0.137** -0.053*** -0.001
Pooled Cross-Section (Unemployment Rate) (1) 0.018*
(1a) 0.019* -0.001***
(2) -0.016 -0.001*** 0.001
Pooled Cross-Section (Leading Index) (1) 0.018*
(1a) 0.018* -0.013***
(2) 0.044* -0.013*** -0.001
interaction between the unemployment rate and the night shift variable.
Coefficient
Levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  CS denotes results from the 1990 cross-section.  PCS denotes results
from the 1990-2000 pooled cross-section.  (1) indicates the simple model without the unemployment rate, (2) indicates the
simple model with the unemployment rate, and (3) indicates the simple model with both the unemployment rate and the
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Proof (Theorem 1, Section 4.3.4)   
Given ( | , , ),s d s di i i i i i iw w E w w LEC X Z   it follows from (14) that  
* * 2
( 1| , , , )
       1 [ ( | , , ) / var( | , , )(1 )]
s d
i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
P s w w LEC X Z
E s LEC X Z s LEC X Z 
  
  
                       (A1) 
where: 
2
* 2
2 2
( )
var( | , , )(1 ) 1 2(1 )( )
2
sv dv
i i i i sv dv
s d sd
s LEC X Z
 
   
  

     
 
                (A2) 
By Vijverberg (1993, p.71),   
sv dv sd sv dvc c         
and, therefore,  
2( ) 2 2( )sv dv sd sv dvc c                                                   (A3) 
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Table B1. NSLY79 Geographic Regions 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Northeast North Central South West
Connecticut Illinois Alabama Alaska
Maine Indiana Arkansas Arizona
Massachusetts Iowa Delaware California
New Hampshire Kansas District of Columbia Colorado
New Jersey Michigan Florida Hawaii
New York Minnesota Georgia Idaho
Pennsylvania Missouri Kentucky Montana
Rhode Island Nebraska Louisiana Nevada
Vermont North Dakota Maryland New Mexico
Ohio Mississippi Oregon
South Dakota North Carolina Utah
Wisconsin Oklahoma Washington
South Carolina Wyoming
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
West Virginia
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